Marianne Salih

The appellant appealed his designation as a dangerous offender and the imposition of an indeterminate sentence following convictions for sexual assault and prostitution-related offences.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge erred in concluding that the appellant showed a likelihood of causing harm through a failure to control sexual impulses, as required for a dangerous offender designation under s. 753(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The court held that the evidence of prostitution-related activities, while harmful, did not demonstrate a failure to control sexual impulses.

The appeal was allowed, the dangerous offender designation was set aside, and the appellant was designated a long-term offender with a determinate sentence of 6.5 years and a 10-year long-term supervision order, effective from the original sentencing date.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's decision declaring certain Criminal Code provisions related to sexual services unconstitutional and sought a stay of the declaration pending appeal.

The Court of Appeal applied the tripartite test from RJR-MacDonald Inc., finding a serious question to be tried, irreparable harm to the Crown (public confusion, impact on law enforcement), and that the balance of convenience favoured granting the stay, especially given the short duration of the stay until the appeal hearing.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittals for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

At trial, a key Crown witness recanted her videorecorded police statement in which she described witnessing the respondent sell cocaine.

The trial judge permitted the Crown to cross-examine the witness under s. 9(2) of the Canada Evidence Act but dismissed the Crown's application to admit the statement for the truth of its contents under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge made multiple errors in his hearsay analysis, including improperly assessing necessity based on the overall strength of the Crown's case, failing to recognize the witness's availability for cross-examination as a procedural safeguard, and improperly exercising his residual discretion.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for assault causing bodily harm arising from an altercation at a bush party.

At trial, the appellant claimed self-defence, but the trial judge rejected his testimony and convicted him.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in assessing credibility.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the trial judge erred by relying on ungrounded common-sense assumptions about human behaviour to reject the appellant's testimony and by failing to consider corroborative defence evidence before concluding the appellant was not credible.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, Romy Desir, appealed an adult sentence for multiple serious crimes, including three jewelry store robberies and aggravated assault, committed when he was 16 years old.

The sentencing judge imposed a global sentence of seven years.

The appellant argued the judge erred in imposing an adult sentence and failed to apply the principle of restraint.

The Court of Appeal upheld the adult sentence, finding no error in the rebuttal of the presumption of diminished moral blameworthiness.

However, the court found that the sentencing judge failed to properly apply the principle of restraint, which dictates that a first penitentiary sentence for a youthful offender should be as short as possible.

Consequently, the global sentence was reduced from seven years to six years less credit for pre-sentence custody.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder, brought a Garofoli application challenging a production order for his cell phone records, arguing the Information to Obtain (ITO) contained significant errors and omissions violating section 8 of the Charter.

The court found that while the affiant made several errors due to inexperience and negligence, there was no intent to mislead.

After excising the errors and amplifying the ITO, sufficient reliable evidence remained to justify the production order.

The court concluded there was no section 8 violation and noted that, even if a breach had occurred, the evidence would be admitted under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The appellant was convicted of assault with a weapon, possession of a weapon, break and enter, and theft.

Identity was the primary issue at trial.

The trial judge found the appellant guilty, rejecting his explanation for his whereabouts as fabricated.

The Court of Appeal allowed the conviction appeal, finding that the trial judge erred by drawing an inference of guilt from a finding of fabrication without independent evidence.

The convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered on all charges.

The sentence appeal was not addressed.

The appellant, Taylor Griffith, appealed his conviction for unlawful possession of a loaded semi-automatic handgun and cocaine for trafficking, and sought leave to appeal his sentence.

The main issue was the exclusion of evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter due to a s. 10(b) right to counsel breach.

The Court of Appeal found that while the police had objectively reasonable grounds for arrest and search incident to arrest, and were justified in delaying counsel access during warrant execution due to officer safety concerns, an unexplained 80-minute delay after warrants were executed did constitute a s. 10(b) breach.

However, applying the Grant test, the court determined that admitting the reliable and crucial evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute, given the unintentional and situation-specific nature of the breach and its moderate impact on the appellant's Charter interests.

The court also found no error in the trial judge's decision not to reduce the sentence based on the s. 10(b) breach, as it did not relate to the circumstances of the offence or offender.

Both the conviction and sentence appeals were dismissed.

In a pre-trial motion for a first-degree murder case, the Crown sought to admit several pieces of evidence.

The court admitted antemortem statements of the deceased and evidence that one of the accused was a marijuana dealer, finding the latter's probative value in establishing narrative and identity outweighed its prejudicial effect.

However, the court excluded rap lyrics found on the other accused's phone, ruling that their limited probative value as circumstantial evidence of participation was outweighed by significant moral and reasoning prejudice.

The appellant, an unlicensed practitioner of Traditional Chinese Medicine, appealed his conviction for sexual assault against a patient.

He argued the trial judge misapprehended text message evidence regarding the evolution of their relationship and applied uneven scrutiny to his testimony compared to the complainant's.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's credibility assessments were supported by the evidence, any misapprehension was not central to the conviction, and the scrutiny of the evidence was balanced and fair.

The accused, Danna Millan, sought a bail review after being detained on tertiary grounds for serious charges including drug trafficking, firearms offences, aggravated assault, kidnapping, and extortion.

The application was based on a material change in circumstances, specifically the COVID-19 crisis and the addition of a third surety.

