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Pleadings in land claim found to seek only monetary relief, not recovery of Crown lands.
At a trial management conference, an issue arose as to whether the plaintiff's pleadings in an Indigenous land claim action sought the recovery of Crown lands or merely monetary relief for alleged breaches of duty.
The court ruled that determining this issue before trial was necessary.
Analyzing the pleadings, the court found the claim exclusively sought equitable compensation, damages, and accounting, and did not properly plead any present-day interest in or right to recover actual Crown land in the Haldimand Tract.
The court issued procedural directions for upcoming out-of-court expert examinations and the appointment of a pre-trial judge.
This endorsement from a case conference addressed several procedural issues in a complex litigation involving Indigenous land claims.
The court provided directions regarding preparatory materials for upcoming out-of-court expert examinations, including the appointment of a hybrid commissioner and deadlines for expert report summaries and legal arguments.
The court also addressed a dispute regarding the scope of cross-examination of an expert witness, directing the parties to narrow issues concerning adversity of interest before seeking further judicial determination.
Finally, the court confirmed the appointment of a pre-trial judge and scheduled the next case conference.
The court adjourned a case conference to allow parties to resolve disputes over expert reports and trial length.
This endorsement from a case conference addresses procedural issues in a complex litigation, specifically disputes regarding the admissibility of expert reports and estimates of trial length.
The court noted progress in resolving these issues and scheduled a further case conference to revisit them and receive an update on an expert witness's health.
The court issued procedural directions regarding expert evidence scheduling, trial timetables, and trial presentation software.
This endorsement from a case conference addresses several procedural issues in a complex litigation, including the taking of expert evidence before trial, Canada's missed deadline for an expert report, the appointment of pre-trial and trial judges, the use of trial presentation software, and Ontario's Crown immunity defence.
The court scheduled a motion for expert evidence and provided directions for parties to prepare a trial timetable and discuss judicial assistance.
The court set a litigation timetable prioritizing realistic deadlines and accommodating expert illness.
This case management conference endorsement addresses the timetable for a complex action, primarily focusing on the delivery of expert reports and amended pleadings.
The court resolved disagreements between the plaintiff, defendants, and intervener regarding deadlines for expert reports, particularly those from the Mississaugas of the Credit First Nation (MCFN) and experts who had been ill.
The court also set a deadline for Ontario's defence to Canada's cross-claim, prioritizing realistic timelines and efficiency over the plaintiff's desire for earlier closures.
Elevated costs of $460,000 awarded to successful party on intervention motion, apportioned among proposed intervener and defendants.
Following the dismissal of a proposed intervener's motion to intervene, the successful party and another intervener sought costs.
The court awarded the successful party elevated costs fixed at $460,000, apportioning liability among the proposed intervener (65%) and the two defendants (17.5% each) due to the defendants' delayed positions which complicated the motion.
The second intervener was awarded $12,500 in costs against the proposed intervener, limited to costs incurred after it first requested them in its factum.
Motion to amend statement of claim granted and cross-motion to strike pleadings by example dismissed.
The plaintiff, Six Nations of the Grand River Band of Indians, brought a motion to amend its statement of claim in a long-standing action concerning the Haldimand Tract.
The defendants did not oppose the amendments but sought extensive time to deliver responding expert reports.
The Attorney General of Canada brought a cross-motion to strike portions of the claim that pleaded breaches of duty 'by example'.
The court dismissed the cross-motion, finding that pleading by example was appropriate given the plaintiff's claim for a complete accounting.
The court granted the motion to amend and set a timeline for the defendants to deliver responding expert evidence, rejecting the defendants' request for a multi-year extension based on their internal retention processes.
Costs of $90,000 were awarded to the plaintiff.
The court granted MCFN and Men's Fire leave to intervene but dismissed HDI's intervention motion as an abuse of process.
This endorsement addresses three motions to intervene in a complex, long-standing action by the Six Nations of the Grand River Band of Indians (SNGR) against the Crown for breaches of duty and treaty obligations related to the Haldimand Proclamation.
The Haudenosaunee Development Institute (HDI) sought to intervene as a party, arguing it represented the true rights-holder and aimed to derail the litigation in favor of nation-to-nation negotiations.
The Mississaugas of the Credit First Nation (MCFN) sought to intervene as a party due to concerns about SNGR's expert evidence impacting MCFN's history and treaty rights.
