CITATION: Six Nations v. Canada et al., 2026 ONSC 4561

COURT FILE NO.: CV-18-00594281

DATE: 20260812

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO

RE: SIX NATIONS OF THE GRAND RIVER BAND OF INDIANS, Plaintiff

AND:

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA and HIS MAJESTY THE KING IN RIGHT OF ONTARIO, Defendants

AND:

MISSISSAUGAS OF THE CREDIT FIRST NATIONS, Intervenor

BEFORE: Parghi J.

COUNSEL: Iris Antonios, Max Shapiro, Gregory Sheppard, Sanjit Rajayer, Alexandra Psellas, Brittany Town, and Robert Janes, for the Plaintiff

Tania Mitchell, Lauri Miller, Patrice Robinson, Maria Vujnovic, Tanya Muthusamipillai, Krystene Swaby, Cameron Fiske, Edward Harrison, Sarah Kanko, Myra Sivaloganathan, Elizabeth Chan, Sara Daulet, and Yazan Matarieh, for the Defendant The Attorney General of Canada

Manizeh Fancy, David Feliciant, Jacqueline Wall, Jennifer Le Pan, Julia McRandall, Aaron Grimes, Serena Yun, David Hyun, Liam Dart, and Bryn Gray, for the Defendant His Majesty the King in Right of Ontario

Nuri Frame, Lillianne Cadieux-Shaw, Conner Sipa, and Troy Klassen, for the Intervenor, Mississaugas of the Credit First Nations

HEARD: June 4, June 11 and August 5, 2026 (oral submissions); and June 24, July 6, and July 10, 2026 (written submissions)

ENDORSEMENT

[1] At issue in this action is whether the 1784 Haldimand Proclamation created a roughly 950,000-acre reserve of land along the Grand River for the Six Nations of the Grand River Band of Indians (the “Six Nations”). The Six Nations asserts that the Haldimand Proclamation did create such a reserve, or, alternatively, created an obligation on the part of the Crown to establish such a reserve. In its Second Fresh as Amended Statement of Claim amended on September 21, 2023 (the “Claim”), the Six Nations says the Crown promised it that land, referred to as the “Haldimand Tract,” and owed it various legal duties in respect of that land, namely Reserve Land Duties, Reserve Creation Duties, Surrender Duties, Surrender Implementation Duties, Appropriation Duties, and Indian Monies Management Duties, each of which is defined in the Claim. The Six Nations says the Crown breached those legal duties as well as its fiduciary duties and/or treaty obligations, including by making several invalid dispositions (i.e., transfers) of land in the Haldimand Tract to third parties. The Six Nations seeks various remedies.

[2] The action was commenced in 1995. It is now proceeding to a bifurcated trial, with Phase I, the liability phase, scheduled to commence in October 2026 and, by the parties’ estimation, to take roughly 2.5 years to conclude.

[3] At the inaugural trial management conference on April 30, 2026, I asked the parties to confirm my understanding that the remedies sought by the Six Nations in the action are monetary in nature and that the Six Nations does not assert an interest in, or seek to recover, any land in the Haldimand Tract currently held by the Crown. In the discussion that ensued, it became clear that this point is very much in dispute. The Six Nations takes the view that it has pleaded in the Claim and is properly seeking land-related remedies as against the Crown. Ontario and Canada assert that the Claim only seeks damages for asserted breaches by the Crown of its various legal duties and, in the alternative, an accounting for the return of monies that belong to the Six Nations. They say that the Six Nations has claimed neither a current interest in Crown land in the Haldimand Tract nor the ultimate restoration of such land to the Six Nations.

[4] By contrast, there is agreement among the parties that no interest is being advanced by the Six Nations in respect of land held by third parties. The only dispute pertains to lands held by the Crown.

[5] There was a further discussion of this issue, which I will refer to as the “Crown lands issue,” at the subsequent trial management conference on June 4, 2026. The parties, unable to resolve the Crown lands issue through further discussion, provided brief oral submissions on the issue at another trial management conference on June 11. I then issued an endorsement requesting submissions from the parties as to “whether the [C]laim as pleaded properly seeks the recovery of land currently held by the Crown.” The parties provided written submissions and appeared before me again on August 5 to provide any submissions they had not yet had the chance to make, and to answer questions from the court.

