John North

Three appellants challenged mandatory minimum sentencing provisions for unauthorized production of marijuana under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act as violating s. 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (cruel and unusual punishment).

The Court of Appeal found that certain mandatory minimum provisions were grossly disproportionate when applied to reasonably foreseeable circumstances, including cases involving minimal involvement, mistaken licensees, and situations lacking culpability regarding statutory aggravating factors.

The court struck down provisions imposing two and three-year mandatory minimums for production of more than 500 plants and the statutory aggravating factor provision.

The court reduced one appellant's sentence and dismissed appeals in the other cases.

The appellant appealed her conviction from the Superior Court of Justice, arguing that the trial judge committed a palpable and overriding error by failing to make more detailed inquiries into the appellant's mental status while she was testifying.

The Court of Appeal rejected this submission, finding that the trial judge had made sufficient inquiries, the appellant had confirmed she was able to continue and had no difficulty with her memory, and defence counsel did not pursue the issue at trial.

No fresh evidence was produced to support the appellant's claim that her mental status would have interfered with her ability to testify.

The appellant was convicted of 40 counts including drug trafficking, criminal organization offences, weapons offences, proceeds of crime, extortion, and criminal interest rate offences.

He was sentenced to 19 years imprisonment with a 9.5-year parole ineligibility period.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld most convictions but allowed the appeal in part.

The court found no Charter violations regarding search and seizure or trial delay.

However, the court quashed convictions for entering into criminal interest rate agreements, finding the trial judge erred in applying a presumption of knowledge without requiring proof of mens rea.

The court also reduced the sentence from 19 to 15 years and set aside the parole ineligibility order except for criminal organization convictions.

The appellant was arrested on a charge of importing cocaine under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and was detained in custody.

Following conviction by jury, the appellant filed an application for judicial interim release under section 523(2)(a) of the Criminal Code, alleging a change in circumstances.

The trial judge dismissed the application on the tertiary ground.

The appellant then brought an application in the nature of habeas corpus with certiorari in aid, seeking declarations regarding the court's jurisdiction to review bail and challenging the absence of a review mechanism as violating her Charter rights.

The Superior Court judge dismissed the application.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that Parliament deliberately chose not to provide a review mechanism for trial judge orders under section 523(2)(a), and that habeas corpus was not an appropriate remedy in these circumstances.

The appellant was convicted of possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking after police found 50 marijuana plants in her car trunk during a search incident to arrest.

The trial judge found that the police violated the appellant's s. 8 Charter rights by conducting a dangerous, masked takedown at gunpoint, and violated her s. 10(b) rights by failing to fully inform her of her right to counsel and delaying her access to counsel for over five hours.

The trial judge also found the arresting officers lied under oath, but declined to exclude the evidence under s. 24(2).

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred in concluding that Charter breaches occurring after the discovery of evidence could not satisfy the 'obtained in a manner' requirement of s. 24(2).

The Court reassessed the Grant factors, found the breaches to be extremely serious, and excluded the evidence, entering an acquittal.

The offender was found guilty by a jury of importing approximately 2.9 kilograms of cocaine hidden in his suitcase.

The Crown and defence presented a joint submission for a sentence of five and a half years, which is below the usual range of six to eight years for first-time importers.

The court accepted the joint submission, finding that the offender's severe cognitive deficits and the certainty of his deportation to Guyana were unusual mitigating circumstances that justified a departure from the usual range.

The offender was sentenced to five and a half years in custody, less pre-sentence custody credit.

Following an earlier ruling declaring two mandatory minimum sentencing provisions in s. 7(2)(b) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act unconstitutional under s. 12 of the Charter, the court considered whether those provisions were severable from the remainder of the section.

The applicant argued the entire subsection constituted a unitary sentencing scheme that must fall together.

The Crown argued the offending subsections could be removed without affecting the validity of the remaining provisions imposing mandatory minimums for larger-scale cannabis production.

Applying the severance principles from Schachter v. Canada and related authorities, the court concluded the unconstitutional provisions were not inextricably bound to the remaining subsections.

The court held that only ss. 7(2)(b)(i) and (ii) were of no force or effect and that ss. 7(2)(b)(iii–vi) remained valid.

The applicant pled guilty to the production of marijuana and theft of electricity after police discovered a large-scale grow operation with a hydro bypass in a residential home.

The Crown sought a mandatory minimum sentence of three years under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The applicant brought a constitutional challenge arguing the mandatory minimums violated s. 12 of the Charter.

The court found that the mandatory minimum sentences could foreseeably capture conduct with minimal moral blameworthiness, such as a licensed producer making an honest mistake about the number of plants, or a gardener unaware of a public safety hazard.

The court declared the mandatory minimum sentences under ss. 7(2)(b)(i)(ii) and 7(3)(c) of no force or effect.

The appellant was convicted of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and breach of recognizance after police, acting on a confidential informant's tip, stopped a taxi he was in and eventually found crack cocaine in his backpack.

On appeal, the appellant argued his Charter rights under ss. 8 and 9 were breached during the traffic stop, pat-down search, and the search of his backpack at the police station.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the traffic stop was a lawful investigative detention, the pat-down was a valid safety search, and the backpack search was a lawful search incident to arrest because police had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest for drug offences prior to the search.

The applicant, a police officer convicted of drug offences, sought disclosure of the identity of an anonymous tipster who emailed police post-conviction alleging misconduct by the applicant's supervising officers.

The Crown provided a redacted summary but claimed confidential informer and public interest privilege over the author's identity.

The Court of Appeal held that neither privilege applied, as there was no express or implied promise of confidentiality to the unsolicited tipster, and no objective evidence to support public interest privilege.

