Leonard Ricchetti

This motion concerned the defendants' application to set aside a noting of default in a simplified procedure action.

The court reviewed the defendants' extensive and unexplained delays in filing a defence, noting a pattern of missed deadlines and a two-month delay in retaining new counsel after terminating previous counsel.

Despite the general preference for resolving disputes on their merits, the court found the defendants' conduct demonstrated "shocking laxity" and deliberate delay.

The motion to set aside the noting of default was dismissed, with costs awarded to the plaintiff.

The plaintiff registered a construction lien against the defendants' property and noted the defendants in default after they failed to deliver a statement of defence.

The defendants subsequently sought to bring a motion to discharge the lien on the basis that it had expired because the plaintiff failed to set the action down for trial within two years.

The court considered the preliminary issue of whether the defendants had standing to bring the motion despite being noted in default.

The court granted the defendants leave under section 5(2) of O. Reg 302/18 to bring the motion, finding there was evidence to support the defence that the lien had expired.

The defendants brought a motion to strike the plaintiff's Statement of Claim on two grounds: failure to pay three separate cost awards and an alleged fraudulent conveyance by the plaintiff's executor.

The court found that the outstanding cost awards had been paid, and the issue of fraudulent conveyance could not be determined on a motion to strike as it required a trial.

The court also noted that the failure to pass accounts was subject to an appeal and thus could not be relied upon.

Consequently, the motion to strike was dismissed.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to apply for judicial review of an adjudicator's interim and final decisions.

The Divisional Court granted leave to apply for judicial review and ordered that the adjudicator's decisions be stayed pending the final determination of the application.

The self-represented plaintiff brought an action against the Crown, the Attorney General, and the police for malicious prosecution, misfeasance in public office, and other torts arising from his arrest and prosecution for offences related to underage prostitution.

The charges had been withdrawn following a resolution involving a peace bond and forfeiture order.

The plaintiff sought leave under s. 17 of the Crown Liability Proceedings Act to proceed with his claims of misfeasance and bad faith, while the defendants moved to strike the claims under Rule 21.01(1)(b).

The court denied the plaintiff's motion for leave and granted the defendants' motions to strike, finding that the plaintiff failed to plead sufficient material facts to support his claims and that the claims were barred by prosecutorial immunity and statutory protections.

The actions were dismissed without leave to amend.

This endorsement addresses multiple motions in a protracted five-year-old action involving alleged fraudulent mortgage enforcement and power of sale transactions.

The court first dealt with a recusal motion brought by the defendant, Mr. D'Mello, alleging conflict of interest and bias against the presiding judge.

The recusal motion was dismissed, with the court finding no evidence of bias and noting Mr. D'Mello's history of unsubstantiated bias claims and attempts to delay proceedings.

The court then largely granted the plaintiff's disclosure motion, ordering Mr. D'Mello and his corporations to provide answers to undertakings and refusals, and produce corporate and trust account records relevant to the alleged fraudulent transactions and piercing of the corporate veil.

Mr. D'Mello's cross-motion for disclosure was dismissed due to lack of supporting evidence and the plaintiff's prior responses.

The defendants by counterclaim, Robert Mammone and S.O.R.A. Real Estate & Insurance Ltd. o/a MIC Financial (the "Brokers"), moved for summary judgment to dismiss Mary Kosta-Cadas's counterclaim against them, arguing it was statute-barred by the applicable limitation period.

Mrs. Kosta-Cadas's claim was for contribution and indemnity in negligence, alleging the Brokers failed to ensure she understood and signed mortgage and renewal documents.

The central issue was the interpretation of section 18 of the Limitations Act, 2002, specifically whether the discoverability principle could cause the limitation period for an indemnity claim to start before the main action was served on the party seeking indemnity.

The court dismissed the Brokers' motion, holding that the limitation period for Mrs. Kosta-Cadas's indemnity claim commenced when she was served with the main action, not when she first became aware of potential issues with the mortgage.

