Jill A. Prenger

The Crown prosecuted two accused arising from the exploitation of two underage complainants in the sex trade in Brantford hotel rooms over two time periods.

The trial judge undertook an extensive credibility and reliability assessment of the complainants, accepted their material evidence, and found corroboration in hotel evidence, phone extraction reports, online ad evidence, police testimony, and seized items.

Applying the human trafficking framework and exploitation factors, the court found that one accused recruited, transported, controlled, deceived, isolated, and financially exploited the complainants, and that the co-accused facilitated the procuring offence by acting in concert, supplying funds and a phone, and participating in the hotel arrangements.

Guilty findings were entered on the trafficking, material benefit, advertising, procuring, identity-information, and proceeds counts.

Heeralal Ramdeo was convicted after a judge-alone trial for kidnapping, use of an imitation firearm to commit assault, and possession of a weapon for a purpose dangerous to public peace.

The Crown alleged Ramdeo masterminded the kidnapping of Dharwant Gill to locate Paul, who had stolen drugs from Ramdeo.

Gill's testimony, though inconsistent and from an unsavoury witness (treated as Vetrovec), was corroborated by other evidence.

The court found a conspiracy proven beyond a reasonable doubt and Ramdeo's probable membership.

Ramdeo's defence was rejected as unreasonable.

He was found guilty on most counts but acquitted of uttering threats due to reasonable doubt regarding the specific content of threats.

J.G. was convicted of sex trade-related offenses (influencing/directing, advertising, obtaining material benefit from a minor's sex trade) and child pornography offenses (possession and distribution).

The court imposed a global sentence of 4 years and six months.

Key legal considerations included the unconstitutionality of mandatory minimum sentences for the sex trade offenses, the inadmissibility of the accused's unrequested disciplinary records from custody, and the application of systemic racism as a mitigating factor in sentencing Black offenders.

The court found mandatory minimums unconstitutional, excluded the disciplinary records, and took judicial notice of systemic racism's deleterious impacts as a mitigating factor.

Credit for pre-trial custody and lockdown days due to COVID-19 was also applied.

In a judge-alone criminal trial subject to a publication ban, the Crown alleged that the accused exploited a 17-year-old complainant in connection with sex trade activity, online advertisements, and related offences.

The trial judge rejected the complainant's evidence that she had entered the sex trade unwillingly, finding instead that she participated voluntarily, which defeated the human trafficking and procuring theories.

The court nevertheless found that one accused actively managed the communications, advertisements, pricing, and operational aspects of the sex trade activity, knew the complainant was under 18, and thereby influenced her movements for the purpose of facilitating the provision of sexual services for consideration.

That accused was convicted of influencing a minor contrary to s. 286.3(2), advertising sexual services, receiving a material benefit, and possessing and distributing child pornography; the co-accused was acquitted on all counts.

The accused, charged with sexual services offences including procuring, sought to cross-examine the complainant about her prior and subsequent involvement in the sex trade.

The Crown objected, arguing the accused must comply with the procedures in s. 276 of the Criminal Code or analogous common law rules established in Seaboyer.

The court declined to follow a recent coordinate decision that extended Seaboyer to sexual services offences, holding that such an extension would exceed the bounds of incremental common law change and circumvent Parliament's deliberate choice not to include these offences in s. 276.

The court concluded that existing rules of evidence are sufficient to protect the trial process from irrelevant and prejudicial evidence.

This ruling addresses the admissibility of evidence obtained during a traffic stop where the defendant, a passenger, was questioned and his personal information was subsequently run through a police database.

The court found that the police officer's actions constituted an unreasonable search and seizure under Section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, as the passenger was psychologically detained without reasonable suspicion and compelled to provide identification.

The officer's testimony regarding the voluntariness of the information and the purpose of the questioning was deemed incredible.

Applying the framework from R. v. Grant, the court concluded that the Charter breach was serious, the evidence was conscriptive and created by the breach, and its admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

Consequently, the evidence was excluded from the trial.

The accused was charged with procuring, advertising sexual services, receiving material benefit, and uttering threats.

A preliminary issue arose regarding the applicability of s. 276 of the Criminal Code to evidence of the complainant's past sexual activity.