[6] Having now considered the various written and oral submissions, I conclude, for the reasons below, that the Claim does not advance any interest in, or seek to recover, any land in the Haldimand Tract currently held by the Crown.

Initial considerations

The appropriateness of determining the issue now

[7] The parties disagree on whether I may make a ruling on this issue at this stage of the proceedings. The Six Nations submits that I cannot, and that the scope of pleadings is an issue to be addressed at trial if and as it arises.

[8] I am, respectfully, unable to agree. The Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194 are clear that, as the trial judge in this matter, I may hold a conference “to consider any matter that may assist in the just, most expeditious and least expensive disposition of the proceeding” (r. 50.10(2)). I may give directions and make orders for interlocutory relief where notice has been given and it is appropriate to do so (rr. 50.13(6)(c) and 50.13(6)(d)(i)).

[9] In my view, the proper interpretation of the pleadings and the nature and scope of the relief sought is a fundamental issue that goes to the heart of the upcoming trial. It therefore should be clarified before the trial commences, and, indeed, as soon as possible. While Phase I of the trial will result only in declaratory relief, and all remaining remedies are to be addressed during Phase II, in my view that does not mean that the scope of the relief sought should be clarified only at Phase II. The parties, and the court, should understand the nature and scope of the ultimate relief being sought from the very outset of trial. Otherwise, there is a risk that Canada and Ontario will not know precisely what they are defending and the court will not know what precisely is being tried and what exactly the declaratory relief to be granted means. Nor would it be appropriate for the pleadings to be clarified part-way through trial, after some relief has been granted (the declarations sought in Phase I of trial) but before the remaining relief sought has been adjudicated.

[10] It is also important to clarify the Crown lands issue before the trial commences given the remarkable length and complexity of the case, the significant volume of judicial and party resources being devoted to it, and the resulting importance of ensuring that matters unfold smoothly during trial. If this issue is not resolved now, it will not go away: it will instead arise during trial, necessitating adjournments, delay, and wasted costs, undermining the parties’ trial preparation efforts, and potentially affecting the ability of the parties to effectively advance or defend the case.

[11] Finally, I am satisfied that the Crown lands issue is appropriately addressed at this stage by way of a trial management conference. The parties have had notice of my concerns and my intention to issue a decision on the issue. They have had the opportunity to provide multiple written and oral submissions. They have availed themselves of those opportunities.

The “compromise” proposed by the Six Nations

[12] The Six Nations states in its written submissions that it “suspects there are limited Crown lands left in the Haldimand Tract,” with the result that any claims to Crown lands may be of little “practical import” in Phase II of trial. As such, and in the interests of protecting the current October 4, 2026 trial date, the Six Nations offers to proceed on the basis that it does not seek to recover Crown lands in this action. It proposes that I issue an endorsement containing language to the effect that the Six Nations “does not seek to have the Court determine that any existing Crown land is reserve land or may be recovered as reserve land in this action.” It further proposes that if, in Phase I of trial, the Court grants a declaration that the Haldimand Tract was set aside or set apart as a reserve, the judgment include language specifying that such a declaration “will not have the effect of recognizing or designating any land” outside of the existing reserves of the Six Nations and the Mississauga of the Credit First Nation “as being presently reserve land”.

[13] The Six Nations goes on to propose, in the same sentence, that it would not seek any recognition of land as presently being reserve land unless and until a finding to this effect were made in Phase II of trial, seemingly leaving open that remedy for a later day. But subsequently, in oral submissions, counsel for the Six Nations stated that it is not seeking an order even in Phase II of trial for any land to be conveyed back to reserve status.

[14] The Six Nations states in its written submissions that this “clarification” is not “a concession that it does not have ongoing interests in the whole of the Haldimand Tract outside the context of this litigation.” The Six Nations “does assert other interests in the Haldimand Tract and the larger territory around the Haldimand Tract,” although it advances no claims based upon those rights in this action.

