Krista Robertson

A citizen of a self-governing Indigenous First Nation challenged a residency requirement in the First Nation's constitution requiring its Chief and Councillors to reside on settlement land or relocate there within 14 days of election.

The majority held that the Charter applies to the First Nation as a government by nature under s. 32(1), that the residency requirement constitutes a prima facie infringement of the appellant's s. 15(1) equality right, but that s. 25 of the Charter shields the requirement from abrogation or derogation because it protects Indigenous difference tied to ancient land-based governance practices.

Martin and O'Bonsawin JJ. dissented on the appeal, finding the s. 15(1) claim must succeed and s. 25 does not shield internal governance rules from Charter claims brought by community members.

Rowe J. dissented on the cross-appeal, finding the Charter does not apply to the First Nation's exercise of its inherent self-government right.

The Siksika Nation and Canada reached a $1.3 billion settlement agreement regarding six representative proceedings concerning historic wrongs involving reserve lands and Treaty rights.

The Siksika Nation moved for an order approving the settlement and discontinuing the actions under Rule 114(4) of the Federal Courts Rules.

Individual members, including the administrator of an estate and another individual, opposed the discontinuance, arguing the claims were class proceedings and that they had standing.

The Federal Court held that the actions remained representative proceedings governed by Rule 114, the individuals did not have standing as class members, and the settlement agreement was reasonable and properly ratified by the Siksika membership.

The motion was granted, though the estate's individual claim was permitted to continue.

The applicant First Nation sought judicial review of a decision by the Director of Exploration granting a mining exploration permit to a corporate respondent on lands within the applicant's traditional territory.

The applicant argued the Crown failed to properly discharge its duty to consult.

The Divisional Court found that the Crown and its delegate had created clear expectations for a community meeting and a Memorandum of Understanding, but abruptly changed course without explanation to expedite the permit for commercial reasons.

The court held that the consultation process lacked genuine engagement and failed to maintain the honour of the Crown.

The application was granted, the permit was set aside, and the matter was remitted for adequate consultation.