Efemena Oghenejakpor

On an appeal from the Consent and Capacity Board, the court considered whether a physician renewing a community treatment order had sufficient basis to conclude that the substitute decision-maker gave informed consent to the treatment plan.

The court held that, although direct physician communication with the substitute decision-maker is not statutorily required, the Board must still be satisfied that the information required by s. 11 of the Health Care Consent Act was provided before consent was obtained.

Because the record and case worker notes did not address whether the substitute decision-maker received the required information about the treatment plan, the Board erred in law by failing to apply the correct consent test.

The appeal was allowed and the matter was referred back with directions that the Board address consent under s. 11 at the upcoming review.

The tenant sought leave to appeal a Landlord and Tenant Board consent order terminating her tenancy for rent arrears, arguing the order was invalid because it lacked a mandatory 'pay and stay' voiding clause under s. 74(3)(b) of the Residential Tenancies Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding that under s. 194 of the Act, parties can agree to settlements that contravene other provisions of the Act.

As the tenant consented to the order with the assistance of counsel and an interpreter, and there was no evidence of fraud or duress, the high threshold for appealing a consent order was not met.

This is an appeal concerning a fraudulent conveyance claim.

The appellant sought to enforce a default judgment against properties held in the name of the respondent's deceased wife, alleging a beneficial interest and fraudulent conveyance.

The trial judge found no fraudulent conveyance of real property but concluded that the respondent had a beneficial interest in cash transferred to his wife, which was used for mortgage payments, attributing half of the unexplained funds ($217,000) to fraudulent conveyances based on an adverse inference.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, finding the trial judge erred in attributing only 50% of the unexplained deposits to the respondent, as the adverse inference should have applied to the entire unexplained amount given the wife's failure to disclose sources.

The Court increased the amount of fraudulently conveyed cash to $434,000.

The appellant, Muhammad Jawaid, appealed a trial judgment in a mortgage action.

The appellant argued that he was not adequately informed about the scope of the trial, was denied procedural fairness, and that the trial judge's decision constituted a collateral attack on an earlier interlocutory order setting aside a default judgment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant was aware of the trial's scope, was not denied procedural fairness, and that an interlocutory order setting aside default judgment is not binding on a subsequent trial judge as it only determines procedure, not the rights of the parties.

The court found no error of fact or law in the trial judge's decision.