[15] Ontario and Canada submit that this “compromise” is not satisfactory. Ontario says this action is an “exhaustive” claim by the Six Nations in respect of any and all of its interests in the Haldimand Tract. It says the Six Nations must advance in this proceeding all claims in respect of the land that it could have advanced with the exercise of due diligence, and that the “compromise” the Six Nations now offers “raises the application of res judicata, cause of action estoppel, issue estoppel and abuse of process.” Canada echoes this concern, submitting that these proceedings “determine all the Plaintiff’s interests in the Haldimand Tract” and that the Six Nations’ proposed “clarification” of the Claim “is clearly meant to” improperly “leave the door open for future claims” and “litigation by installment”.

[16] To the extent that the Six Nations “compromise” would have me not rule on the relief that is and is not sought by the Claim, I am unable to accept the “compromise.” Given the significance and complexity of the issues in the litigation, the duration of this case, and the goal of efficiency in litigation, the question of what this case is and is not about is one that should be addressed head-on before litigation commences. It should not be sidestepped.

[17] Nor, however, do I accept Ontario’s and Canada’s submissions on this point. My request for clarity on the “Crown lands” issue is not (and should not be interpreted by Ontario and Canada as) an opportunity to constrain the future ability of the Six Nations to litigate in respect of the Haldimand Tract, including in respect of any claim to Crown lands. To be clear, I make no ruling on whether any subsequent claims advanced by the Six Nations in respect of the land at issue in this action will give rise to res judicata or abuse of process concerns regarding any subsequent claim to Crown lands. Indeed, as Ontario and Canada acknowledged in response to my questions, such concerns would only crystallize if and when a second, allegedly duplicative or abusive, proceeding were commenced. Until then, such concerns are purely speculative, and it would be improper for me to address them.

The parties’ positions

The Six Nations

[18] The Six Nations says it is clear that the Claim not only seeks damages but also advances an interest in respect of Crown land.

[19] It submits that its interest in Crown land is expressly pleaded in the request in subparagraphs 1(e) and 1(f) of the Claim for a remedy of accounting and a declaration that the Crown must restore to the Six Nations Trust “all assets which were not received but ought to have been received, managed or held by the Crown for the benefit of the Six Nations of the Grand River”. The Claim defines “assets” in subparagraph 1(e) as “all property, interests in property, money or other assets … which were or ought to have been received, managed or held by the” Crown “for the benefit of the Six Nations”. The Six Nations states that the Claim also pleads, in paragraph 6, that the Crown was subject at all material times to hold, protect, manage and care for the lands, personal property and all other assets of the Six Nations for the benefit of the Six Nations. It submits that, read in context, the term “assets” includes lands, and that read together, these provisions make clear that it is seeking the restoration of land assets.

[20] The Six Nations says its interest in Crown land is implicit in, and a necessary consequence of, its overall position in this action. It reasons that legal title to the Haldimand Tract was vested in the Crown. Since some of the land in the Haldimand Tract was not validly surrendered, any Crown land in the Haldimand Tract that became reserve land in 1784 through the Haldimand Proclamation, and which was not subsequently validly surrendered or otherwise appropriated to another use, remains reserve land today. In the words of the Six Nations, “[t]his conclusion follows as a consequence of Crown land being made a reserve and not [validly] surrendered or otherwise appropriated” (emphasis in original). As such, the Claim does properly plead a “claim that could result in the recognition of a current reserve interest in Crown lands” during Phase I “and the recovery of Crown lands” during Phase II.

[21] The Six Nations takes the view that the particulars of its interest in Crown land cannot be delineated until Phase II. It submits that the “issue of which specific Crown lands are still reserve lands today may be relevant at Phase II of the trial on remedies, for example if the defendants argue that they do not owe compensation for a particular parcel of Crown land in the Haldimand Tract because it is still reserve land” (emphasis in original). However, the Six Nations “does not know or have an inventory of Crown lands within the Haldimand Tract, nor does [it] know what use is presently being made of any such lands.” This is because “the knowledge necessary to answer this question is in the Crown’s possession,” and consequently “it has been impossible for the [Six Nations] to know or specify which Crown lands may be potentially available for recovery.”

