Ryan M. Kniznik

The applicant, Fiona Bagust-Homes, brought a motion for temporary child and spousal support, seeking to impute an annual income of $200,000 to the respondent, Gregory Devine, based on his historical earnings.

The respondent, currently unemployed, argued the motion was premature, proposed a lower imputed income of $75,000, and contended the applicant had no need for support due to her received capital.

The court found the respondent intentionally unemployed and imputed an income of $200,000.

It ordered temporary child support based on a set-off of table amounts and temporary spousal support at the mid-range of the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines.

The court also directed that support payments be made from the respondent's held capital and ordered him to maintain a life insurance policy as security.

This appeal concerned a family law dispute between separated spouses regarding financial issues.

The appellant, Fay-Lynn Muraven, challenged the trial judge's decisions on a date of marriage deduction for inherited property, the calculation of after-tax costs for children's parochial school expenses (s. 7 expenses), and the refusal to award prejudgment interest on equalization payments and child support arrears.

The Court of Appeal reviewed the trial judge's application of inconsistent standards, the discretion in reopening trials for new evidence, and the exercise of discretion regarding prejudgment interest.

The Court found no errors in the trial judge's decisions, concluding that the inherited property was acquired before marriage, the s. 7 expense calculation was reasonable, and the refusal to award prejudgment interest was supported by the evidence, despite the lack of explicit reasons.

The appeal was dismissed.

The parties, divorced nine years ago, continue to experience significant conflict over parenting arrangements, particularly regarding their son's international travel.

The respondent brought a motion seeking a declaration that the applicant breached a 2015 court order by taking their son to New York without his consent, causing him to miss school.

The applicant brought a cross-motion for the passport's return and to restrict the respondent from bringing further motions without leave.

The court found the applicant breached the order by removing the child from school without the respondent's prior consent.

However, the court dismissed the respondent's request for a $2500 payment, clarifying that "costs" under Rule 1(8)(a) of the Family Law Rules refers to legal fees and disbursements, not a penalty.

The applicant's cross-motion was also dismissed, as there was no material change in circumstances to vary the passport custody order and restricting the respondent's access to court was deemed an exceptional remedy not warranted here.

The mother appealed a trial judge's decision awarding sole custody of two children to their father.

The children had resided with the father since 2010 when the Children's Aid Society placed them with him, and the mother had previously agreed to this arrangement in 2012.

At trial, the Office of the Children's Lawyer supported continued residence with the father.

The mother sought to introduce hearsay evidence of statements made by the children and a surreptitious recording, arguing the trial judge erred in excluding this evidence and in awarding sole custody based on the father's alleged inattention to medical needs.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding no error in the exclusion of the hearsay evidence or the recording, and finding the trial judge's custody determination was thorough, sensitive, and owed deference.

The appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal costs was refused.

Appeal from a trial judge's decision granting sole custody of a child to the respondent mother and permitting relocation from Toronto to Nova Scotia.

The appellant father challenged the custody award, relocation decision, access schedule, and costs award.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decisions on custody and relocation, finding they were supported by the record and within the trial judge's discretion.

The court modified the access schedule by removing a four-hour restriction on overnight visits with the child's grandparents, finding it inconsistent with the trial judge's own findings regarding the child's relationship with the paternal grandparents.

The costs award was upheld as within the trial judge's discretion.

The appellant father appealed a summary judgment order granting his 18-year-old daughter child support and university expenses.

The daughter had withdrawn from parental control, and the central issue was whether this withdrawal was involuntary under s. 31(2) of the Family Law Act.

The appeal judge found that the motion judge erred in granting summary judgment because there were significant facts in dispute regarding the voluntariness of the withdrawal that required a trial.

The appeal was allowed, the summary judgment was set aside, and the matter was ordered to proceed to trial.

The interim support order was varied to account for financial contributions made by the mother.

The appellant appealed from a trial judge's orders awarding the respondent ongoing spousal support of $25,000 per month in a 26-year marriage and costs of $250,000.

The appellant raised four grounds of appeal: (1) the trial judge erred by not explicitly providing for a review of spousal support upon retirement; (2) the trial judge erred in concluding the respondent had no beneficial interest in business shares transferred during the marriage; (3) contingent on ground two, the spousal support award was excessive; and (4) the trial judge's costs award was based on a purely mathematical approach.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's reasoning or conclusions.

Appeal from a trial judgment concerning a dispute between a former unmarried couple over property rights in development properties.

The trial judge found that a property development agreement (PDA) existed between the parties despite a cohabitation agreement containing broad waivers of property rights.

The trial judge set aside the cohabitation agreement as it applied to the development properties under section 56(4)(b) of the Family Law Act, finding that neither party understood the consequences of the agreement regarding their property development venture.

The trial judge awarded the respondent $3,325,000 plus interest and costs.

The appellant appealed on three grounds: the trial judge erred in setting aside the agreement only as to development properties; in not setting aside the entire agreement including the spousal support waiver; and in calculating the amount owing under the PDA.

This is a costs decision following the court's determination of two motions: the respondent's motion for summary judgment and the applicant's motion for temporary child support.

The court granted partial summary judgment to the applicant on the issue of entitlement to child support and awarded both retroactive and prospective temporary child support.

The applicant sought full indemnity costs of $17,789.72, arguing success, failure of the respondent to make settlement offers, unreasonable litigation behavior, and bad faith.

The respondent argued no costs should be awarded or alternatively costs should be limited to half of partial indemnity costs due to divided success.

The court awarded the applicant full indemnity costs, finding the applicant was substantially successful, the respondent engaged in unreasonable behavior including refusing to respond to settlement offers and bringing numerous unsuccessful procedural motions, and while not finding bad faith, the respondent's conduct warranted full cost recovery.

