Emmett Brownscombe

The applicant, charged with murder, brought an application for disclosure of cell phone records from a separate homicide investigation, arguing they were relevant to a third party suspect defence.

The Crown argued the records were third party records subject to the O'Connor regime.

The court found that the police believed there was a connection between the two murders and that there was an air of reality to the third party suspect defence.

Consequently, the requested records were 'obviously relevant' and subject to the Crown's first party disclosure obligations under Stinchcombe.

However, the court found the applicant's request for the entirety of the cell phones' content was overly broad and ordered the Crown to provide a list of the types of information available so the applicant could make a tailored request.

The appellant appealed his jury convictions for sexual assault and assault against his spouse.

He argued the trial judge erred by failing to give a limiting instruction regarding evidence of his controlling behaviour and by failing to caution against cross-count reasoning.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the contextual evidence was relevant to the issue of consent and that a cross-count reasoning caution was unnecessary because the physical and sexual assaults were inextricably linked.

The accused, Isiaha Gordon-Brown, pleaded guilty to five counts including trafficking in cocaine and fentanyl, possession of a prohibited firearm device, possession of a loaded restricted handgun, and possession of proceeds of crime.

He proceeded to a judge-alone trial on one count of drug trafficking in association with a criminal organization (the "Jungle Gang").

The court found him guilty on the criminal organization count based on circumstantial evidence demonstrating his association with the gang and his senior role in drug trafficking within their territory.

The court then proceeded to sentencing, considering aggravating factors such as the dangerous nature of the drugs and firearms, the commercial scale of trafficking, and the accused's senior position, balanced against strong mitigating factors including his lack of prior record, early guilty plea, and significant rehabilitative efforts in custody.

A total sentence of 15 years was imposed, reduced to 11 years by the totality principle, and further reduced by 31 months for pre-sentence custody, resulting in a remaining sentence of 8 years and 5 months.

The appellant, J.W., appealed his conviction for sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by relying on portions of the appellant's police statement that were not properly in evidence and by making a finding of fabrication without independent supporting evidence.

These errors deprived the appellant of a fair trial and impacted the assessment of his defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction was set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The applicant, CT, brought an application under s. 24(2) of the Charter to exclude Facebook messages from evidence in his sexual offence trial.

He argued the messages were seized without a warrant, breaching his s. 8 Charter rights, and that their admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The court found that the police conduct did not constitute a search or seizure engaging s. 8, as the complainant voluntarily provided the messages.

Furthermore, the court held that CT did not have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the messages, particularly given the exploitative nature of the adult-child relationship.

The application to exclude evidence was dismissed.

This is an appeal from convictions for receiving a material benefit, procuring, and advertising under the Criminal Code.

The appellant argued that the trial judge reversed the burden of proof by seeking positive evidence to support the defence theory.

The Court of Appeal reviewed the trial judge's reasons contextually and found that the judge understood and correctly applied the burden of proof, accepting the complainant's evidence which supported the elements of each offence.

The appeal was dismissed.

During a murder trial, the Crown sought to introduce two pieces of evidence: an internet search conducted by an associate of the accused shortly after the shooting, and a video found on the associate's phone depicting the accused brandishing a firearm 11 days prior to the murder.

The court ruled the internet search inadmissible, finding its limited probative value was outweighed by its prejudicial effect.

However, the court admitted the video as prior discreditable conduct, concluding it was highly probative on the central issue of identity and its prejudicial effect could be mitigated by jury instructions.

The applicant, a young person charged with second-degree murder and firearms offences, brought a Charter application alleging violations of his rights under sections 10(a) and 12 during his arrest.

The police executed a search warrant using a dynamic entry and a violent struggle ensued when the applicant resisted arrest, resulting in officers punching him multiple times to gain control and seize a loaded firearm.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the section 10(a) right to be informed of the reasons for arrest did not accrue until the applicant was safely detained, which was delayed by his own actions.

Furthermore, the court held that the force used by the police was reasonable and justified under the circumstances, resulting in no section 12 violation.

The accused, charged with second-degree murder, sought to exclude a photograph taken of him surreptitiously by a police officer while he was seated in a courtroom for an unrelated matter.

The accused argued the photograph violated his rights under sections 7 and 8 of the Charter.

The court found no Charter breaches, noting there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in a public courtroom and no state compulsion involved.

However, the court exercised its residual discretion to exclude the photograph because the officer violated section 136 of the Courts of Justice Act, which prohibits taking photographs in a courtroom without judicial authorization.

In a youth prosecution for second degree murder arising from a fatal shooting at Dundas Square, the Crown brought a Leaney application seeking leave to adduce recognition evidence from several non-expert witnesses based on surveillance footage and images recovered from seized mobile phones.

The court applied the threshold admissibility principles governing recognition evidence, focusing on the witnesses' prior acquaintance and whether they were in a better position than the trier of fact to identify the persons depicted.

The court permitted recognition evidence from one investigating officer as to the accused and another individual, and from another officer as to a third individual, but excluded the proposed recognition evidence of three other witnesses for insufficient familiarity.

The ruling distinguished threshold admissibility from ultimate reliability, leaving reliability to the trier of fact.

The young person, charged with second degree murder, brought a Charter application challenging the validity of a search warrant executed at his residence.

He argued the Information to Obtain (ITO) failed to establish he resided at the address, the warrant was overly broad, the search of seized cell phones occurred outside the warrant's time limit, and the affiant deliberately misled the issuing justice.

The court dismissed the application, finding sufficient surveillance evidence linked the young person to the residence, the seizure of multiple phones was necessary, the forensic examination of the phones did not need to occur within the warrant's entry window, and there was no evidence of deliberate deception by police.

The young person, charged with second-degree murder, brought a Charter motion alleging a breach of section 8 rights regarding the search of a co-accused's mobile phone.

The applicant sought to exclude photographic and video evidence found on the device.

The court held that the applicant lacked standing, as there was no subjective or objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in images taken by another person in a group setting.

Furthermore, the court found the search warrant was validly issued based on reasonable and probable grounds.

The application was dismissed.

The accused was charged with refusing to provide a sample into an approved screening device under the Criminal Code and careless driving under the Highway Traffic Act.

The Crown proved the careless driving charge beyond a reasonable doubt based on evidence of aggressive and erratic driving, including high-speed passing and tailgating.

However, the court dismissed the refusal charge, finding that the accused's refusal was equivocal and that the officer rushed to judgment without affording the accused adequate opportunity to provide a sample, particularly given the accused's medical condition following a serious motor vehicle collision.