Men's Fire of the Six Nations Grand River Territory sought to intervene in HDI's motion to oppose it.
The court granted Men's Fire leave to intervene in HDI's motion, denied HDI's motion to intervene in the main action (finding its interest not genuine, an abuse of process, and causing undue delay), and granted MCFN's motion to intervene in the main action with specific terms to manage its participation.
The court ordered Canada to pay $150,000 in interim costs for pre-trial expert examinations but awarded no costs for the motion.
The Attorney General of Canada brought a motion seeking leave to examine three expert witnesses before trial.
The parties largely resolved the motion, leaving the court to adjudicate the quantum of interim costs payable by Canada to the plaintiff (Six Nations of the Grand River Band of Indians) and the costs of the motion.
The court awarded the plaintiff $150,000 in interim costs to indemnify for financial prejudice due to duplicated work and early incurred expenses from the pre-trial examinations.
The court declined to award costs for the motion itself, finding that all parties had compromised their positions and no exceptional circumstances warranted a costs award.
The court denied the defendants' request to vacate expert report deadlines pending a pleadings motion.
This endorsement from a case management conference addressed the timing for the delivery of the defendants' expert reports and the scheduling of motions to amend and strike pleadings.
The defendants sought to vacate expert report deadlines, arguing new claims required new experts.
The court largely denied this, granting only a brief extension for expert reports to June 9, 2023, with an exception for an ill expert.
The court also granted leave for the defendants' cross-motion to strike portions of the pleading, ordering it to be heard concurrently with the plaintiff's motion for leave to amend on June 30, 2023, emphasizing the need to settle pleading propriety before summer.
The court scheduled a motion to amend pleadings and required specific justifications before extending the expert report deadline.
This case management conference addressed the plaintiff's proposed amended statement of claim and the defendants' request to vary the timetable for expert reports.
The court scheduled the motion to amend the statement of claim.
Regarding the expert reports, the court was prepared to consider an extension but required more specific information from the defendants regarding which reports needed expansion, why, and the estimated time required, rather than vacating the date outright.
A further case management conference was scheduled to address the expert report timetable.
An unrecognized First Nation was granted leave to intervene in a treaty action to protect its contingent collective interest, subject to strict conditions.
Namaygoosisagagun Ojibway Nation sought leave to intervene in the Robinson Superior Treaty action under Rule 13.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
The plaintiffs and Gull Bay First Nation opposed the intervention, arguing that Namaygoosisagagun was not a recognized band and lacked a collective interest.
The Crown defendants consented with provisos to prevent litigation of Namaygoosisagagun's band status or s. 35 rights within this proceeding.
The court granted leave to intervene, finding that Namaygoosisagagun had a contingent collective interest that met the low threshold for intervention, but imposed strict conditions prohibiting them from seeking to prove or determine issues related to their band status, s. 35 rights, or beneficiary status under the Treaty, and from making submissions conflicting with the plaintiffs' position on distribution.
The court varied its previous costs order to align with a prior agreement between the parties.
This is a costs endorsement following a successful appeal by the Attorney General of Canada and several First Nations against the Estate of William Albin Herold.
The Court of Appeal had previously allowed the appeals and set aside the lower court orders.
In this endorsement, the court fixed the costs of the proceedings below at $154,530.76, awarded to the appellant First Nations, as the Attorney General of Canada did not seek costs below.
The court also varied its previous appeal costs award, granting the full $43,000 (inclusive of disbursements and taxes) to the appellant First Nations, with no costs awarded to the Attorney General of Canada on appeal, in accordance with a prior agreement between the parties.
The Court of Appeal held that an 1868 Crown grant did not convey ownership of islands that had separated from the mainland due to flooding.
The Estate of William Albin Herold claimed ownership of three islands in Lake Katchewanooka, arguing they were conveyed as part of Lot 35 by Letters Patent in 1868, despite having separated from the mainland due to rising water levels.
The application judge found in favour of the Estate, applying a "Flooding Principle" to fix the boundary and concluding that treaties with First Nations did not affect the Crown's right to sell.
The Court of Appeal allowed the appeals by the First Nations and the Attorney General of Canada, finding that the application judge made extricable errors of law by failing to objectively ascertain the parties' intentions in the Letters Patent, misapplying the Flooding Principle, and not properly considering the Crown's treaty obligations.