Ontario and Canada

[22] Ontario and Canada assert that the Claim does not sufficiently plead a claim for the “restoration” or “return” of Crown lands, or any present-day interest in Crown lands that would require their “restoration” or “return” to the Six Nations. They say any such claim goes “significantly beyond what is specifically pleaded” in the Claim and that the action primarily seeks monetary compensation only. They say the Claim does not properly identify the type of interest the Six Nations claims in land in the Haldimand Tract, or the specific land in respect of which it claims such an interest.

[23] They reject the suggestion by the Six Nations that its claim of an interest in the land is a necessary consequence of the relief sought and therefore properly pleaded. Canada contrasts the language of the Claim with the pleadings in other cases in which, according to Canada, a claimant First Nation properly pleaded an interest in land. Canada submits that in those other cases, “[n]one of the remedies sought … were implied. They were expressly pleaded, clearly outlined the type of interest being sought in land, and clearly demarcated and identified the lands sought to be restored in kind.” In one such case, the claim sought declarations that certain lands had not been validly surrendered, that those lands formed part of the reserve at issue, and that all land conveyance instruments were null and void (Chippewas of Sarnia v. Canada (Attorney General) (2000), 2000 CanLII 16991 (ON CA), 51 O.R. (3d) 641 (C.A.), at paras. 1-3, 9). The Court of Appeal for Ontario observed that the claimant First Nation had sought “a remedy related to the return of the lands themselves” in addition to a claim for damages from the Crown (at paras. 245-246). In another case, the claimant First Nation pleaded that certain lands had been improperly excluded from its reserve and sought a declaration that the disputed land formed part of its reserve, together with damages for the Crown’s alleged breach of its fiduciary duties in excluding those lands from the reserve (Chippewas of Saugeen First Nation v. South Bruce Peninsula (Town), 2024 ONCA 884, 502 D.L.R. (4th) 261, at para. 1). Canada states that the Six Nations, unlike the claimant First Nations in these other cases, has not properly pleaded the land-related remedies it now says it is seeking.

[24] Canada submits that it has not defended this action as a claim for continuing rights to land in the Haldimand Tract and the restoration of Crown land in kind. It says such a defence could not be provided in the absence of a pleading from the Six Nations that specifies the lands in which the Six Nations claims a present-day interest. Canada states it has not prepared evidence in respect of its property rights and does not know what would be involved in collecting such evidence.

[25] Ontario and Canada dispute the Six Nations’ suggestion that the specific lands the Six Nations seeks will only be ascertainable at Phase II. Canada states this position is improper “case splitting” and will impede the goal of bifurcation, which is to sequence the hearing of the case in a way that supports the administration of justice. It submits that the remedy sought must be properly pleaded so that in Phase I “the defendants may argue for appropriate declarations, third parties are able to assess whether their rights may be impacted by the case, and the Court is able to exercise its discretion to issue Phase I declarations prudently.”

Analysis

[26] Both sides, in their submissions on what relief the Claim seeks, have sought to rely on materials other than the Claim itself. For instance, they have invoked correspondence and other “representations” between the parties, going as far back to the initial commencement of the action in 1995, which they say support their respective interpretations of the Claim.

[27] I decline to consider these extrinsic materials. What the Claim seeks is best determined with reference to the language of the Claim itself. In any event, it would not have assisted me to consider extrinsic materials, because viewed as a whole, the extrinsic materials do not point to one clear interpretation of the relief sought in the Claim.

[28] I therefore focus my analysis on the wording of the Claim itself, with reference to the requirements for pleadings set forth in the Rules of Civil Procedure.

