Michael Nash

The appellant appealed from a trial judge's orders awarding the respondent ongoing spousal support of $25,000 per month in a 26-year marriage and costs of $250,000.

The appellant raised four grounds of appeal: (1) the trial judge erred by not explicitly providing for a review of spousal support upon retirement; (2) the trial judge erred in concluding the respondent had no beneficial interest in business shares transferred during the marriage; (3) contingent on ground two, the spousal support award was excessive; and (4) the trial judge's costs award was based on a purely mathematical approach.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's reasoning or conclusions.

The Applicant sought an increase in spousal support from $15,000 to $30,000 per month, and retroactive support, arguing a material change in circumstances due to the Respondent's undisclosed significant increase in income and net worth following a business merger and IPO shortly after their separation agreement was finalized.

The Respondent argued against variation, citing the Miglin test and claiming the Applicant had access to income from her father's businesses held in trust.

The court found the Respondent engaged in blameworthy conduct by misrepresenting his financial circumstances and failing to disclose the impending business transaction.

The court also affirmed the existence of a resulting trust over the assets held by the Applicant for her father, meaning no income could be imputed to her from those assets.

The court varied the spousal support to $25,000 per month, retroactive to January 1, 2009, and ordered a lump sum payment.

The applicant mother brought a motion seeking a custody and access assessment under s. 30 of the Children's Law Reform Act in a parenting dispute involving a young child.

The parties had exercised a de facto equal time-sharing arrangement since separation but disagreed over future schooling, residence, and parenting arrangements.

The court reviewed extensive jurisprudence governing s. 30 assessments and reaffirmed that such assessments should not be ordered routinely and require identifiable clinical issues that necessitate expert assistance.

The court found that the alleged concerns, including the child's behavioural difficulties and parental conflict, did not constitute clinical issues requiring expert analysis.

The motion for a s. 30 assessment was dismissed.