The appellate court concluded that the Letters Patent did not convey the islands, as they were physically separate, separately identified, and subject to specific Crown obligations under Treaty 78.
Duty to consult does not apply to Parliament’s law-making process.
An Indigenous rights-holder sought judicial review over the federal law-making process, alleging a duty to consult before introduction and enactment of omnibus environmental legislation that could affect Treaty 8 harvesting rights.
A majority held the reviewing court lacked jurisdiction under the Federal Courts Act because the impugned ministerial conduct was legislative in character and not reviewable as action of a federal board, commission, or tribunal.
The Court further held the duty to consult does not attach to the legislative process itself, given separation of powers, parliamentary sovereignty, and parliamentary privilege.
The appeal was dismissed, while leaving open that enacted legislation may still be challenged through constitutional and other established remedies where rights are adversely affected.
Mining exploration permit set aside due to Crown's failure to fulfill its duty to consult.
The applicant First Nation sought judicial review of a decision by the Director of Exploration granting a mining exploration permit to a corporate respondent on lands within the applicant's traditional territory.
The applicant argued the Crown failed to properly discharge its duty to consult.
The Divisional Court found that the Crown and its delegate had created clear expectations for a community meeting and a Memorandum of Understanding, but abruptly changed course without explanation to expedite the permit for commercial reasons.
The court held that the consultation process lacked genuine engagement and failed to maintain the honour of the Crown.
The application was granted, the permit was set aside, and the matter was remitted for adequate consultation.
Pleading restored after concession that core treaty claims were justiciable.
On a Rule 21.01 appeal, the court held that the moving party's representative treaty claim was not entirely non-justiciable.
After the respondent conceded on appeal that core claims, including a declaration about the meaning of the Treaty 3 schools provision, were justiciable, the court found it unfair to maintain an order striking the entire pleading without identifying the allegedly non-justiciable portions.
The order striking the statement of claim and dismissing the action was set aside without prejudice to a more targeted future challenge.
The court upheld the motion judge's conditions for proceeding representatively, requiring authorization from all 28 bands or joinder of non-authorizing bands, granted the requested plaintiff substitution amendment, and awarded appeal costs.
Individual Aboriginal members' assertion of treaty rights as a defence to a tort action constituted an abuse of process.
The appellants, individual members of the Fort Nelson First Nation, blocked a logging company's access to timber sites after the Crown granted logging licences.
Sued in tort, they defended on the basis that the licences were issued in breach of the duty to consult and violated their treaty rights under Treaty No. 8.
The Supreme Court of Canada held that the duty to consult is owed to the Aboriginal group collectively, and absent authorization from the First Nation, individual members cannot assert a breach of that duty on their own.
The Court declined to make a definitive pronouncement on whether individual members could assert treaty rights in these circumstances, but ultimately dismissed the appeal on the basis that raising the defences constituted an abuse of process, as the appellants had failed to challenge the licences when issued and instead resorted to self-help by blockading access.
Public interest Aboriginal rights litigation justified no costs despite Crown success.
Following the dismissal of an action and related motions concerning Treaty 3 beneficiaries and Aboriginal rights litigation, the successful government defendant sought costs of approximately $31,000 on a partial indemnity basis.
The plaintiffs argued that the matter constituted public interest litigation raising novel issues regarding civil procedure for Aboriginal rights claims, and that no costs should be awarded.
The court held that the litigation raised significant public interest considerations and novel legal questions concerning the procedural framework for litigating Aboriginal rights.
Exercising its discretion on costs, the court declined to apply the traditional rule that costs follow the event in order to avoid discouraging public interest litigation.
No order as to costs was made.
Ontario has the authority to take up Treaty 3 lands without federal approval.
The plaintiffs, members of the Grassy Narrows First Nation, brought an action alleging that Ontario's issuance of a forestry licence in the Keewatin portion of Treaty 3 lands violated their treaty harvesting rights.
The trial judge found that Ontario could not take up lands in the Keewatin territory without Canada's approval.
The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that upon the transfer of beneficial ownership of the Keewatin lands to Ontario in 1912 pursuant to s. 109 of the Constitution Act, 1867, Ontario acquired the right to take up lands under the treaty without federal approval.
The Court found that the trial judge erred in interpreting the treaty as requiring a two-step authorization process and in finding that s. 91(24) gave Canada a continuing supervisory role over provincial land use.