The court found that the proposed release plan, including three sureties and strict house arrest, sufficiently addressed the tertiary grounds, and granted release.

The appellant, Zi-Yue Huang, appealed a 12-month sentence for three counts of robbery, arguing the sentencing judge erred by not crediting pre-sentence custody and by treating his mental health as an aggravating factor.

The Court of Appeal found the sentencing judge erred in failing to credit pre-sentence custody without providing reasons, which impacted the sentence.

However, the court found no error in how the sentencing judge considered the appellant's mental health.

The appeal was allowed, and the sentence was adjusted to reflect credit for pre-sentence custody.

The appellant, O'Neil Thompson, appealed his conviction for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario found that the trial judge erred in not finding an arbitrary detention under s. 9 of the Charter when police boxed in the appellant's car without reasonable grounds.

The Court also confirmed a serious breach of s. 10(b) due to a systemic issue within the Peel Regional Police regarding the immediate provision of the right to counsel.

Applying the s. 24(2) Charter analysis, the Court concluded that the serious nature of the Charter breaches, particularly the arbitrary detention and the systemic delay in advising of the right to counsel, outweighed society's interest in the admission of the evidence.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and an acquittal directed.

The appellant, a former fashion photographer, appealed his convictions for six counts of sexual assault and one count of sexual exploitation involving four young women, and his subsequent 51-month imprisonment sentence.

The appeal raised four grounds: the application judge's refusal to sever charges, the trial judge's decision to admit cross-count similar fact evidence, alleged errors in the jury charge, and the fitness of the sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding no errors in the lower court's decisions regarding severance, similar fact evidence admissibility, or jury instructions, and concluding the sentence was fit and within the appropriate range for the offences committed.

The appellant, Daniel Palmer, appealed his conviction for sexual exploitation of a minor (J.P.), who was his youth advisor.

The trial judge found Palmer guilty, disbelieving his testimony and concluding that the elements of sexual exploitation, including sexual purpose, were met.

Palmer argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence, erred in assessing mens rea by not considering J.P.'s testimony about punitive intent, and improperly considered a defence concession.

The appeal court dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge correctly applied the law regarding sexual purpose, which does not require the accused's sexual gratification, and properly assessed the evidence and mens rea.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, sexual interference, and uttering threats to cause death, as well as seeking leave to appeal his sentence of three years' imprisonment.

The sole ground of appeal from conviction concerned the sequence in which the trial judge disposed of a constitutional challenge to section 119(4) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act and a third party records application under section 278.3 of the Criminal Code.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred by first dismissing the third party records application and then treating the constitutional application as moot.

The Court of Appeal found no reversible error, holding that the appellant failed to demonstrate the extrajudicial measures record was potentially relevant, and therefore the Crown's duty to inquire was not triggered.

The sentence appeal was dismissed as the trial judge properly considered aggravating and mitigating factors.

Four accused were convicted of drug trafficking offences committed for the benefit of a criminal organization (the Five Point Generals), conspiracy to traffic controlled substances, and firearms offences following a three-month jury trial based largely on intercepted communications.

The appellants challenged their convictions on five grounds: jury selection procedures, cross-examination limitations of the Crown's expert witness, exclusion of defence expert evidence, admission of extrinsic misconduct evidence, and alleged imbalance in the jury charge.

They also appealed their sentences, primarily challenging the credit awarded for pre-sentence custody.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all conviction appeals and three of four sentence appeals, allowing only Shane Evans' sentence appeal based on inadequate credit for pre-sentence custody.

The accused was charged with firearm offences and obstructing a police officer following a shooting.

The police detained the accused and others in an apartment under exigent circumstances.

After the accused provided false names, he was arrested for obstruction of justice.

The police subsequently conducted a warrantless search of his cellphone, discovering photos of him holding a firearm used in the shooting.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging breaches of his rights under ss. 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b).

The court found multiple Charter violations, including an unlawful cellphone search, an unreasonable strip search, failure to file a Report to Justice for the cellphone extraction, and unreasonable delays in informing the accused of his firearm charges and facilitating his right to counsel.

Applying the s. 24(2) framework, the court concluded that the admission of the photos would bring the administration of justice into disrepute and excluded the evidence.

The appellant was convicted of importing almost two kilograms of cocaine and sentenced to six years imprisonment, less credit for pre-trial custody on a 1.5:1 basis plus an additional 90-day credit for harsh conditions in remand custody.

The appellant appealed, arguing that sections 719(1) and 719(3.1) of the Criminal Code violated her Charter rights under sections 7 and 12 by effectively requiring her to spend significantly longer in custody before becoming eligible for parole than an offender who had received bail.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that parole eligibility questions are not a component of the determination of a fit sentence, and that neither section 719(1) nor 719(3.1) delays parole eligibility or requires offenders denied bail to serve longer sentences than those granted bail.

The court also found no material misapprehension of evidence regarding the appellant's remorse.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The trial judge found a breach of the appellant's s. 8 Charter rights regarding the search of two vehicles, but declined to exclude the evidence under s. 24(2).

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in characterizing the breach as technical, failed to consider misleading information in the Information to Obtain, failed to consider the unlawful resort to a telewarrant, and incorrectly balanced the Grant factors.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the breach was minor and made in good faith, the impact on the appellant's rights was relatively low, and the evidence was highly reliable and central to the Crown's case.