Marianne Salih

The Crown brought an urgent application for certiorari and mandamus to quash a Justice of the Peace's decision to strike a bail hearing under s. 515(6) of the Criminal Code.

The Justice of the Peace struck the hearing after the proposed surety made a profane remark and then lied about it, deeming it unfair to the accused.

The Superior Court found that the Justice of the Peace lacked jurisdiction to strike the proceeding, as the witness's conduct, while unexpected, did not impair the accused's right to a fair hearing or engage principles of fundamental justice.

The court emphasized that a bail hearing is not subject to a "do-over" simply because a release plan falters.

The application was granted, quashing the decision and ordering the bail hearing to be completed.

The accused, Mireille Pardieu, was charged with manslaughter after restraining Fadumo Hassan, who subsequently died due to complications of chest compression exacerbated by cocaine and ethanol intoxication.

The defense argued self-defence under section 34 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown conceded an air of reality to self-defence but argued the force used was disproportionate, specifically the duration of restraint after the victim stopped resisting.

The court found Ms. Pardieu's actions reasonable, noting her belief of ongoing threat and the unknown contributing factors of the victim's drug and alcohol use, which a reasonable person would not have known would make the restraint fatal.

The Crown failed to disprove self-defence beyond a reasonable doubt.

Mark Buckley, charged with unlawfully being in a dwelling, possession for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of proceeds of crime, applied under section 24(2) of the Charter to exclude all evidence.

He alleged violations of his rights under sections 7, 8, and 10(b), specifically regarding delayed rights to counsel, failure to caution, questioning before counsel access, and unlawful search of his bag.

The court found a minor breach of the duty to hold off questioning in the police car but no other Charter breaches.

Applying the Grant test, the court determined that the seriousness of the breach was low, its impact on Buckley minimal, and society's interest in adjudication on the merits high.

Consequently, the application to exclude evidence was dismissed, and all evidence was deemed admissible.

The appellant appealed convictions for four counts of sexual assault, one count of assault, and one count of forcible confinement, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing the complainant's credibility and reliability by treating memory gaps and inconsistencies as enhancing factors, and materially misapprehended the evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly grappled with the difficulties in the complainant's evidence, provided rational explanations for her findings, and that her credibility findings were owed deference.

The Crown sought a long-term offender (LTO) declaration and a 10-year long-term supervision order (LTSO) against the offender, Jeffrey Bluecloud, following his conviction for multiple bank robberies and associated charges.

The offender conceded LTO status but sought a lower reformatory sentence and a 5-year LTSO.

The court designated the offender as an LTO, imposing a further sentence of 15 months in a provincial reformatory and a 7-year LTSO.

The decision emphasized public safety through rehabilitation, considering the offender's Indigenous background and the unsuitability of a federal penitentiary sentence due to likely segregation preventing access to programming.

The accused were charged with firearms offences after police found two loaded handguns in satchels in the back seat of a rented vehicle they were occupying.

The Crown relied on circumstantial evidence and DNA profiles linking the accused to the firearms.

The court acquitted one accused entirely, finding reasonable doubt regarding his knowledge and control of the firearms.

The other accused was acquitted of charges relating to one firearm due to the possibility of indirect DNA transfer, but convicted of possession of the second firearm.

The court also held that the second firearm, which was inoperable but easily repairable, met the definition of a firearm for simple possession but not for possession in a motor vehicle or possession of a loaded firearm.

The appellants, Roslyn Blake and Claire Graham, appealed their convictions, seeking a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay under section 11(b) of the Charter, relying on the framework established in *R. v. Jordan*.

The Court of Appeal assumed, without deciding, that Ms. Graham's net delay could exceed 30 months.

However, the court upheld the trial judge's finding in Ms. Blake's case that the complexity of the matter justified the delay beyond the presumptive ceiling, noting that this assessment was equally applicable to both co-accused appellants.

The court emphasized the deference owed to the trial judge's expertise in assessing case complexity.

