Shain Widdifield

The applicant brought a constitutional challenge arguing that ss. 119(1)(c) and 120(1) of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act violate ss. 7 and 12 of the Charter.

The applicant argued that because pre-sentence custody is not recognized in calculating parole eligibility, offenders denied bail are arbitrarily delayed in their day parole compared to those released on bail.

The court dismissed the application, finding that while the right to apply for parole engages a liberty interest, the deprivation is not grossly disproportionate or overbroad given the distinct purposes of pre-trial custody and the conditional release regime.

The applicants moved for an interlocutory injunction to stay the Public Order Emergency Proclamation and related orders pending a judicial review application.

Before the motion was heard, the Governor in Council revoked the proclamation and all related orders.

The Federal Court dismissed the motion as moot because the legislative instruments had already been revoked, leaving no live controversy affecting the parties' rights that could be resolved by a stay.

The Court also declined to award costs to the applicants, noting their motion was unlikely to succeed even if not moot, and directed that costs be in the cause of the underlying judicial review.

The appellant, a disbarred lawyer, appealed the dismissal of her habeas corpus application challenging the validity of her warrant of committal.

The application judge had found the application frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, noting that the arguments had been unsuccessfully raised multiple times before.

The Court of Appeal found no merit in the appeal, specifically endorsing the application judge's analysis and conclusion, and dismissed the appeal.

The applicant, an inmate at Grand Valley Institution for Women, applied for a writ of habeas corpus challenging the validity of her warrant of committal.

The respondent moved to dismiss the application as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The court found that the applicant was attempting to relitigate issues already decided against her by the Superior Court and the Court of Appeal.

The court dismissed the application summarily under the Criminal Proceedings Rules and declined to award costs, noting there is no jurisdiction to award costs in criminal habeas corpus matters.

The applicant, who was previously convicted of fraud, brought an application seeking a declaration that s. 380(1) of the Criminal Code is unconstitutional because it is silent on the mens rea for the offence, allegedly violating the Charter.

The court held a preliminary hearing to determine standing and abuse of process.

The court found that the applicant lacked private interest standing because his conviction was final and the issue was moot for him.

The court also found he lacked public interest standing because the application did not raise a serious justiciable issue and he did not have a genuine interest.

Finally, the court dismissed the application as an abuse of process, finding it amounted to a collateral attack on his prior criminal conviction.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to appeal the decision of a Prothonotary who granted Canada's motion to stay their mass tort proceedings under s. 50.1 of the Federal Courts Act.

The proceedings relate to the administration of the anti-malarial drug mefloquine to Canadian Armed Forces members.

The stay was granted because Canada intends to institute a third party claim for contribution and indemnity against the drug's manufacturer, Roche, over which the Federal Court lacks jurisdiction.

The Court upheld the Prothonotary's decision, finding no palpable and overriding error in the determination that Canada had a genuine desire to bring the claim, nor any correctness error in the finding that the third party claim is grounded in provincial tort law rather than a comprehensive federal statutory framework.

The appellant owned two handguns registered in the 1980s.

Under the new Firearms Act, he had until December 31, 2002, to re-register them as grandfathered s. 12(6) handguns.

He failed to do so, and his registrations expired.

In 2007, he applied to re-register the handguns, but the Registrar refused in 2009 because he no longer held a valid licence with s. 12(6) privileges.

The provincial court and superior court upheld the refusal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant lost his grandfathered status by failing to continuously hold a registration certificate, and was therefore ineligible for a licence and registration under the Act.

The applicant sought a writ of habeas corpus with certiorari in aid to challenge a correctional decision maintaining his medium-security classification and denying transfer to a minimum-security institution.

He argued that reliance on institutional incidents and his continued association with a motorcycle club violated his Charter rights and rendered the decision unlawful.

The court held that habeas corpus requires a deprivation of liberty, and the applicant’s circumstances involved no change in the nature or conditions of his detention.

The security classification decision therefore did not constitute a deprivation of residual liberty reviewable through habeas corpus.

In any event, the court found the decision reasonable and supported by evidence of continued association with a security threat group.

The plaintiff sought to certify a class action against multiple police services and government entities regarding mass arrests and detentions during the 2010 G20 Summit in Toronto.

The court dismissed the certification motion, finding that while some causes of action (like false imprisonment and battery) were properly pleaded against the Toronto Police Services Board, the claims against other defendants failed.

Crucially, the plaintiff failed to satisfy the identifiable class, common issues, and preferable procedure requirements of the Class Proceedings Act due to the highly variable individual conduct of protesters and the impermissible use of subclasses.

Following the dismissal of a class proceeding, the Attorney General for Canada sought costs against the plaintiffs' solicitors, arguing the plaintiffs had not given informed consent regarding costs exposure.

The motions judge ordered the solicitors to personally indemnify the defendants for costs, finding that uninformed consent equated to a lack of authority to commence the action.

The Court of Appeal allowed the solicitors' appeal, holding that a failure to advise on costs does not invalidate the authority conferred by a client to commence proceedings, and that breach of warranty of authority could not put the defendants in a better position than if the impecunious plaintiffs had provided informed consent.