This endorsement addresses a procedural conference concerning the unilateral cancellation of a motion date booked via Calendly.

The court emphasized that opposing counsel cannot unilaterally cancel a scheduled hearing date without consent, as per the Central West (CW) Notice to the Profession and Parties.

The judge clarified that the court relies on counsel's undertakings in Calendly regarding attempts to agree on mutually convenient dates, and that a consent from opposing counsel is not a prerequisite for booking a motion.

The court strongly condemned the abuse of the Calendly scheduling system, outlining various forms of misconduct, and warned of serious consequences, including cost awards or other sanctions, for non-compliance with scheduling rules and undertakings.

The Plaintiffs brought a motion to find Shayna Dallas and 2697909 Ontario Inc. in contempt of court for failing to attend an examination in aid of execution and for failing to produce specified documents.

The court found that the contempt for non-attendance was purged by the subsequent payment of costs.

Regarding document production, despite skepticism about the completeness of disclosure, the court determined that the Plaintiffs did not meet the high burden of proving a "deliberate and flagrant breach" beyond a reasonable doubt.

The motion was dismissed without prejudice to renewal on new evidence.

The Applicant Father sought the sale of the matrimonial home and an investment property due to significant financial burden.

The Respondent Mother opposed the sale of the matrimonial home and brought a cross-motion for child and spousal support.

The court ordered the immediate sale of both properties, finding that the financial situation necessitated the sales and that the Mother's opposition was not based on oppressive conduct or substantial prejudice.

The Mother's support motion was adjourned until after the property sales.

This motion concerned applications by the Dallas Defendants and Mangal Defendants to withdraw deemed admissions arising from their failure to respond to a Request to Admit from the Plaintiffs.

The court applied a three-part test, considering whether the proposed amendments raised a triable issue, if the admission was inadvertent, and if withdrawal would cause uncompensable prejudice.

The court found that the moving parties failed to establish a triable issue regarding property valuation, notice of power of sale, or Ms. Dallas's authority.

While counsel claimed inadvertence, the delay in bringing the motion after being alerted to the issue was unexplained.

Significant prejudice to the plaintiffs, including delays and costs, was identified.

The court also noted the moving parties' inconsistent positions on property valuation in a related proceeding.

Considering all circumstances, the motions to withdraw deemed admissions were dismissed.

The plaintiff, Bradley J. Grant Investments Inc. (Grant), brought a motion for interim Mareva and Norwich orders against Nestig Inc. and Stephen Lee Heimbecker, along with other related parties.

Grant alleged a fraud exceeding $51 million, breach of contract, and breach of fiduciary duty, claiming that Heimbecker induced advances for specific investments but failed to provide documentation or repay funds.

Heimbecker contended the relationship was a simple debt evidenced by promissory notes and denied fraud.

The court found Grant established a strong prima facie case of fraud, breach of trust, and/or breach of fiduciary duty, primarily due to Heimbecker's failure to disclose the use of advanced funds.

The court also found a serious risk of asset dissipation, noting Heimbecker's liquidation of assets (racehorses, farm, home) and potential relocation.

The interim Mareva injunction was granted to preserve assets, and the Norwich order was granted to compel financial institutions to disclose information, as Heimbecker was the only practical source and had refused disclosure.

The defendants brought a motion for an order requiring the plaintiffs to post security for costs under Rule 56.01.

The court found that the plaintiff Alexandra Tang was not ordinarily resident in Ontario and that the plaintiffs (including the corporations) lacked sufficient assets in Ontario to cover a potential cost award.

However, the motion was dismissed due to the defendants' obstructive conduct during cross-examinations regarding the merits of the claim, their "hardball litigation" tactics, and significant delay in bringing the motion.

The court emphasized that the merits of the claim are relevant, especially when impecuniosity is not alleged, and that the defendants' conduct prejudiced the plaintiffs' ability to demonstrate their case's merits.