The appeals were dismissed.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's decision to exclude evidence obtained during a border search, finding that a border services officer violated the respondent's ss. 7 and 10 Charter rights.

The trial judge determined that the officer had formed a particularized suspicion, engaging the respondent's Charter rights, and applied the R. v. Grant test to exclude the evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Crown's appeal, deferring to the trial judge's fact-driven findings, particularly on the officer's credibility, and finding no reversible error in the s. 24(2) analysis.

The appellant was convicted of importing heroin after 1.8 kilograms of the drug were found hidden in his suitcase.

He appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in her jury instructions on circumstantial evidence by failing to explicitly state that exculpatory inferences need not arise from proven facts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the jury was adequately and sufficiently instructed in accordance with the principles in Villaroman, and that the charge as a whole did not shift the burden of proof to the accused.

The appellant, convicted of second-degree murder, appealed on two grounds: the constitutionality of the amended s. 232(2) of the Criminal Code regarding provocation, and alleged errors in the trial judge's jury charge on the Not Criminally Responsible (NCR) defence.

The Court of Appeal declined to rule on the constitutional question, finding it was raised tactically for the first time on appeal and lacked an air of reality.

The court also found no reversible error in the NCR instructions, clarifying that the jury was properly guided on the disjunctive nature of the s. 16 test.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Dalien Ilunga, appealed his conviction for sexual assault and failure to comply with a probation order, advancing three grounds: the trial judge erred in shifting the burden of proof, provided insufficient reasons, and trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's application of the burden of proof or sufficiency of reasons.

Regarding ineffective assistance, the court found trial counsel did not deprive the appellant of his right to testify and that counsel's overall strategy and advice, despite some flawed understanding of legal principles regarding prior convictions and utterances, fell within the range of reasonable professional assistance.

Malachi Brown was found guilty by a jury of assault with a weapon and using an imitation firearm while committing an assault with a weapon.

The court addressed the Kienapple rule, determining it did not prevent multiple convictions for these offences due to Parliament's intent to displace it for s. 85 of the Criminal Code.

Considering aggravating factors (use of imitation firearm, victim's age, breach of trust) and mitigating factors (first offender, youth, family support, anti-Black racism social context), the court sentenced Brown to a total of eighteen months imprisonment, to be served as a conditional sentence in the community, followed by two years of probation.

A ten-year weapons prohibition and a DNA order were also imposed.

The appellant, Mohinder Saini, appealed his conviction for four counts of dangerous driving causing death and nine counts of dangerous driving causing bodily harm, as well as his six-year sentence.

The collision involved 17 vehicles, resulting in four fatalities and nine serious injuries.

At trial, the appellant claimed momentary inattention due to undiagnosed sleep apnea and "microsleep" but the trial judge rejected this, finding his conduct a marked departure from the standard of care.

On appeal, Saini argued the trial judge applied uneven scrutiny to defence evidence, the sentence was unfit, and his s. 14 Charter right to an interpreter was breached.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no palpable or overriding error in the trial judge's assessment of evidence, the sentence was within the appropriate range, and while some interpretation errors occurred during the reading of sentencing reasons, they were not material to the trial's fairness or the appellant's ability to participate, ordering a certified translation of the reasons as a remedy.

The Crown applied under s. 714.1 of the Criminal Code for an order permitting a key witness, residing in Nova Scotia, to testify by video conference at the trial.

The respondent opposed, arguing mere inconvenience was insufficient to displace the presumption of in-person testimony.

The court granted the application, finding that despite the witness's convenience being the primary reason, the evidence was constrained, safeguards could be implemented, and significant court staffing shortages in Toronto justified the order to prevent further delays, especially given the accused was in custody.

The order was conditional on the witness testifying from a courthouse to preserve solemnity.

The offender, Pitchou Kanyanga, pleaded guilty to procuring a person to offer sexual services for consideration, receiving a material benefit from sexual services, and advertising sexual services.

