Pierre-Gabriel Grégoire

The appellant, a gay single man, claimed the medical expense tax credit (METC) for expenses incurred in 2015 for egg donation and gestational surrogacy services.

The Minister disallowed the claim.

The Tax Court of Canada held that the egg donor and surrogates did not meet the statutory definition of 'patient' under the Income Tax Act, as they were not the appellant's spouse, common-law partner, or dependant.

The Court also found that the denial of the METC did not infringe section 15 of the Charter, as the legislation did not treat the appellant differently from others in 2015.

The appeal was allowed only to the extent of a concession made by the Crown regarding DNA fragmentation expenses.

The appellant bank appealed GST/HST reassessments relating to its credit card and loyalty points programs.

The Tax Court of Canada held that the bank was not entitled to notional input tax credits for redemption payments made to a grocery retailer, as these were made in the course of providing exempt financial services rather than a commercial activity.

The Court also found that credit card processing services provided by third parties were excluded from the definition of financial services and were therefore taxable supplies.

The appeals were allowed in part only to give effect to certain agreed adjustments.

This application concerned the interpretation of a dispute resolution clause in a Share Purchase Agreement (SPA) regarding the calculation of a post-closing working capital adjustment.

The core issue was whether the purchaser, Rester Ontario Investments Inc., was permitted to provide narrative written submissions to an independent accountant in response to the vendor's, Elad Canada Operations Inc., dispute notice.

The court determined that the interpretation of the SPA was a matter for the court, not the independent accountant.

It ruled that narrative submissions were permissible, provided they did not alter the original calculations, and set page limits for both Rester's submissions and Elad's reply.

The appellant, a teacher assistant, was convicted of assault for grabbing a seven-year-old boy by the throat.

On appeal, she argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding video timestamps and erred in rejecting the defence of corrective force under s. 43 of the Criminal Code.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding that the timestamp evidence was not properly authenticated as real evidence, and even if it were, it did not render the verdict unreasonable.

The court also upheld the trial judge's rejection of the s. 43 defence, concluding that the force was applied out of anger and frustration, not for educative or corrective purposes, and therefore did not meet the requirements for justification under the section.