The plaintiff, Sharna Gayle, brought a motion to amend her Amended Statement of Claim in a solicitor's negligence action against Lerners LLP and its lawyers.

The proposed amendments sought to increase the damages claimed from $1,000,000 to $20,000,000 and to add extensive particulars detailing the alleged negligence and breach of fiduciary duty, including allegations of conflict of interest due to "religious and personal affiliations." The court granted the amendment to increase the damages, affirming that such an increase does not constitute prejudice.

However, the court dismissed the motion to add the detailed particulars, finding that these proposed amendments violated Rule 25.06(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure by pleading evidence, explanations, and submissions rather than concise material facts.

The court also found that the proposed amendments did not introduce a new cause of action and that the delay in seeking amendments was not excessive enough to presume non-compensable prejudice.

The Applicant sought costs on a full recovery basis after successfully striking the Respondents' pleading due to their bad faith conduct, including deliberate non-disclosure and non-compliance with court orders.

The Respondents argued for no costs or a significantly reduced amount.

The court awarded full indemnity costs, finding the Respondents' conduct warranted a punitive award, but reduced the claimed amount due to some excessive hours and the abandonment of a contempt motion.

The costs were awarded jointly and severally against all Respondents due to their concerted efforts to obstruct disclosure.

The plaintiff sought an extension of time to serve a Statement of Claim, filed in 2017 for a 2015 motor vehicle accident.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the delay of over five years to be extreme and inexcusable.

The plaintiff's explanations, including inability to locate parties, a negligent associate, and COVID-19, were deemed without merit.

The court found actual and presumed prejudice to the defendants due to the passage of time, loss of evidence, and compromised ability to investigate and bring third-party claims.

The decision emphasized counsel's ultimate responsibility for prosecuting the action.

The applicant brought a motion to strike the pleadings of the respondent and two added respondents for persistent and deliberate non-compliance with numerous court orders.

These orders included requirements for financial disclosure, payment of spousal support and costs, and adherence to preservation orders related to the sale of the matrimonial home.

The court found the respondents' conduct to be in bad faith, rising to the level of fraudulent misconduct, aimed at frustrating the applicant's financial claims.

Given the egregious nature of the breaches and the futility of lesser remedies, the court granted the motion, striking the respondents' pleadings and allowing the applicant to proceed to an uncontested trial.

The defendants moved to dismiss or stay the plaintiff's action under Rule 21.01(3) due to pending related proceedings.

The court rejected arguments of res judicata and issue estoppel, finding no final determinations had been made.

It allowed the action to proceed against one defendant, Vilson Da Silva, as the claims were distinct and could not be brought in the existing lien action due to the Construction Lien Act.

However, claims against Leblon Carpentry were dismissed for lack of factual basis, and claims against Leblon Drywall were dismissed (without prejudice) as they were duplicative of an existing counterclaim in the lien action and contrary to the purpose of the Construction Lien Act.

To ensure judicial economy and avoid multiplicity of actions, the court ordered the transfer of a related Barrie action to Brampton and directed that all three interconnected actions be tried together or sequentially.

This is an appeal from a conviction for sexual assault.

The appellant raised four grounds: improper use of a prior consistent statement to bolster credibility, error in reliability analysis regarding the complainant's detailed description, failure to adequately address the physical improbability of the touching as described, and misapprehension of evidence regarding the touched breast.

The court dismissed all grounds, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's assessment of credibility and reliability, proper use of contemporaneous demeanor evidence, and a thorough consideration of the physical mechanics of the assault.

The conviction was upheld.

The court issued a costs endorsement following a motion where the respondent sought to introduce issues regarding a joint venture, a mortgage renewal, and the distribution of trust funds.

The applicant was successful in opposing the joint venture issue, while the respondent was successful on the mortgage renewal issue.

The court found that both parties had taken unreasonable positions on the issues they lost.

Given the divided success, the court declined to award costs to either party and cautioned them against taking unreasonable positions that hinder the resolution of the family law dispute.