The Crown argued s. 276 applied, asserting that the procuring charge implied a lack of consent, effectively making the sexual activity sexual assault (a listed offence under s. 276).

The defence argued s. 276 did not apply as none of the charged offences are listed in s. 276(1), nor are they predicate or included offences.

The court ruled that s. 276 was not applicable, distinguishing between "control" in procuring and the vitiation of consent required for sexual assault, and noting Parliament's deliberate exclusion of sexual services offences from s. 276(1) in recent amendments.

The applicant, Tevin Wheatley, sought a bail review under section 520 of the Criminal Code after his detention was ordered due to breaching previous bail conditions related to serious human trafficking and dangerous driving charges.

The review was premised on a material change in circumstances: the presentation of a new surety (Minister Brenda Clarke) and a plan incorporating GPS electronic monitoring.

The court considered the admissibility of the new evidence under the modified Palmer criteria as per R. v. St. Cloud.

The judge found the new surety and GPS monitoring sufficiently mitigated the secondary (public safety) and tertiary (confidence in the administration of justice) grounds for detention.

Consequently, the applicant was released on a $5,000 recognizance with strict conditions, including GPS monitoring, residency with the surety, and restrictions on phone/internet use and travel.

Following conviction for sexual assault and sexual interference arising from historic sexual touching of a six-year-old child by a trusted family member, the court determined a fit sentence.

The defence argued for a conditional sentence and raised Charter issues concerning the applicable minimum punishment under s. 11(i), while the Crown sought a custodial term and a stay of the sexual assault count.

The court held that denunciation and general deterrence predominated in sentencing sexual offences against children, particularly where there was a breach of trust and significant victim impact.

A conditional sentence was found inappropriate, the sexual assault conviction was stayed, and a custodial sentence of six months less a day followed by two years' probation was imposed, together with ancillary orders.

The accused was charged with three offences: recruiting, holding, concealing, harbouring or exercising control over a person under 18 years of age to offer or provide sexual services for consideration contrary to section 286.3(2) of the Criminal Code; receiving a financial or material benefit from the commission of an offence under section 286.1(2) contrary to section 286.2(2); and knowingly advertising an offer to provide sexual services for consideration contrary to section 286.4.

The Crown's case relied primarily on the testimony of the complainant, a vulnerable 17-year-old who was homeless, drug-addicted, and desperate for money when she met the accused through Instagram.

The court found the complainant credible and reliable, and determined that the accused recruited her into sex work, controlled her movements, plied her with drugs, created a Backpage advertisement using her photographs, and took money from her after she engaged with a client.

The accused was found guilty on all three counts.

In a historical child sexual abuse prosecution involving two complainants from the same family, the court assessed reliability concerns arising from delayed disclosure, childhood memory, inconsistencies, and an alleged family falling-out said to support collusion.

Applying the W. (D.) framework and principles governing children's evidence, the court rejected the accused's evidence and found that one complainant's detailed account bore sufficient indicia of reliability despite inconsistencies attributable to age and the passage of time.

The court found reasonable doubt on the counts relating to the second complainant, including on intent and whether the brief over-clothing contact was sexual in nature.

Convictions were entered on two counts and acquittals on two counts.

The accused, jointly charged with firearms offences, brought applications for a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter, alleging their s. 11(b) rights to a trial within a reasonable time were breached.

The total time from charge to the anticipated end of trial was approximately 33.5 months.

The court analyzed the delay, attributing portions to inherent time requirements, neutral delay (including illness of counsel and accommodating co-accused's counsel), and institutional delay.

The court found the institutional delay of approximately 16 months fell within the combined Morin guidelines for provincial and superior courts.

Balancing the prejudice against the societal interest in trying serious firearms charges, the court dismissed the applications.

The accused was charged with several firearms offences after taking a firearm and ammunition from a vehicle and delivering them to an acquaintance for safekeeping.

The defence argued that the accused acted under duress arising from threats of death or serious bodily harm by an abusive partner with a violent criminal history.

The court assessed the common law defence of duress using the framework from Supreme Court of Canada authorities and considered evidence of threats, fear, the accused’s circumstances including drug dependency and abuse, and whether a safe avenue of escape existed.

