James Bray

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed Lorne Rappaport’s appeal from convictions for sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, and sexual exploitation.

The appellant, a hockey coach, was found to have engaged in a sexual relationship with the complainant, who was 15 at the time.

The appeal alleged misapprehension of evidence and improper application of legal principles regarding credibility.

The Court found no material misapprehension and held that the trial judge’s credibility findings and application of the law were reasonable and thorough.

The decision concerns the extradition of Adeyanju Olaniyan, Rachel O’Connor, and Timothy Balogun to the United States to face prosecution for an alleged fraud scheme involving the use of spoofed calls to obtain and resell medical supplies.

The court reviews the evidence, including voice identification, financial records, and circumstantial evidence, and finds that the evidence is sufficient to justify committal for extradition under the Extradition Act.

The court addresses the reliability of voice identification evidence and the legal standards for committal, ultimately granting the extradition applications.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual exploitation and sexual assault.

The central issue at trial was the complainant's age when the sexual contact began, which determined the validity of consent.

The trial judge found the contact started when the complainant was 15 and the appellant was in a position of trust.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's credibility and reliability findings, arguing reliance on illogical assumptions regarding the complainant's behaviour and the implausibility of the appellant's account.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's findings, emphasizing the deference owed to trial judges on credibility and reliability, and finding no palpable and overriding error or ungrounded assumptions.

The appellants, convicted of murder, appealed on grounds of reasonable apprehension of bias by the trial judge and violation of their right to be present.

The trial judge repeatedly encouraged guilty pleas in chambers and directly to the accused, expressing strong opinions on the evidence and linking rulings to plea outcomes.

The Court of Appeal found that the judge's conduct created a reasonable apprehension of bias and infringed the accused's right to be present under s. 650(1) of the Criminal Code, compromising the fairness and integrity of the trial.

The appeals were allowed, and a new trial was ordered for both appellants.

The appellant was convicted of seven counts of sexual assault, one count of assault with a weapon, and one count of assault.

He appealed on three grounds: the trial judge's treatment of the complainant's motive to fabricate, alleged "oath helping" to bolster the complainant's credibility, and the admission of electronic evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment that the mere existence of family law litigation did not establish a motive to lie, no impermissible oath helping in the complainant's explanation for delayed reporting, and that the electronic evidence met the low bar for admission under the Canada Evidence Act and was not central to the credibility analysis.

The appellant, S.W., appealed his conviction for sexual assault related to a second sexual encounter with the complainant.

The complainant, heavily intoxicated, had no memory of this encounter.

The Crown's case relied significantly on Facebook messages exchanged between the appellant and the complainant's boyfriend (impersonating the complainant), where the appellant described overcoming resistance and not taking "no" for an answer.

The appellant argued these messages were exaggerated due to impairment and an attempt to sound "macho." The trial judge rejected the appellant's explanation, finding the messages to be a truthful account demonstrating the complainant's non-consent and the appellant's knowledge or recklessness regarding it.

On appeal, S.W. challenged the trial judge's credibility assessment and reliance on the messages.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no material error in the trial judge's reasoning or her application of legal principles regarding consent and credibility.

The Crown sought directions regarding solicitor-client privilege over financial documents (cheques and statements of account) obtained from financial institutions during a fraud investigation against the defendants.

The court ruled that cheques to or from a lawyer/law firm are presumptively not privileged when obtained from a financial institution, as they reflect transactions, not communications.

Even if presumed privileged, that presumption was rebutted in this case.

For legal invoices, the court ordered that copies be securely retained until the conclusion of proceedings or destroyed, and that a vetted copy of seized records be made for disclosure.

Following convictions after trial for seven counts of sexual assault, one count of assault with a weapon, and one count of assault against an intimate partner over the course of a marriage, the court imposed a global penitentiary sentence of four years.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence in intimate partner sexual violence cases, relied on the Court of Appeal's guidance that forced penetration typically attracts a sentence in the three-to-five-year range, and treated the prolonged pattern of abuse, the major victim impact, and the presence of the children during some assaults as aggravating.

Mitigating factors included the offender's lack of prior record, stable employment, family and community support, and collateral impact on his children.

DNA, sex offender registration, and weapons prohibition orders were also made.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder and indignity to human remains after confessing to undercover officers during a 'Mr. Big' operation.

He appealed his convictions, arguing the confession was obtained through police coercion amounting to an abuse of process under the Hart framework.

He also appealed his 17-year parole ineligibility period.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge reasonably concluded the police conduct was not coercive and the appellant's will was not overborne.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the parole ineligibility period was not demonstrably unfit given the horrific nature of the crimes and the aggravating factors.