Granville Nolley Cadogan

In a divorce proceeding, both parties brought motions to enforce a settlement agreement, but advanced divergent interpretations of its terms.

The court noted that neither party addressed the appropriate legal test for determining if a binding agreement was reached, nor the correct procedural mechanism under the Family Law Rules (Rule 16 or Rule 18(13)).

The court adjourned the motions and directed counsel to provide further submissions on these procedural and substantive issues before making a final decision.

The plaintiff sought summary judgment against the defendant due to default under a mortgage.

The defendant opposed, seeking to bring the mortgage back into good standing and alleging bad faith by the plaintiff.

The court found no genuine issue requiring a trial but declined to grant summary judgment immediately.

Instead, it granted the defendant conditional relief under Section 23(1) of the Mortgages Act, allowing her to cure the default by paying $100 into court and all outstanding money by a specified date, failing which the plaintiff could move for judgment.

Costs were reserved.

The appellant appealed both his conviction for stunt driving and his sentence following a retrial.

The appellant was originally charged in September 2011 with driving 218 km/h in a 100 km/h zone on Highway 401, allegedly racing with another vehicle.

After a lengthy procedural history, the retrial commenced in March 2017.

The appellant raised multiple grounds of appeal regarding jurisdiction, alleged non-disclosure of dispatch recordings, and Charter violations related to a second officer's attendance at the scene.

The court dismissed all grounds of appeal against conviction, finding no evidentiary foundation for the appellant's assertions and noting the appellant's own failure to diligently pursue available remedies.

On the sentence appeal, the court found the trial judge made an error in principle by failing to consider that the appellant had already served 12 days incarceration and three months of a driving prohibition for the same offence.

The conviction was upheld but the sentence was varied.

Troy Rennie sought an order for partition and sale of a property and rectification of title, arguing he was a joint owner.

Maureen Rennie opposed, claiming Troy was not an owner, or alternatively, that the sale should be denied due to malicious, vexatious, or oppressive conduct.

The court found that Troy was a valid joint owner, the transfer was a gift, not subject to an oral trust or resulting trust, and there were no exceptional circumstances to deny the partition and sale.

The court ordered the sale of the property and awarded costs to Troy, with a portion to be paid personally by the respondent's counsel due to inappropriate conduct.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle on Highway 401 while performing a stunt by speeding 218 km/h in a posted 100 km/h speed zone, contrary to section 172(1) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The defendant brought an application to stay proceedings alleging the Crown destroyed or failed to provide dispatch communications, thereby violating his Charter section 7 rights.

The court dismissed the application, finding no evidence that such communications ever existed.

The trial proceeded ex parte after the defendant and counsel failed to appear on the final trial date.

The court found the defendant guilty based on the officer's credible evidence of the speed measurement and identification.

The moving party brought a motion to set aside a default judgment of $189,016.95 obtained by the respondents on their counterclaim.

The underlying dispute involved vendor take-back mortgages related to the purchase of a restaurant, where the moving party alleged the funds were never actually advanced.

Applying the five-part test for setting aside a default judgment, the court found that the delay in bringing the motion was not fatal, there was a plausible excuse for the default, and the moving party had an arguable defence on the merits.

The court concluded that the interests of justice favoured setting aside the default judgment and awarded costs to the moving party.

The plaintiff appealed an interlocutory order of a Master to the Divisional Court instead of a single judge of the Superior Court.

The defendant successfully moved to quash the appeal, and the plaintiff's motion to extend time to appeal was dismissed.

In this costs endorsement, the court awarded the defendant full indemnity costs for the motion to quash, noting the plaintiff pursued the wrong appellate route despite repeated warnings.

The court also awarded partial costs for the motion to extend time, fixing total costs at $7,497.49.

The defendant successfully brought a motion to quash the plaintiff's appeal of an interlocutory order and successfully resisted the plaintiff's motion to extend the time to appeal.

The court awarded the defendant full indemnity costs of $5,997.49 for the motion to quash, finding the plaintiff's pursuit of the appeal in the wrong forum was entirely unnecessary despite repeated warnings.

The court also awarded the defendant partial indemnity costs of $1,500.00 for the motion to extend time, noting efficiencies between the two interrelated motions.

The plaintiff obtained a default judgment in a mortgage enforcement action, which was subsequently set aside by a Master.

The plaintiff appealed the Master's order to the Divisional Court, arguing it was a final order.

The defendant moved to quash the appeal on the basis that the order was interlocutory and the appeal lay to a single judge of the Superior Court.

The plaintiff brought a cross-motion to extend the time to appeal to a single judge.

The court held that an order setting aside a default judgment is interlocutory, quashed the appeal, and denied the extension of time because the proposed appeal lacked merit, as the Master had no jurisdiction to vary a prior judge's peremptory order.

The Plaintiff appealed a Master's order setting aside a default judgment to the Divisional Court, believing it to be a final order.

The Defendant moved to quash this appeal, arguing the Master's order was interlocutory and thus appealable only to a single judge of the Superior Court.

The Plaintiff also brought a cross-motion to extend the time for appeal to a single judge, should the initial appeal be quashed.

The court determined that an order setting aside a default judgment is interlocutory, not final, and therefore the appeal to the Divisional Court was improper.

