Emmett Brownscombe

The appellant appealed his jury convictions for sexual assault and assault against his spouse.

He argued the trial judge erred by failing to give a limiting instruction regarding evidence of his controlling behaviour and by failing to caution against cross-count reasoning.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the contextual evidence was relevant to the issue of consent and that a cross-count reasoning caution was unnecessary because the physical and sexual assaults were inextricably linked.

The accused, Isiaha Gordon-Brown, pleaded guilty to five counts including trafficking in cocaine and fentanyl, possession of a prohibited firearm device, possession of a loaded restricted handgun, and possession of proceeds of crime.

He proceeded to a judge-alone trial on one count of drug trafficking in association with a criminal organization (the "Jungle Gang").

The court found him guilty on the criminal organization count based on circumstantial evidence demonstrating his association with the gang and his senior role in drug trafficking within their territory.

The court then proceeded to sentencing, considering aggravating factors such as the dangerous nature of the drugs and firearms, the commercial scale of trafficking, and the accused's senior position, balanced against strong mitigating factors including his lack of prior record, early guilty plea, and significant rehabilitative efforts in custody.

A total sentence of 15 years was imposed, reduced to 11 years by the totality principle, and further reduced by 31 months for pre-sentence custody, resulting in a remaining sentence of 8 years and 5 months.

The appellant, J.W., appealed his conviction for sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by relying on portions of the appellant's police statement that were not properly in evidence and by making a finding of fabrication without independent supporting evidence.

These errors deprived the appellant of a fair trial and impacted the assessment of his defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction was set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The applicant, CT, brought an application under s. 24(2) of the Charter to exclude Facebook messages from evidence in his sexual offence trial.

He argued the messages were seized without a warrant, breaching his s. 8 Charter rights, and that their admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The court found that the police conduct did not constitute a search or seizure engaging s. 8, as the complainant voluntarily provided the messages.

Furthermore, the court held that CT did not have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the messages, particularly given the exploitative nature of the adult-child relationship.

The application to exclude evidence was dismissed.

This is an appeal from convictions for receiving a material benefit, procuring, and advertising under the Criminal Code.

The appellant argued that the trial judge reversed the burden of proof by seeking positive evidence to support the defence theory.

The Court of Appeal reviewed the trial judge's reasons contextually and found that the judge understood and correctly applied the burden of proof, accepting the complainant's evidence which supported the elements of each offence.

The appeal was dismissed.