The Crown sought a five-year jail sentence, while the defence requested a three-year sentence with enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody, aiming for a time-served disposition.

The court found the offender's conduct to be at the lower end of the exploitative scale compared to other cases.

Considering aggravating factors such as a lengthy criminal record and possession of a firearm, and mitigating factors including a guilty plea, remorse, difficult upbringing, and strong family support, the court initially warranted a four-year imprisonment.

However, significant "Duncan credit" was applied due to harsh pre-sentence custody conditions (lockdowns, triple-bunking), resulting in a net sentence of one day in jail, effectively time served.

Ancillary orders included a lifetime weapons prohibition and a DNA sample order.

The accused, Jude Egwu, was arrested for sexual assault and gave a statement to police after invoking his right to counsel.

His lawyer, a casual friend practicing family and immigration law, provided no legal advice regarding his right to silence or self-incrimination.

A blended voir dire was held to determine the admissibility of the statement.

The court found that while the police complied with s. 10(b) Charter, the lawyer's complete failure to provide advice, coupled with the accused's lack of comprehension of the primary police caution, created a fundamental unfairness in the interrogation process.

Although not a Charter violation attributable to the state, the court exercised its common law power under s. 24(1) of the Charter to exclude the portion of the accused's statement where he became evasive and conspicuously dodged questions about having sex with the complainant, as its admission would infect the appearance of a fair trial.

The defendants were sentenced following their convictions for kidnapping (both defendants) and aggravated assault, robbery, and uttering death threats (one defendant).

The court considered aggravating factors, including the use of a firearm and severe injuries to the victim, and mitigating factors such as youth, lack of prior records, and compliance with release conditions.

The decision also addressed constitutional challenges to minimum sentences and a victim restitution request.

The first defendant received 4 years and 3 months for kidnapping, while the second defendant received a global sentence of 4 years and 9 months for kidnapping, aggravated assault, and robbery (death threats stayed).

The appellant, convicted of second-degree murder, appealed on three grounds: the trial judge's alleged errors in jury instructions regarding after-the-fact conduct evidence and the relationship between intoxication and accident, and the unreasonableness of the verdict.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's comprehensive and fair instructions on after-the-fact conduct, which were vetted by the parties and relevant to the appellant's state of mind.

The court also found no reversible error in the intoxication instructions, noting that the jury was properly equipped to consider all evidence.

Finally, the court concluded that the second-degree murder verdict was reasonable, as there was sufficient inculpatory evidence for a properly instructed jury to reach that conclusion.

The appellant, J.C., appealed five convictions for assault and assault with a weapon against his former domestic partner, BOH, arguing that the trial judge's reasons were insufficient.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge's reasons deficient but determined that for four of the five counts (assault and assault with a weapon involving a frying pan and knife), the convictions were supported by the record and the deficiencies did not preclude meaningful appellate review.

However, for the conviction of assault with a drill, the court found the reasons critically insufficient as the conviction was not supported by unambiguous, independent, and contemporaneous confirmatory evidence, making it impossible to discern the trial judge's path to the verdict.

Consequently, the appeal was allowed in part, setting aside the conviction for assault with a drill and ordering a new trial on that count, while dismissing the appeal for the other four counts.

The Crown brought a pre-trial motion seeking a ruling on the admissibility of WhatsApp messages between the complainant and the respondent in a sexual assault trial.

The Crown argued that the respondent's silence in response to the complainant's direct allegation of non-consensual sexual activity in the messages constituted an adoptive admission.

The motion also addressed the admissibility of implied "other sexual activity" (paternity testing) within the messages, engaging s. 276 of the Criminal Code.

The court granted the Crown's application, finding that the respondent's silence could reasonably be considered an adoptive admission by a jury.

The court also ruled that the evidence of paternity testing was admissible as critical background, with proper jury instructions to prevent twin myth reasoning.

The defence was permitted to adduce evidence of any prior denials by the respondent.