The court quashed the Plaintiff's appeal and denied the cross-motion for an extension of time, finding no merit to the proposed appeal as the Master correctly lacked jurisdiction to vary a judge's peremptory order.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing their action as an impermissible collateral attack on a decision of the Deputy Director of Titles.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge failed to address the appellants' request for an extension of time to appeal the Land Titles Decision.

The Court noted that one of the appellants had been acquitted of fraud in a related criminal trial, which contradicted the Deputy Director's findings, and that there were concerns about procedural fairness at the Land Titles hearing.

The action was reinstated to allow the appellants to bring a proper motion for an extension of time.

A dispute between former cohabiting partners over beneficial ownership of a home registered solely in the respondent’s name.

The applicant relied on a written agreement confirming that the respondent held legal title as trustee for both parties with each owning a 50% beneficial interest.

The respondent argued the applicant contributed little to the purchase and had breached the agreement by failing to pay expenses.

The court accepted the authenticity and effect of the written agreement and found the applicant had made substantial financial contributions including mortgage payments and vehicle payments that offset other expenses.

The court declared the applicant held a 50% beneficial interest and set out terms for buyout or sale of the property, with adjustments for unpaid contributions after January 2014.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing her motion to set aside a judgment from an undefended matrimonial trial.

The appellant's pleadings had been struck due to her continuing contempt of court orders requiring financial disclosure.

The Court of Appeal found that the respondent was entitled to proceed with the undefended trial because the appellant failed to purge her contempt or reinstate her pleadings by the court-ordered deadline.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The applicant brought a motion seeking to set aside an order striking her pleadings for contempt due to failure to provide court‑ordered disclosure and to set aside a subsequent final order made after an undefended trial granting the respondent an equalization payment and other relief.

The court reviewed the procedural history, noting that the applicant had been repeatedly given opportunities to purge her contempt and comply with disclosure and costs orders but failed to do so.

The applicant did not appeal the earlier orders and did not bring a timely motion within the deadline permitted by the earlier order striking her pleadings.

The court held that the applicant was not entitled to notice of the subsequent undefended trial and failed to establish any basis to set aside the earlier orders.

The motion was dismissed and costs were awarded to the respondent.

The plaintiffs commenced an action against their automobile insurer alleging breach of contract, entitlement to various statutory accident benefits, and damages for bad faith following a 1999 motor vehicle accident.

They sought payment for a proposed medical assessment, vocational training and educational expenses, the cost of a spinal cord stimulator, and damages arising from alleged improper claims handling.

The court found that the plaintiffs failed to establish entitlement to the claimed benefits because the assessments and treatments were not proven to be reasonably required and several claims were not properly submitted or mediated under the applicable Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The court also held that the insurer’s conduct did not constitute bad faith and did not represent a marked departure from ordinary standards of decency.

The action was dismissed in its entirety.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their action against the respondent vendors for breach of a real estate contract.

The appellants alleged the vendors misrepresented that certain repairs were completed prior to closing and failed to perform the work in a good and workmanlike manner.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the plain language of the agreement only required re-grading the soil.

The court also found no error in the motion judge's rejection of the appellant's credibility, noting the appellants failed to lead evidence that the repairs were improperly done.

The appeal was dismissed.

Following a four-day trial in which the applicant was granted sole custody of a child, the court determined costs payable by the unsuccessful respondent.

The applicant sought full recovery costs of $29,912.50, while the respondent argued no costs should be awarded, claiming the applicant behaved unreasonably and the costs were excessive and beyond her ability to pay.

The court rejected the respondent's arguments, finding neither party acted in bad faith and both sincerely believed custody was in the child's best interests.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs of $10,000.00, considering the importance of the custody issue, the complexity of the case, and the respondent's modest financial circumstances.

A custody trial concerning a two-year-old child born in 2010.

The applicant, a non-biological father who has acted as the child's parent since birth, sought custody against the respondent, the child's maternal aunt, who sought custody on behalf of the biological family.

The biological mother, who suffers from serious drug addiction, supported the aunt's claim.

The court awarded sole custody to the applicant, finding that the child's best interests were served by maintaining stability with his psychological father and primary caregiver, rather than being transferred to the biological family.

The court considered factors including the child's strong attachment to the applicant, the length of time in a stable home environment, the permanence of the applicant's plan versus the temporary nature of the aunt's plan, and the child's biracial heritage.

The responding party was previously found in contempt for failing to provide financial disclosure.

She failed to purge her contempt, did not attend subsequent hearings citing medical issues, and failed to pay outstanding costs orders.

The moving party moved to strike her pleadings.

The court found a consistent pattern of non-compliance and struck the responding party's pleadings, granting the moving party leave to proceed with an undefended trial.

Costs of $15,000 on a full recovery basis were awarded to the moving party.

The tenant brought a motion to set aside the registrar's dismissal of his appeal, extend the time to perfect the appeal, and for an order allowing re-entry into the premises.

The underlying appeal was from a Landlord and Tenant Board decision.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding that the appeal was an attempt to relitigate factual findings rather than raising a question of law, and noting the tenant's failure to take any steps to perfect the appeal for over a year.

The balance of convenience favoured the landlord.