The court concluded that the threats were credible, temporally connected to the accused’s conduct, and reasonably believed by the accused.

Although alternatives may have existed objectively, the accused’s circumstances undermined the availability of a safe avenue of escape, and the proportionality requirement was satisfied.

The accused brought pre-trial motions challenging the admissibility of a firearm seized pursuant to a telewarrant and utterances made to police during the search.

The court upheld the search warrant, finding the confidential informant's tip was sufficiently compelling, credible, and corroborated to justify the warrant, resulting in no section 8 Charter breach.

Regarding the utterances, the court found statements made to one officer were voluntary and admissible, but statements made to another officer were obtained in violation of the accused's section 10(b) Charter rights because the officer failed to advise him of the availability of duty counsel via a toll-free number.

The latter statements were excluded under section 24(2).

The accused was convicted by a jury of manslaughter in the death of her three‑year‑old child following a prolonged pattern of physical abuse.

Medical evidence established multiple blunt‑force injuries of varying ages, including skull fractures and internal bleeding, culminating in a fatal head injury inflicted while the child was in the accused’s sole care.

The court rejected the accused’s explanation that earlier injuries resulted from an accidental bookcase incident and found beyond a reasonable doubt that she had inflicted numerous prior assaults over weeks or months.

Emphasizing denunciation and deterrence in cases involving violence against vulnerable children and abuse of parental trust, the court imposed a substantial penitentiary term.

Immigration consequences were considered but given only modest weight.

During a jury trial for second degree murder arising from the death of a young child, the defence sought to call a kinesiologist as a forensic expert to testify that the child’s fatal injuries could have resulted from a series of accidental falls.

Applying the admissibility framework for expert evidence set out in Mohan and Abbey, the court found the proposed witness was not properly qualified and that the proposed field of "forensic kinesiology" was not a recognized scientific discipline.

The court also found the proposed opinion relied on limited anecdotal factual foundations and reflected an advocacy-driven approach rather than objective expertise.

The probative value of the evidence was minimal and its prejudicial effect significant because it purported to address the ultimate issue of accident versus homicide.

The application to admit the expert evidence was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for dangerous driving, arguing that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence and failed to properly consider evidence suggesting the driving was the result of a momentary lapse.

The appellant also argued the trial judge relied on extrinsic information relating to possible alcohol impairment despite the withdrawal of the excess blood alcohol charge.

The court reviewed the applicable standards of review for factual and legal errors and considered whether the trial judge failed to address potentially exculpatory evidence.

The court held that the trial judge properly considered the evidence, rejected the momentary lapse explanation, and did not rely on extrinsic information.

The conviction was upheld.

During a trial for second-degree murder involving the death of a three-year-old child, the Crown sought to introduce graphic autopsy photographs.

The accused objected, arguing the photographs were highly prejudicial and would alienate the jury.

The court ruled the photographs admissible, finding they were necessary to demonstrate the nature and extent of the injuries, which was critical to the Crown's theory that the injuries were inflicted deliberately rather than accidentally.

The court concluded the probative value of the photographs outweighed their prejudicial effect, subject to limiting instructions to the jury.

The accused, charged with second-degree murder following the death of her three-year-old child from blunt force head trauma, applied for a directed verdict on both second-degree murder and manslaughter.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence and expert medical testimony indicating the child suffered multiple inflicted injuries of varying ages while in the exclusive care of the accused.

The court applied the Sheppard test and found sufficient evidence upon which a reasonable jury could conclude the accused committed an unlawful act causing death, and that she had the requisite intent for murder.

The application for a directed verdict was dismissed.

The accused applied under s. 591(3) of the Criminal Code to sever an indictment charging multiple assaults against his children and assaults and sexual assaults against his former spouse.

The court considered the interests of justice test articulated in R. v. Last, balancing potential prejudice to the accused from a combined trial against the public interest in efficient proceedings and minimizing repeated testimony by child witnesses.

The court found a significant risk of propensity reasoning if all counts were tried together but also recognized the burden of requiring the children to testify in multiple trials.

As a compromise, the court ordered severance only of the sexual assault counts relating to the spouse, while leaving the remaining counts to proceed together.