Narissa Somji

The appellant, a domestic traveler residing on Cornwall Island, appealed his conviction for hindering an officer and evading compliance under the Customs Act after failing to attend a secondary inspection at a mixed-traffic corridor border crossing.

The appellant argued the primary border services officer lacked reasonable grounds to suspect a contravention of the Act when making the referral based solely on an automated license plate 'lookout'.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, holding that the threshold for a search under s. 99(1)(f) of the Customs Act does not apply to a mere referral to secondary inspection, which is a routine part of the screening process.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 14 years imprisonment imposed after conviction on 23 drug and weapons-related offences, including conspiracy to traffic heroin, cocaine, and methamphetamine, dangerous possession of weapons, conspiracy to assault, and money laundering.

The appellant raised three issues: (1) that the sentencing judge erred in applying the parity principle by giving him the same sentence as his co-conspirator despite allegedly playing a lesser role; (2) that he should have received enhanced credit for harsh pre-trial custody conditions; and (3) that he should have received credit for time spent on restrictive bail conditions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on the first two grounds but granted it in part on the third ground, allowing an additional 177 days credit for restrictive bail conditions.

The accused, a public servant at Library and Archives Canada, was charged under s. 80(1)(b) of the Financial Administration Act with making opportunity for another person to defraud the government in relation to the procurement of IT consulting services.

The Crown alleged that the accused's communications with a vendor gave the vendor an unfair competitive advantage and enabled bid-rigging.

The court found that while the accused's conduct may have reduced the openness and transparency of the procurement process, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that his actions created an opportunity to defraud the government of public money or that he had the requisite mens rea.

The accused was found not guilty.

The applicant sought a stay of proceedings under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging unreasonable delay.

The court applied the framework established in R. v. Jordan, calculating the total delay and deducting defence-attributable delay.

The court found that, after attributing 7 months of delay to the defence, the total delay fell below the 30-month presumptive ceiling for Superior Court matters.

Alternatively, even if the delay exceeded the ceiling, the case presented exceptional transitional circumstances due to its complexity and multi-accused nature, justifying a trial on the merits.

The application for a stay was dismissed.

In this criminal jury trial ruling, the accused sought to have the defence of mistake of fact put to the jury on bid-rigging charges under s. 47(2) of the Competition Act.

The court held that whether the RFPs were calls for bids or tenders was a question of fact, not law, and applied the air of reality test to determine whether the defence should be left with the jury.

On the totality of the evidence, including uncertainty in the procurement documents and witness evidence, the court found an evidentiary foundation for an honest mistaken belief.

The jury was therefore permitted to consider the mistake of fact defence in relation to the nature of the RFPs.

On a mid-trial application for a directed verdict, a self-represented accused sought acquittal on bid-rigging and conspiracy counts arising from a multi-accused prosecution concerning a Transport Canada RFP.

Applying the directed verdict standard, the court held that the Crown's case against the moving party rested on thin direct evidence and circumstantial inferences that were not reasonably available on the whole of the record.

The evidence established only knowledge of and limited participation in his company's own joint venture proposal, which was not illegal.

There was no evidence capable of supporting membership in the larger alleged three-bid scheme or conspiracy.

A directed verdict of acquittal was entered on both counts.

In a criminal prosecution alleging bid-rigging and conspiracy arising from multiple federal government IT procurement processes, the Crown moved for a similar fact ruling permitting the jury to use evidence on one count across other counts against the same accused.

Applying the governing similar fact evidence framework, the court held that such evidence is presumptively inadmissible unless its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect and it is sufficiently connected to a live issue.

The court found minimal moral prejudice because the jury had already heard the impugned evidence, but concluded that significant differences among the three groups of procurements reduced the probative value of using the evidence across all procurements.

The motion was therefore granted only in part, limited to the CBSA RFPs and subject to further submissions after the defence evidence.

Accused charged with bid‑rigging and conspiracy challenged the constitutionality of s. 69(2) of the Competition Act, which deemed certain documents and records found in possession of a “participant” to constitute prima facie proof of knowledge and related facts.

The applicants argued the provision created evidentiary and legal presumptions that effectively shifted the burden of proof onto the accused, contrary to the presumption of innocence under ss. 7 and 11(d) of the Charter.

The court held that the section required the trier of fact to accept knowledge of documents as proven and could compel the accused to respond before the Crown proved guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The provision therefore infringed the presumption of innocence and fundamental justice and was not justified under s. 1 of the Charter.

Section 69(2) was declared of no force or effect in criminal proceedings, though its use in Competition Tribunal proceedings was unaffected.

The applicants, who were self-represented accused in a complex multi-party jury trial for bid-rigging, brought an application under s. 650(2)(b) of the Criminal Code to be absent from portions of the trial that did not directly relate to the charges against them.

They argued that attending the entire 15-week trial would cause significant financial and personal hardship.

The Crown opposed their absence unless strict conditions were met.

The court found that while the applicants established substantial cause for their absence, their self-represented status posed a risk to trial fairness and efficiency.

The court granted the application on the strict condition that the applicants retain counsel to be present in court during their absence and sign a fully informed waiver.

Multiple accused charged with bid-rigging and conspiracy to bid-rig under the Competition Act and Criminal Code brought applications under ss. 11(b) and 24(1) of the Charter seeking a stay of proceedings for unreasonable delay.

The prosecution involved a large multi‑accused investigation into coordinated bids for federal government IT contracts and involved extensive disclosure and lengthy preliminary inquiry proceedings.

The court analyzed delay using the framework from R. v. Morin and classified various periods as inherent delay, waiver by the accused, or limited systemic delay.

Most of the post‑charge delay was attributable to the complexity of the case and to the accused’s consent to postponement pending certiorari and appellate proceedings.

The applicants failed to demonstrate actual prejudice or unreasonable systemic delay.