26 total
Appeal dismissed; HRTO reasonably balanced Charter expressive rights against Human Rights Code protections in union blog dispute.
The appellant, a manager at a provincial jail, filed a human rights complaint after the respondent union president posted sexist comments about her on a union blog during a labour dispute.
The Human Rights Tribunal dismissed the complaint, finding the conduct did not constitute discrimination 'with respect to employment' under s. 5(1) of the Human Rights Code, after balancing the Code's objectives with the respondent's Charter rights to freedom of expression and association.
The Divisional Court upheld the decision on judicial review.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, confirming that administrative tribunals must consider Charter values when interpreting their home statutes, even absent ambiguity, and that the Tribunal's balancing of these rights was reasonable.
Certification and leave granted in Sino-Forest securities class action.
In this proposed securities class action arising from the collapse of a public issuer, the plaintiffs sought leave under Part XXIII.1 of the Securities Act and certification of claims on behalf of purchasers of notes and shares in the primary and secondary markets.
Subject to one contested issue concerning former noteholders who had assigned their notes during the class period, the motions were unopposed or proceeded on consent.
The court granted leave and certified the action, holding that the substantive dispute over whether assigned noteholder claims vested in transferees under New York law should be postponed until after certification.
The court found it procedurally preferable and fair to defer that merits issue until after a defence was delivered, thereby avoiding interlocutory delay in a large and complex class proceeding.
Leave to appeal denied; independent claims by litigation trust not precluded by class action Bar Order.
The moving parties sought leave to appeal a decision dismissing their Rule 21 motion.
They argued that the action brought by the litigation trust was barred by a Bar Order issued in related class actions, specifically under the phrase 'other claims over'.
The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding that the claims were independent and did not seek contribution or indemnity for damages owed to the class action plaintiffs.
The motion judge's interpretation of the Bar Order was correct and consistent with prevailing case law.
Appeal of summary judgment dismissing claim against employment agency for failing to forward application dismissed.
The appellant appealed an order granting the respondent employment agency's motion for summary judgment and dismissing her claim.
The motion judge found no evidence that the agency was contractually obliged to forward her application for a specific position.
The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's conclusion that the claim was based on bare allegations.
The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay costs of $4,500.
Costs of $7,500 awarded against applicant; public interest litigant shield rejected in personal vindication case.
Following the dismissal of her application for judicial review, the applicant opposed an award of costs, arguing the case involved novel human rights issues of public importance.
The Divisional Court rejected this argument, finding the proceeding was a quest for personal vindication arising from fractious collective bargaining, not a public interest matter.
The court awarded the successful respondents $7,500 in costs, discounting their requested amount of $15,000 to exclude expenses related to the involvement of three intervenors.
Judicial review dismissed; HRTO reasonably balanced workplace discrimination protections with union's freedom of expression.
The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision dismissing her complaint of discrimination and harassment.
The complaint arose from sexist blog posts made by a union president during a labour dispute.
The Divisional Court upheld the Tribunal's decision, finding it reasonable to conclude that the blog posts were not made 'in the workplace' and that the Tribunal appropriately considered the union president's Charter rights to freedom of expression and association when determining the posts did not constitute discrimination with respect to employment.