A 17-year-old university student sought child support from her father after withdrawing from his parental control.

The father moved for summary judgment to dismiss the application, arguing that the daughter's withdrawal from parental control under the Family Law Act disentitled her to support.

The court found that although the daughter had withdrawn from parental control, her withdrawal was involuntary due to the father's controlling nature, his failure to consider her best interests, his lack of attempts to repair the relationship, and the fact that she did not withdraw from both parents.

The court dismissed the father's motion and found the daughter entitled to child support.

The court also determined temporary child support of $6,500 per month, retroactive to August 1, 2016, and ordered the father to pay all college expenses as section 7 special and extraordinary expenses.

The quantum of final support was left for trial.

Appeal from a trial judgment in a family law matter arising from a 40-year marriage.

The trial judge ordered an equalization payment of $140,000 from the wife to the husband, dismissed the wife's claim for an unequal division of net family property, and awarded costs of $109,248 to the husband.

The wife appealed on three grounds: rejection of her expert evidence regarding farm equipment valuation, failure to award an unequal share of net family property based on alleged reckless depletion, and the quantum of costs awarded.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's treatment of expert evidence, his analysis of the net family property claim, or his costs award.

A father appealed a declaration granted by the Superior Court that his 16-year-old daughter had withdrawn from parental control under section 65 of the Children's Law Reform Act.

The father argued that he was entitled to be a party to the application and that the court should not have granted the declaration.

The Court of Appeal held that while parents must be parties to applications under Part III of the CLRA, the court retains discretion to direct the extent of their participation.

The court also held that the factors to be considered on such an application extend beyond the child's age to include the reasons for the declaration, its utility, and the child's best interests.

The appeal was dismissed.

The respondent brought a 14B motion to reopen evidence in two previously heard motions (a summary judgment motion to dismiss a child support application and a temporary support motion) that were awaiting decision.

The respondent sought to introduce fresh evidence regarding a receivership order affecting a company in which he held a 60% interest.

The applicant opposed the motion and sought dismissal, or alternatively, sought specific disclosure orders.

The court found it had jurisdiction to reopen argument but held that the respondent failed to meet the test for admission of fresh evidence, even under the relaxed standard applicable before decision release.

The respondent provided insufficient evidence demonstrating how the receivership would affect his ability to pay support.

The motion was dismissed with costs reserved.

Following the dismissal of the father's motion regarding his daughter's withdrawal from parental control, the daughter and mother sought costs.

The court found that while the father did not act in bad faith, he acted unreasonably by omitting relevant evidence, relying on inadmissible letters, using accusatory language, and failing to respond to offers to settle.

The daughter was awarded full indemnity costs of $6,063.52.

The mother's claim for costs was dismissed as her participation was not necessary.

The respondent's motion for a non-dissipation/Mareva injunction against the applicants' worldwide assets was dismissed.

The applicants sought costs for the dismissed motion.

The court, applying Rule 24(1) of the Family Law Rules, found the applicants were entitled to costs on a partial indemnity basis, as the respondent's litigation conduct was not egregious.

The court fixed costs at $12,113.88, payable at the conclusion of the trial.

The father, Robert Keith Glegg, brought a motion to set aside a prior order declaring his daughter, Olivia Glegg, an independent minor who had withdrawn from parental control, and sought temporary or permanent custody.

The court dismissed the father's motion, finding that Olivia, being over 16, had a common law and statutory right to withdraw from parental control, and that the father was not entitled to be a party or receive notice of the original declaration application.

The court emphasized Olivia's articulate and thoughtful reasons for her decisions, including accelerating her university entrance and attending a university in Florida, which were deemed to be in her best interests.

The respondent, Laura Reggimenti, brought a motion for a preservation/non-dissipation order against the worldwide assets of the applicants, Joseph Rosati and Linda Rosati, in a protracted matrimonial litigation.

The court reviewed the history of previous non-dissipation orders and their vacating, as well as the applicants' real estate dealings.

Applying the criteria for a Mareva injunction from Chitel v. Rothbart, the court found no real risk of assets being removed or dissipated outside the ordinary course of business.

The court also considered the strength of the respondent's underlying fraud claim, noting admissions made by the respondent in prior proceedings that weakened her prima facie case.

The motion was dismissed, with the court emphasizing that execution before judgment is an exceptional remedy not justified by the facts.

The respondent brought a motion seeking various grounds of relief pertaining to a protracted trial, including recalling herself to testify, filing a late expert report, and revisiting prior rulings regarding another expert's disqualification and amendment of particulars of fraud.

The court granted all substantive requests, allowing the respondent to attempt to requalify her expert, admit a new expert's report, amend her particulars of fraud, and provide further testimony.

The court applied the Supreme Court of Canada's framework from *White Burgess Langille Inman* regarding expert witness independence and impartiality, finding the previous judge applied an overly stringent test.

Despite the respondent's substantial success on the motion, costs were denied due to her prior procedural failures.

The respondent sought to set aside the registration of a child support order from the Circuit Court of Broward County, Florida dated August 22, 2012.

The respondent argued that the registration should be set aside on grounds of lack of proper notice, lack of reasonable opportunity to be heard, lack of jurisdiction, and that the order was contrary to public policy in Ontario.

The court found that while the respondent had proper notice and a reasonable opportunity to be heard, and that the Florida court had jurisdiction, the Florida order was contrary to public policy in Ontario because it imposed child support obligations significantly higher than would have been ordered under Ontario law, and because the applicant should have pursued a variation application under the Interjurisdictional Support Orders Act rather than commencing a fresh proceeding in Florida.

The registration was set aside and the original Ontario order was varied.