The Court further held that the Trotta test for production in support of fresh evidence was premature, as the motion was properly characterized as one for directions on the scope of Crown disclosure.

The application for disclosure was allowed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for trafficking in cocaine, possession of proceeds of crime, and offering to transfer a firearm, which arose from an undercover police operation.

He argued that the trial judge erred in refusing to stay the charges for unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter, failing to exclude evidence due to s. 8 and s. 10(b) Charter breaches, misapprehending identification evidence, and rejecting his entrapment application.

The Court of Appeal reviewed the periods of delay and found that while the delay was significant, it did not violate s. 11(b) when balanced against societal interests and the lack of actual prejudice.

The Court also upheld the trial judge's findings that the search was consensual or minimally intrusive, the identification evidence was reliable, and the undercover officer's actions constituted legitimate investigation rather than entrapment.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, a youth at the time of his initial involvement, was convicted of participating in a terrorist group after attending training camps and committing acts such as shoplifting and removing a surveillance camera.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence, erred in admitting his post-arrest statement despite Charter breaches, improperly admitted hearsay evidence under the co-conspirators' exception, and failed to stay proceedings for abuse of process and entrapment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's factual conclusions were supported by the record, the Charter breaches did not warrant exclusion of the statement under s. 24(2), the hearsay evidence was properly admitted, and the police conduct did not amount to entrapment or an abuse of process.

The accused applied for a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms alleging a breach of the right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b).

Approximately 26 months had elapsed between arrest and the scheduled trial date on a charge of importing heroin.

Much of the delay occurred while the accused attempted to change counsel, pursued Legal Aid Ontario appeals, and brought two Rowbotham applications to obtain funded counsel.

The court found that the 15½‑month delay associated with securing counsel was neutral and attributable to the accused’s own decisions rather than Crown or institutional misconduct.

Balancing the Morin factors, the court concluded the delay was not unreasonable and declined to stay the proceedings.

The appellant was convicted of conspiracy to traffic in cocaine and trafficking in cocaine following a jury trial.

The Crown's case relied heavily on the evidence of a police informant and hearsay statements made by an alleged co-conspirator.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge misdirected the jury on the application of the co-conspirators' exception to the hearsay rule, particularly given it was a two-person conspiracy and the Crown sought to rely on statements made after the conspiracy alleged in the indictment.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the jury instructions failed to properly isolate the findings required before hearsay evidence could be used against the appellant.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

Media organizations challenged the constitutionality of the mandatory publication ban on bail hearing information under s. 517 of the Criminal Code, arguing it unjustifiably infringed freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the constitutionality of the provision.

The Court found that while the mandatory ban limits freedom of expression, it is justified under s. 1 of the Charter.

The ban's objectives of safeguarding the right to a fair trial and ensuring expeditious bail hearings are pressing and substantial.

The mandatory nature of the ban is rationally connected to these objectives, minimally impairs freedom of expression given its temporary nature and limited scope, and its salutary effects outweigh its deleterious effects.

The appellant pleaded guilty to multiple drug trafficking charges, including possession of over one kilogram of cocaine, and was sentenced to 7 years' imprisonment.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge failed to apply the gap principle, as his last conviction was 11 years prior.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the trial judge placed undue emphasis on the criminal record and failed to weigh rehabilitation prospects.

The appeal was allowed and the sentence reduced to 5.5 years.

The appellant appealed his conviction for trafficking cocaine and the forfeiture order regarding his vehicle.

He argued that the trial judge erred in admitting statements made by his co-accused and in using the co-accused's post-arrest videotaped statement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the co-accused's statements were admissible as declarations made in furtherance of a conspiracy, as they were intended to explain delivery arrangements to an undercover police officer.

The court also held that the trial judge properly used the videotaped statement solely to assess the co-accused's credibility.

The sentence appeal regarding the forfeiture order was abandoned.

The appellant was convicted of possession of Ecstasy for the purpose of trafficking and production of Ecstasy.

During the investigation, police obtained a general warrant under s. 487.01 of the Criminal Code to conduct repeated covert entries and searches of a commercial office space and storage units.

The appellant appealed the convictions, arguing that the general warrant violated his s. 8 Charter rights because s. 487.01 does not authorize repeated covert entries and the statutory requirements were not met.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that a covert entry and search is an investigative technique under s. 487.01, no other provision authorized the technique, and the warrant was in the best interests of the administration of justice.

The respondent, a first offender, pleaded guilty to importing 9.56 kilograms of high-grade heroin into Canada as a courier.

The sentencing judge imposed a sentence of seven years and nine months, treating heroin as only marginally more dangerous than cocaine and considering the respondent's wilful blindness as a mitigating factor.

The Crown appealed the sentence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that heroin is significantly more dangerous than cocaine and that wilful blindness is not a mitigating factor.

The Court established a sentencing range of 12 to 17 years for first offender couriers importing large amounts of high-grade heroin for personal gain, and increased the respondent's sentence to 14 years and nine months.

Media organizations appealed orders upholding a mandatory publication ban imposed under s. 517 of the Criminal Code during terrorism-related bail proceedings and interpreting the ban to apply to all jointly charged accused when requested by one accused.

The Court of Appeal held the appeal should be heard despite mootness because the issue was recurring, evasive of review, and remained adversarial.

A majority held that the mandatory ban infringed s. 2(b) of the Charter and was justified under s. 1 only where the charges may be tried by a jury; the provision was therefore read down to that extent.

The interpretation ruling applying the ban to all jointly charged accused was upheld, and no costs were awarded.