Brett Cohen

The appellant pleaded guilty to robbery and attempted robbery arising from a carjacking spree and was sentenced to 2.5 years' incarceration.

He appealed on two grounds: that the sentencing judge erred in treating denunciation and deterrence as primary sentencing objectives for a youthful first-time offender, and that the sentencing judge failed to account for collateral immigration consequences.

The Court of Appeal found that despite a misstatement of the law, the sentencing judge did not overemphasize denunciation and deterrence, as evidenced by a below-range sentence.

The court also held that immigration consequences could not be avoided without imposing an unfit sentence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his robbery convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in dismissing his application to adduce unknown third-party suspect evidence regarding a subsequent attempted carjacking.

The Court of Appeal found that even if the trial judge erred by referring to certain witness testimony, her core reasoning applying the Grant framework was sound.

The trial judge correctly concluded the two incidents were not sufficiently similar to suggest the same individuals committed both offences.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and appealed both the conviction and the sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's assessment of evidence or consent analysis.

However, the court allowed the sentence appeal, finding that the trial judge erred in dismissing the appellant's s. 11(b) Charter application regarding post-conviction delay.

The court found the delay unreasonable, specifically rejecting the trial judge's characterization of immigration complexity and minor technical issues as exceptional circumstances.

As a remedy for the Charter breach, the conditional sentence was reduced from two years less a day to 20 months, as a conditional discharge was deemed unfit given the serious nature of the offence.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and sexual interference.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the trial judge erred in failing to provide a corrective instruction after the Crown's closing address invited the jury to engage in impermissible reasoning, specifically by linking the absence of a motive to fabricate with the reliability of the complainant's testimony.

The Court of Appeal found that the Crown's closing improperly invited the jury to equate the complainant's good relationship with the appellant and lack of motive to fabricate with the reliability of her evidence.

The court held that a corrective instruction was required, and its absence compromised the appellant's right to a fair trial.

The convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant, convicted of first-degree murder and attempted murder for the benefit of a criminal organization, appealed a Superior Court judge's decision denying his application for a reduction in parole ineligibility under s. 745.6(1) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant argued the application judge erred by treating non-acknowledgment of guilt as a precondition, placing undue weight on gang membership, and misinterpreting R. v. Swietlinski.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no material error in the application judge's discretionary decision, affirming that guilt acknowledgment is not a precondition but relevant to assessing responsibility, and that the judge's weighing of factors was reasonable.

The appellant was convicted of 10 sexual abuse offences against his former partner's daughter.

On appeal, he challenged the trial judge's admission of evidence related to pornography and his surveillance of the victim's grandmother's house, as well as the Crown's cross-examination of its own witnesses.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the impugned evidence was relevant and properly used for material issues or credibility, and that the procedure for refreshing witness memories was appropriate given the lack of objection at trial and absence of prejudice.

Jonathan Garrett was charged with sexual assault, having previously pleaded guilty to assault and mischief.

The trial focused solely on the sexual assault charge.

The complainant's testimony was found to contain numerous significant inconsistencies when compared to her prior statements to police, hospital staff, and evidence given at the preliminary hearing.

Applying the principles from R. v. W.(D.), the court determined that these inconsistencies, which were not merely collateral, created a reasonable doubt regarding the complainant's lack of consent and the accused's guilt.

Consequently, the Crown failed to prove the sexual assault charge beyond a reasonable doubt, and Garrett was acquitted.

The appellant appealed her conviction for fraud over $5,000 arising from an insurance fraud conspiracy investigation known as "Project Whiplash" involving staged motor vehicle collisions.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's rejection of her section 11(b) Charter application regarding trial delay.

The Court of Appeal held that even accepting the appellant's position that individually charged but related defendants should not be treated the same as co-accused persons, there was insufficient institutional or Crown delay to support a Charter violation.

The total delay of approximately ten months fell within acceptable guidelines for provincial court trials under the pre-Jordan law and was not presumptively unreasonable under the Jordan regime.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for aggravated assault, assault with a weapon, and possession of a weapon for a purpose dangerous to the public peace, as well as his sentence.

The offences occurred at a detention centre where the appellant and three co-accused attacked a fellow inmate in his cell.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred by drawing inferences to fill evidentiary gaps regarding what occurred inside the cell where there was no video surveillance.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction for aggravated assault but set aside the convictions for assault with a weapon and possession of a weapon for a purpose dangerous to the public peace on the basis of the Kienapple principle.

The Court also found the trial judge erred in law by bifurcating the sentence, ordering part of it to be served concurrently and part consecutively.

The sentence was varied to two and one-half years to be served consecutively to the appellant's existing sentences.

The appellant was convicted of sexual offences against a 10-year-old male complainant following a judge-alone trial.

The trial judge convicted the appellant of sexual misconduct during the period December 2012 to August 2013 and on October 21, 2013, but acquitted on charges relating to August 6, 2013.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the trial judge's reasoning, arguing she failed to explain how she could accept the complainant's evidence on some counts while rejecting it on others, that she improperly focused on credibility rather than reliability, and that she failed to consider the appellant's demeanour when confronted.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons were adequate and went beyond reliance on demeanour alone.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the trial judge.

The Crown conceded that an error was made in the calculation of pre-sentence custody credit.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted and the appeal was allowed.

The pre-sentence custody credit was recalculated at a 1.5 to 1 ratio, resulting in a reduction of the sentence from 10 years 290 days to 9 years 251 days, with pre-trial custody credited as 3 years 114 days instead of 2 years 75 days.

An appeal under Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code against the Ontario Review Board's disposition dated April 29, 2016.

The appellant, found NCRMD for sexual assault, challenged the Board's decision to continue his detention in a Secure Forensic Unit rather than place him in a general forensic unit or impose a hybrid order allowing discretionary transfer.

The appellant conceded he remained a significant threat to public safety and that detention was appropriate, but argued the Board erred in: (1) failing to provide reasons for rejecting a hybrid order; (2) misapprehending evidence regarding his low risk for coercive sexual contact; and (3) failing to apply the least restrictive disposition test.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no legal error in the Board's disposition.