Ryan M. Kniznik

The respondent brought a 14B motion to reopen evidence in two previously heard motions (a summary judgment motion to dismiss a child support application and a temporary support motion) that were awaiting decision.

The respondent sought to introduce fresh evidence regarding a receivership order affecting a company in which he held a 60% interest.

The applicant opposed the motion and sought dismissal, or alternatively, sought specific disclosure orders.

The court found it had jurisdiction to reopen argument but held that the respondent failed to meet the test for admission of fresh evidence, even under the relaxed standard applicable before decision release.

The respondent provided insufficient evidence demonstrating how the receivership would affect his ability to pay support.

The motion was dismissed with costs reserved.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment regarding the equalization of net family properties, specifically challenging the valuation of foreign lands in Iran and the calculation of the respondent's net family property.

Prior to the hearing, the appellant brought motions to preclude the respondent from making submissions due to an alleged breach of costs orders and to adduce fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the preliminary motions, finding no breach of the costs orders and that the fresh evidence could have been adduced at trial with due diligence.

The substantive appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge made no palpable and overriding errors in valuation and was entitled to draw an adverse inference from the appellant's failure to provide a property valuation.

Following the dismissal of the father's motion regarding his daughter's withdrawal from parental control, the daughter and mother sought costs.

The court found that while the father did not act in bad faith, he acted unreasonably by omitting relevant evidence, relying on inadmissible letters, using accusatory language, and failing to respond to offers to settle.

The daughter was awarded full indemnity costs of $6,063.52.

The mother's claim for costs was dismissed as her participation was not necessary.

The respondent's motion for a non-dissipation/Mareva injunction against the applicants' worldwide assets was dismissed.

The applicants sought costs for the dismissed motion.

The court, applying Rule 24(1) of the Family Law Rules, found the applicants were entitled to costs on a partial indemnity basis, as the respondent's litigation conduct was not egregious.

The court fixed costs at $12,113.88, payable at the conclusion of the trial.

The father, Robert Keith Glegg, brought a motion to set aside a prior order declaring his daughter, Olivia Glegg, an independent minor who had withdrawn from parental control, and sought temporary or permanent custody.

The court dismissed the father's motion, finding that Olivia, being over 16, had a common law and statutory right to withdraw from parental control, and that the father was not entitled to be a party or receive notice of the original declaration application.

The court emphasized Olivia's articulate and thoughtful reasons for her decisions, including accelerating her university entrance and attending a university in Florida, which were deemed to be in her best interests.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment awarding the respondent a 45% interest in a commercial property via constructive trust, retroactive spousal support, and prejudgment interest on an equalization payment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the limitation period for the unjust enrichment claim was tolled due to the appellant's fraudulent concealment of the property's true ownership.

The court also upheld the awards for retroactive spousal support and prejudgment interest, noting the appellant's history of non-disclosure and failure to pay adequate support.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision that he had no right to unilaterally set off disputed amounts against a court-ordered costs award in a family law proceeding.

The Divisional Court upheld the motion judge's finding that neither the Courts of Justice Act nor equitable principles permit unilateral set-off against a court order.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding the motion judge's costs award, reducing it from substantial indemnity to partial indemnity, finding the motion judge erred in principle by treating the appellant's maintained position as an additional factor justifying enhanced costs.

The husband appealed the trial judge's equalization payment and spousal support orders, arguing errors in determining the matrimonial home, denying a tax liability deduction, and calculating support.

The wife cross-appealed the denial of pre-judgment interest, indexing, security for support, and compensatory support, as well as the treatment of mortgage payments on excluded property.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the appeal and the cross-appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's factual findings or exercise of discretion, though it amended a review clause on consent.

The moving party sought an interim order restraining the responding party from depleting a specific property pending the disposition of his appeal.

The moving party had previously been awarded an equalization payment and a preservation order, but the trial judge indicated the judgment nullified the pre-trial preservation order.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion, finding that the preservation order was necessary under s. 12 of the Family Law Act to protect the moving party's interests and ensure sufficient assets remained to satisfy the equalization entitlement, as the balance of convenience favoured maintaining the status quo.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment regarding equalization, spousal support, and vesting orders.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's rejection of an alleged debt to the appellant's brother or the imputation of income for spousal support.

The Court upheld the vesting of two condominiums in the respondent as security for the equalization and support owed, and provided directions for the sale of the matrimonial home.

The respondent, Laura Reggimenti, brought a motion for a preservation/non-dissipation order against the worldwide assets of the applicants, Joseph Rosati and Linda Rosati, in a protracted matrimonial litigation.

The court reviewed the history of previous non-dissipation orders and their vacating, as well as the applicants' real estate dealings.

Applying the criteria for a Mareva injunction from Chitel v. Rothbart, the court found no real risk of assets being removed or dissipated outside the ordinary course of business.