[29] Subrule 25.06(9) provides that “[w]here a pleading contains a claim for relief, the nature of the relief claimed shall be specified”. The Supreme Court of Canada has held that the Rules apply even when the court is characterizing claims in “Aboriginal cases,” where the rules are “generously interpreted … to facilitate the resolution in the public interest of the underlying controversies” (Lax Kw’alaams Indian Band v. Canada (Attorney General), 2011 SCC 56, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 535, at para. 40).

[30] Pleadings serve several important purposes, including defining the issues “with clarity and precision,” giving opposing parties “fair notice of the precise case” to meet and “the precise remedies sought,” facilitating settlement, and assisting the court in investigating the truth and the allegations made (National Trust Co. v. Furbacher, [1994] O.J. No. 2385 (Gen. Div.), at p. 17; see also Lax Kw’alaams, at para. 43).

[31] These requirements make clear that it is not sufficient to simply say that a particular form of relief is necessarily implied in an action. Relief must be expressly and properly pleaded in the manner described above.

[32] In my respectful view, the Claim does not plead any present-day interest in Crown lands by the Six Nations in a manner that meets these requirements.

[33] The main relief sought is articulated in subparagraph 1(d) of the Claim, which pleads that the Six Nations claims “equitable compensation and/or damages arising from” Canada’s and/or Ontario’s alleged “breaches of fiduciary duty and/or treaty obligations”. This request for relief expressly and clearly refers to monetary relief, and monetary relief alone. It does not refer to any “return” or “restoration” of the land.

[34] This language is echoed in paragraph 17.2, which pleads that “[a]s a result of the appropriation of” certain lands in the Haldimand Tract “for its own use and benefit and the consequent breach of either the Reserve Land Duties or the Reserve Creation Duties, the Crown is liable to pay equitable damages or equitable compensation for the fair market value of the” lands. Again, no interest in the land or entitlement to a land-based remedy is sought.

[35] The alternative relief claimed, pleaded in subparagraphs 1(e) and (f), is an accounting and a return of “assets”.

[36] The Six Nations claims in subparagraph 1(e), in the alternative to the claim for equitable compensation and/or damages in subparagraph 1(d), “a declaration” that Ontario and/or Canada are “obliged to account to the Six Nations … for all property, interests in property, money or other assets (‘assets’) which were or ought to have been received, managed or held by” the Crown “for the benefit of the Six Nations”. This request for an accounting is neither an assertion of an interest in land nor a claim to “recover” it.

[37] The Six Nations claims in subparagraph 1(f), “if necessary, a declaration” that Ontario and/or Canada “must restore to the Six Nations Trust … all assets which were not received but ought to have been received, managed or held by the Crown for the benefit of the Six Nations … or the value thereof”. Importantly, the Six Nations Trust is defined in paragraph 23 of the Claim to mean the “proceeds” of the “Dispositions.” The “Dispositions,” in turn, are defined in paragraph 22 as “various grants, sales, leases, permits or other dispositions … which purported to grant the title to, rights of possession, occupation, use or other interests in, parts of the Haldimand Tract or Simcoe Patent Lands” to third parties.

[38] These definitions make clear that even though subparagraph 1(e) of the Claim defines “assets” as including property, the Six Nations Trust holds only the funds from transfers of land in the Haldimand Tract to third parties (i.e. dispositions) and does not hold any real property. Where a parcel of land ought to have been managed or held by the Crown for the benefit of the Six Nations, the Six Nations Trust could hold “the value thereof,” but, by its very definition, could not hold the property itself. As such, whatever assets the court orders to be “restored” to the Trust cannot consist of real property. Those assets can only be monetary, based on the language of and definitions within the Claim itself. It follows that a return of “assets” from the Six Nations Trust is by definition only a form of monetary relief and cannot include a return of the lands in the Haldimand Tract that were transferred.

[39] I accordingly conclude that the primary relief claimed, of equitable compensation and/or damages, and the alternative relief claimed, of accountings and/or the return of assets to the Six Nations Trust, are all forms of monetary relief. As such, the Claim does not assert any present-day interest in or right to “recover” land in the Haldimand Tract.

