Marianne Salih

The appellant was convicted of possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking and possession of cannabis resin following a joint trial in the Ontario Court of Justice.

He appealed on three grounds: reasonable apprehension of bias based on remarks made by the trial judge in an unrelated sentencing proceeding; the trial judge's erroneous admission of a videotaped police interview as voluntary; and the trial judge's failure to conduct an inquiry into a breach of the right to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Charter when uncontradicted evidence revealed such a breach.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that while the bias claim and voluntariness determination were not independently fatal, the trial judge's failure to assist a self-represented accused by raising and inquiring into the Charter breach rendered the trial unfair.

A new trial was ordered.

The accused, Deanna Passera, was found guilty by a jury of importing cocaine.

Prior to sentencing, she filed a constitutional challenge to sections 719(1) and 719(3.1) of the Criminal Code, arguing that the provisions, which govern the commencement of sentences and credit for pre-sentence custody, violated sections 7 and 12 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

She contended that the legislative scheme resulted in offenders detained pending trial serving a lengthier period in custody before parole eligibility compared to identically situated offenders released on bail, thereby being overbroad, arbitrary, and grossly disproportionate.

The court dismissed the constitutional challenge, finding that the legislative scheme, when considered holistically with the Corrections and Conditional Release Act, was not unconstitutional.

It held that Parliament's intent was to create reasonable parity at the statutory release date and that any disparity in parole eligibility was justified by public safety and rehabilitation objectives.

The court then proceeded to sentence Ms. Passera to six years imprisonment for importing 1.994 kg of cocaine, crediting her 1.5:1 for 992 days of pre-sentence custody (1488 days) and an additional 90 days (3 months) for harsh lock-down conditions, resulting in a remaining sentence of 613 days.

The appellant appealed a long-term offender (LTO) designation imposed following his conviction for aggravated assault, weapons dangerous, and breach of probation.

The appellant had stabbed a victim six times on a subway platform.

The trial judge sentenced him to four years and one day imprisonment with a concurrent sentence for breach of probation, and imposed an LTO designation with a seven-year supervision order.

The appellant raised three issues: insufficient reasons regarding the interpretation of "substantial risk that the offender will reoffend" misapplication of the statutory test, and failure to consider discretion not to make an LTO designation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the evidence supported the LTO designation.

The appellant was arrested on a charge of importing cocaine under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and was detained in custody.

Following conviction by jury, the appellant filed an application for judicial interim release under section 523(2)(a) of the Criminal Code, alleging a change in circumstances.

The trial judge dismissed the application on the tertiary ground.

The appellant then brought an application in the nature of habeas corpus with certiorari in aid, seeking declarations regarding the court's jurisdiction to review bail and challenging the absence of a review mechanism as violating her Charter rights.

The Superior Court judge dismissed the application.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that Parliament deliberately chose not to provide a review mechanism for trial judge orders under section 523(2)(a), and that habeas corpus was not an appropriate remedy in these circumstances.

During a trial for sexual interference, the Crown and Defence brought several pre-trial and mid-trial applications regarding the admissibility of evidence.

The court ruled that the accused's statements to police on November 18 and October 26 were voluntary and did not violate his s. 10(b) Charter rights.

However, a statement made on October 28 was excluded because the accused was heavily intoxicated, rendering it involuntary.

The court also ordered redactions to the complainant's police interview to prevent impermissible oath-helping, and made mid-trial rulings allowing some prior consistent statements by the complainant to rebut allegations of recent fabrication.

The appellant, a bank employee, pleaded guilty to fraud over $5,000 after disclosing clients' personal financial information to fraudsters, causing significant losses.

He appealed his sentence of two years less a day and a DNA order, seeking a conditional sentence or a reduction to 18 months.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge properly weighed mitigating factors, gave sufficient reasons, and appropriately prioritized general deterrence and denunciation for a large-scale fraud involving breach of trust.

The appellant, Valentine Ngoddy, appealed his conviction for sexually assaulting a developmentally delayed complainant.

The complainant did not testify at trial, and her hearsay statement was admitted for its truth.

The Superior Court of Justice, on appeal, found that the trial judge erred in admitting the hearsay statement.

The court determined that the statement lacked sufficient threshold reliability, as factors such as spontaneity were overemphasized, repeated assertions were improperly used as corroboration, and the absence of a motive to fabricate was incorrectly treated as a positive indicator of reliability.

Furthermore, the court found no functional alternative to cross-examination, given the inconsistencies in the complainant's various statements and her cognitive limitations.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction was set aside, and an acquittal was entered.

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed on a youthful first offender, arguing it was demonstrably unfit and failed to properly consider parity with co-accused.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the sentence was lenient, the trial judge's combination of a jail term, maximum probation, and credit for stringent bail conditions was not demonstrably unfit.

The court also found no error in the trial judge's consideration of parity given the material differences among the co-accused.

The accused, jointly charged with firearms offences, brought applications for a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter, alleging their s. 11(b) rights to a trial within a reasonable time were breached.

The total time from charge to the anticipated end of trial was approximately 33.5 months.

The court analyzed the delay, attributing portions to inherent time requirements, neutral delay (including illness of counsel and accommodating co-accused's counsel), and institutional delay.

The court found the institutional delay of approximately 16 months fell within the combined Morin guidelines for provincial and superior courts.

Balancing the prejudice against the societal interest in trying serious firearms charges, the court dismissed the applications.

The accused, charged with possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, brought a renewed application to stay the proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter following a mistrial.

The court held that under s. 653.1 of the Criminal Code, the earlier s. 11(b) ruling by the first trial judge was binding on the parties, and it was not in the interests of justice to revisit those findings.

After analyzing the additional delay caused by the mistrial and scheduling the retrial, the court concluded that the total delay of nearly 35 months, while lengthy, did not violate the accused's right to be tried within a reasonable time when balanced against the serious nature of the offence and the lack of prejudice to fair trial interests.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant, charged with drug trafficking offences, sought a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, alleging unreasonable delay.

The total time from arrest to the scheduled trial was approximately 31 months.

The court analyzed the timeline, categorizing periods of inherent, institutional, and neutral delay across both the Ontario Court of Justice and the Superior Court of Justice.

Finding a total institutional delay of 22.25 months, the court balanced the prejudice to the applicant against society's interest in a trial on the merits.

The application was dismissed, as the delay was deemed reasonable in the circumstances.

The applicant brought a Rowbotham application seeking a conditional stay of proceedings until state-funded counsel was provided for her trial on charges of fail to comply with a recognizance, criminal harassment, and assault with a weapon.

The Crown conceded that the applicant was indigent and ineligible for Legal Aid.

The court considered whether counsel was essential to a fair trial, examining the seriousness of charges, complexity of proceedings, and the applicant's ability to participate effectively.

The court found that while the applicant faced health challenges and limited education, she was intelligent and articulate, the case involved only credibility issues without legal complexity, and judicial assistance could adequately equip her for trial.

The application was dismissed.

The accused applied for a Rowbotham order seeking a conditional stay of proceedings until the state funded defence counsel after Legal Aid Ontario refused coverage.

The court reviewed the governing principles requiring proof that legal aid was denied, that the accused was indigent, and that proceeding without counsel would materially compromise trial fairness.

The court found the accused had exhausted all legal aid appeals, lacked financial means while attending school full‑time under bail conditions, and faced serious trafficking charges likely involving complex issues including search warrant challenges and voluntariness of a statement.

The court also observed significant limitations in the accused’s literacy and ability to navigate court proceedings.

Concluding that the accused’s fair trial rights would be jeopardized without representation, the court granted a conditional stay pending state-funded counsel.