Rebecca McConchie

The appellant, aged 21, engaged in a sexual relationship with a 15-year-old complainant.

He was convicted of sexual touching and sexual assault, as the age difference precluded the defence of consent under s. 150.1 of the Criminal Code.

The trial judge stayed the proceedings, finding s. 150.1 violated s. 7 of the Charter.

The summary conviction appeal court set aside the stay.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that s. 150.1 is not overbroad and does not violate s. 7 of the Charter, as its purpose is to protect children from sexual contact with adults due to inherent power imbalances.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants were convicted by a jury of conspiracy to traffic in cocaine and possession of proceeds of crime.

They appealed their convictions on the grounds that jurors were exposed to extrinsic information (including internet searches and old newspaper articles) during the trial, and that the trial judge erred in her instructions on the co-conspirator hearsay exception.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reasonable possibility that the extrinsic information affected the verdict given the trial judge's instructions and the nature of the information.

The court also upheld the trial judge's conspiracy instructions as compliant with the Carter and Mapara framework.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and sexual exploitation of his foster child.

He argued the trial judge made several errors in assessing credibility, including reversing the burden of proof, misapprehending evidence, improperly using out-of-court statements as corroboration, and failing to address inconsistencies in the complainant's testimony.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly applied the W. (D.) principles, correctly admitted prior consistent statements as narrative, and made credibility findings that were fully supported by the record.

The appellant, a chiropractor, appealed his sexual assault conviction arising from an incident where he massaged a patient's back with a tool while surreptitiously masturbating.

The appellant argued the contact was purely therapeutic and non-sexual.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that a reasonable observer would find the contact sexual in nature and that the complainant's sexual integrity had been violated without her consent.