The court also considered the strength of the respondent's underlying fraud claim, noting admissions made by the respondent in prior proceedings that weakened her prima facie case.

The motion was dismissed, with the court emphasizing that execution before judgment is an exceptional remedy not justified by the facts.

The respondent brought a motion seeking various grounds of relief pertaining to a protracted trial, including recalling herself to testify, filing a late expert report, and revisiting prior rulings regarding another expert's disqualification and amendment of particulars of fraud.

The court granted all substantive requests, allowing the respondent to attempt to requalify her expert, admit a new expert's report, amend her particulars of fraud, and provide further testimony.

The court applied the Supreme Court of Canada's framework from *White Burgess Langille Inman* regarding expert witness independence and impartiality, finding the previous judge applied an overly stringent test.

Despite the respondent's substantial success on the motion, costs were denied due to her prior procedural failures.

Following a ruling granting the respondent wife exclusive possession of the matrimonial home and temporary custody of the children, the court determined costs.

The wife had served an offer to settle, while the applicant husband had not.

The court emphasized the importance of offers to settle in family law proceedings, even for litigants of modest means.

The wife was awarded $12,500 in costs, to be paid from the husband's share of the net proceeds of the sale of the matrimonial home or credited against any equalization payment.

The parties, who continued to reside in the matrimonial home post-separation, brought competing motions regarding the temporary custody of their children and exclusive possession of the home.

The mother sought exclusive possession due to the toxic home environment adversely affecting the children, while the father sought the pre-trial sale of the home and alleged parental alienation.

The court granted the mother temporary exclusive possession, finding that the high-conflict environment was intolerable and detrimental to the children's best interests.

The father's motion for the pre-trial sale of the home was dismissed to prevent further emotional disruption to the children.

Both parties' requests for psychiatric assessments of the other were also dismissed.

The moving party sought leave to appeal an order requiring her to pay $150,000 to the responding party for interim disbursements under Rule 24(12) of the Family Law Rules.

The moving party argued there were conflicting decisions regarding the requirement of exceptional circumstances and that there was good reason to doubt the correctness of the order.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding no conflicting decisions as the rule involves discretionary balancing to level the playing field, and no good reason to doubt the correctness of the motions judge's factual findings and exercise of discretion.

The applicants brought a motion for leave to argue a motion for summary judgment mid-trial, and the respondent brought a motion for directions seeking a trial de novo following a mistrial declared by the previous trial judge.

The court dismissed the motion for leave for summary judgment, interpreting Rule 16(1) of the Family Law Rules to mean that such motions must be brought before a trial commences.

The court also dismissed the respondent's request for a trial de novo, ordering that the trial continue from the point where the evidence concluded, in accordance with a prior Divisional Court order.

The appellant appealed an order setting aside a 2005 amending agreement to a separation agreement, declaring the respondent the sole owner of a property, and ordering prospective spousal support.

The respondent cross-appealed on issues including retroactive support, pre-judgment interest, and costs.

The Court of Appeal upheld the applications judge's decision to set aside the agreement due to the appellant's significant financial non-disclosure and unconscionability.

The appeal was dismissed in its entirety.

The cross-appeal was allowed only to award pre-judgment interest on the retroactive child and spousal support order.

The appellant appealed an arbitration award determining retroactive and prospective child support and costs following a dispute arising from a separation agreement.

The arbitrator had found that the payor parent failed to provide adequate financial disclosure and imputed substantial income based on corporate earnings, discretionary expenses, and adverse inferences under the Federal Child Support Guidelines.

The arbitrator ordered retroactive child support back to 2009 and prospective support based on table amounts, together with significant arbitration costs.

The court held that the arbitrator committed no reviewable error in interpreting the separation agreement, imputing income, attributing corporate pre‑tax income, or awarding retroactive support, and deferred to the arbitrator’s factual and credibility findings.

However, the court found the arbitrator’s reasoning on costs insufficient and reduced the costs award.

The husband brought a motion for leave to appeal an interim support order made during an application to vary.

He argued the motions judge lacked jurisdiction under the Divorce Act to grant interim relief on a variation application.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding no conflicting principles in the case law and no reason to doubt the correctness of the decision.

The court noted the motions judge remained seized of the matter and the husband would have a full right of appeal once a final decision was made.

The moving party sought to stay a final divorce order while remaining in contempt of multiple Ontario court orders requiring her to return the parties' child from Poland to Canada.

The respondent brought a cross-motion to prohibit the moving party from proceeding until her contempt was purged.

The Court of Appeal granted the cross-motion, exercising its discretion to refuse to hear the moving party's request for a stay because doing so while she remained in contempt of closely connected child custody orders would be manifestly unjust and an abuse of process.