[40] The preceding subparagraphs of the Claim do not change this analysis. Subparagraphs 1(a) through (c) plead that the Six Nations claims:

1(a) A declaration that the Haldimand Proclamation set apart or aside lands whose legal title was vested in the Crown extending for six miles from each side of the Grand River beginning at Lake Erie and extending in that proportion to the head of the Grand River (the “Haldimand Tract”) for the use and benefit of the Six Nations of the Grand River, and that this gave rise to the Reserve Land Duties, Surrender Duties, Surrender Implementation Duties, Appropriation Duties and Indian Monies Management Duties defined further below in this Statement of Claim ….

(b) A declaration that, if the Haldimand Proclamation did not set aside the Haldimand Tract as a Reserve … in 1784, that it obliged the Crown to make the Haldimand Tract a Reserve and gave rise to the Reserve Creation Duties, Reserve Land Duties, Surrender Duties, Surrender Implementation Duties, Appropriation Duties and Indian Monies Management Duties defined further below in this Statement of Claim ….

(c) Declarations that one or both of the Defendants breached fiduciary and/or treaty obligations owing to the Six Nations of the Grand River, as described herein ….

[41] Read in the context of the Claim as a whole, these introductory subparagraphs do not assert a present-day Six Nations interest in the land in the Haldimand Tract. Rather, they describe the interest that the Six Nations say they had in that land in the past. They articulate the duties to which the Six Nations say the Crown was subject as a consequence of the Six Nations’ past interest in the land. They identify the ways in which the Six Nations says the Crown breached those duties. They seek declarations describing those past interests, duties, and breaches, which form the basis of the requests for monetary relief pleaded immediately afterward in subparagraphs 1(d) through (f).

[42] The remainder of the Claim underscores this interpretation. The Claim goes on to outline “examples of the breaches of the Crown’s obligations to the Six Nations.” It repeats and elaborates on the claims for monetary relief pleaded in subparagraphs 1(d) through (f) in respect of these various examples. For instance:

a. The Claim seeks “equitable compensation or equitable damages” in respect of the Lands in Innisfil and East Hawkesbury Townships (para. 43.1), the Talbot Road Lands (para. 58.11), the Hamilton/Port Dover Plank Road Lands (para. 60), the lands in Block 5 (para. 24.5), the lands in Block 6 (para. 30.1), the Port Maitland Lands (para. 62.1), the lands purportedly surrendered in 1841 (paras. 73.3, 73.5, 73.6), and the Crown’s alleged improvident investment of Six Nations monies in projects carried out by the Grand River Navigation Company (paras. 51, 55, 55.1).

b. The Claim seeks an “accounting” in respect of the alleged improper extraction of natural resources from the Six Nations reserve (para. 81).

c. The Claim seeks an “accounting” or, alternatively, “equitable compensation” in respect of certain surrendered lands (para. 56.3) and in respect of the alleged mismanagement by the Crown of Six Nations monies (para. 74.3).

[43] Nowhere in the discussion of these alleged breaches of the Crown’s obligations does the Claim refer to present-day interests in the land or seek the “return” or “restoration” of the land to the Six Nations. To the contrary, the Claim consistently seeks only equitable compensation or damages and/or an accounting.

[44] I accordingly find that, read as a whole, the Claim does not plead that any non-monetary relief is sought in respect of Crown lands within the Haldimand Tract. Rather, it expresses the opposite: that only monetary relief, in the form of equitable compensation or damages and/or an accounting, is being sought. The Six Nations’ purported request for relief in the form of an interest in Crown lands and an entitlement to their return is not adequately “specified” for the purposes of rule 25.06(9). It is not pleaded in a way that clearly or precisely gives the Crown defendants fair notice of such a request for relief, nor does it assist the court in understanding such a request for relief. In this respect the Claim stands in stark contrast to the explicit and clear pleadings for land-related relief in Chippewas of Sarnia and Chippewas of Saugeen First Nation, discussed above.

[45] No costs were sought by either party in respect of this issue. In my view, it is appropriate that each party bear its own costs.

Parghi J.

Date: August 12, 2026