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The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the constitutionality of the Criminal Code's record screening regime for complainants' private records.
Two consolidated appeals challenging the constitutionality of ss. 278.92 to 278.94 of the Criminal Code (the 'record screening regime'), enacted by Bill C-51 in 2018.
The regime governs the admissibility of complainants' private records in the possession or control of the accused in sexual offence proceedings, and extends complainant participatory rights to admissibility hearings.
The majority held that the provisions do not infringe ss. 7, 11(c), or 11(d) of the Charter, finding that the admissibility threshold is rationally connected to Parliament's objective of protecting complainants' privacy and dignity, the Stage One application process is not overbroad, advance disclosure does not violate the right to silence or the privilege against self-incrimination, and complainant participation does not undermine trial fairness or prosecutorial independence.
Both Crown appeals were allowed, the cross-appeal by one accused was dismissed, and the complainant's appeal was allowed with costs.
Three judges dissented in part, concluding the record screening regime — though not the s. 276 regime — is unconstitutional.
Section 150.1 of the Criminal Code is not overbroad and does not violate the Charter.
The appellant, aged 21, engaged in a sexual relationship with a 15-year-old complainant.
He was convicted of sexual touching and sexual assault, as the age difference precluded the defence of consent under s. 150.1 of the Criminal Code.
The trial judge stayed the proceedings, finding s. 150.1 violated s. 7 of the Charter.
The summary conviction appeal court set aside the stay.
On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that s. 150.1 is not overbroad and does not violate s. 7 of the Charter, as its purpose is to protect children from sexual contact with adults due to inherent power imbalances.
The appeal was dismissed.
Appeal from drug conspiracy convictions dismissed; juror internet research did not compromise the verdict.
The appellants were convicted by a jury of conspiracy to traffic in cocaine and possession of proceeds of crime.
They appealed their convictions on the grounds that jurors were exposed to extrinsic information (including internet searches and old newspaper articles) during the trial, and that the trial judge erred in her instructions on the co-conspirator hearsay exception.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reasonable possibility that the extrinsic information affected the verdict given the trial judge's instructions and the nature of the information.
The court also upheld the trial judge's conspiracy instructions as compliant with the Carter and Mapara framework.
Appeal from sexual assault convictions dismissed; trial judge made no errors in credibility assessment.
The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and sexual exploitation of his foster child.
He argued the trial judge made several errors in assessing credibility, including reversing the burden of proof, misapprehending evidence, improperly using out-of-court statements as corroboration, and failing to address inconsistencies in the complainant's testimony.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly applied the W. (D.) principles, correctly admitted prior consistent statements as narrative, and made credibility findings that were fully supported by the record.
Sexual assault conviction upheld for chiropractor who surreptitiously masturbated while treating a patient.
The appellant, a chiropractor, appealed his sexual assault conviction arising from an incident where he massaged a patient's back with a tool while surreptitiously masturbating.
The appellant argued the contact was purely therapeutic and non-sexual.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that a reasonable observer would find the contact sexual in nature and that the complainant's sexual integrity had been violated without her consent.
Regulatory charges quashed as statute-barred due to regulator's failure to act within limitation period.
The defendants were charged with creating an unauthorized security interest in a credit union contrary to the Credit Unions and Caisses Populaires Act.
They brought a motion to quash the Information, arguing it was laid outside the two-year statutory limitation period.
The court found that the regulatory agency had knowledge of the material facts more than three years before the charge was laid, and that the failure to share this information with the Superintendent in a timely manner frustrated the limitation period.
The motion was granted, the Information was quashed, and the charges were dismissed.