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Circumstantial case failed to prove identity in sprawling online harassment prosecution.
The accused faced charges arising from a sustained online harassment campaign involving sexually explicit videos, pornographic material, and demeaning messages directed at the complainant, her then boyfriend, and others in their social and professional circles.
The Crown relied entirely on circumstantial evidence to prove identity, alleging motive, means, opportunity, exclusive knowledge, and sophisticated efforts to mask the source of the communications.
The court applied the circumstantial evidence framework and found that, although the evidence raised suspicion and pointed toward the accused in some respects, it did not establish that guilt was the only reasonable conclusion available on the whole of the evidence.
Concerns about the credibility and reliability of key witnesses, the lack of forensic linkage to the accused’s seized devices, and unresolved alternative inferences arising from third-party internet attribution created a reasonable doubt.
The accused was acquitted on all counts.
No Charter breach arose from arrest and phone seizure in a shelter lounge.
In a criminal trial, the self-represented accused sought exclusion of cell phone evidence following his arrest in the public lounge of an emergency shelter on charges arising from threatening emails to an elected official.
The court held that, although the accused subjectively viewed the shelter as his home, he had no objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the shared, openly accessible, supervised lounge area.
The arrest was supported by reasonable grounds and was not arbitrary, and the seizure of the phone was a valid search incident to lawful arrest followed by a judicially authorized forensic search.
In the alternative, even if ss. 8 or 9 had been breached, the evidence would have been admitted under the Grant framework.
The court admitted the accused's post-arrest statement, finding he had an operating mind despite experiencing psychotic symptoms.
The court considered whether A.O.'s post-arrest statement to police was voluntary, given his mental health history and evidence of psychosis.
After reviewing the circumstances of the arrest, A.O.'s mental state, and the content of the police interview, the court found that A.O. had the capacity to understand what he was saying and that his statement could be used against him.
The application to admit the statement was granted.
The court granted the Crown's application to allow the complainant to testify via CCTV.
This ruling addresses the Crown’s application for the complainant to testify via CCTV in a sexual assault and assault by choking prosecution.
The court grants the application, finding that the complainant’s concerns about testifying in the presence of the accused and before a jury are reasonably held and that testifying via CCTV will facilitate a full and candid account of her evidence.
The decision reviews the legislative amendments to section 486.2(2) of the Criminal Code, clarifies that necessity is no longer the standard, and emphasizes the importance of balancing the interests of the complainant and the accused’s right to a fair trial.
Summary conviction appeal allowed and new trial ordered due to errors in s. 10(b) Charter analysis.
The Crown appealed a summary conviction acquittal of the accused on a charge of operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams.
The trial judge had excluded the breath readings after finding a breach of the accused's s. 10(b) Charter rights because the officer did not facilitate the right to counsel while waiting for an Approved Screening Device to arrive.
The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred in law by failing to assess whether the accused had a realistic opportunity to consult counsel and by misapplying the s. 24(2) analysis.
The acquittal was set aside and a new trial ordered.
Motion for state-funded counsel and transcripts on appeal dismissed due to appellant's sufficient financial resources.
The appellant, representing himself, brought a motion requesting state-funded counsel and state-paid transcripts for his summary conviction appeal pursuant to sections 683(1) and 684(1) of the Criminal Code.
The court assessed the appellant's financial circumstances, noting he receives a federal pension, owns a home and vacant land with significant equity, and has access to financial help from family.
Finding that the appellant has sufficient resources to pay the estimated $14,000 for counsel and transcripts, and noting the apparent weakness of the appeal, the court concluded it was not in the interests of justice to grant the requests.
The motion was dismissed and a timetable for the appeal was set.
Appeal from assault convictions dismissed; trial judge correctly rejected self-defence claim for stabbing unarmed victim.
The appellant appealed his convictions for assault with a weapon and assault causing bodily harm arising from a stabbing at a wedding reception.
The appellant argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence and erred in applying the law of self-defence.
The Superior Court of Justice found the trial judge correctly applied the three-part test for self-defence under section 34 of the Criminal Code and reasonably concluded the appellant's response was disproportionate and not a justified act of self-defence.
The appeal against conviction was dismissed, though the victim fine surcharge was set aside.
The court excluded breath test evidence due to a systemic s. 10(b) breach but convicted the accused of impaired driving based on physical observations.
The defendant was charged with operating a conveyance while impaired by alcohol and having a blood alcohol level of 80 mg or more within two hours of operating a conveyance.
The trial proceeded as a blended voir dire.
The defendant challenged the admissibility of breath test evidence on multiple grounds: that the approved screening device demand was not made immediately; that his s. 10(b) right to counsel was breached by an eight-minute delay in informing him of that right; and that the Intoxlyzer test was not administered as soon as practicable.
The court found a breach of s. 10(b) rights and excluded the breath test evidence under s. 24(2) due to a pattern of systemic failures by the Ottawa Police Service to immediately advise detainees of their right to counsel.
However, the defendant was found guilty of impaired operation of a conveyance based on evidence of his driving pattern, physical observations, and the presence of alcohol in the vehicle.
Breath sample evidence was excluded due to a section 10(b) Charter breach while awaiting a roadside screening device.
The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood contrary to the Criminal Code.
The trial proceeded on a blended basis with evidence applicable to both a Charter voir dire and the trial proper.
The central issue was whether the Crown had proven the charge beyond a reasonable doubt, with particular focus on whether the breath samples were obtained "as soon as practicable" and whether the accused's Charter rights were violated.
The court found a serious breach of the accused's section 10(b) Charter rights when the officer failed to advise the accused of his rights to counsel during the period between the ASD demand and the arrival of the approved screening device.
The court excluded the breath sample evidence pursuant to section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.
As a result, the Crown could not prove the charge and the allegations were dismissed.
The court has jurisdiction under section 486.3 to appoint counsel for an unrepresented defendant in a peace bond hearing.
The Crown brought an application under section 486.3 of the Criminal Code seeking to have counsel appointed to cross-examine the complainant on behalf of the defendant in a peace bond hearing under section 810 of the Criminal Code.
The defendant appeared in person.
The court ruled that it had jurisdiction to make the order, finding that the Criminal Code procedures and provisions apply to proceedings under section 810 by virtue of section 810(5), which provides that the summary conviction procedures apply with necessary modifications.