Stanley Peter Jaskot

The applicant brought a motion regarding an unpaid equalization payment and sought a preliminary order that the respondent was not entitled to further relief due to his ongoing breach of a 2008 child support order.

The respondent had accumulated approximately $300,000 in child support arrears, claiming his obligation ended due to estrangement from the children, though he never sought to vary the order.

Applying the three-stage test for Rule 1(8) of the Family Law Rules, the court declined to exercise discretion in the respondent's favour.

The court ordered that the respondent's motion be dismissed unless he pays the arrears accumulated up to the children's 18th birthdays and commences a Motion to Change within 60 days.

The respondent (mother) brought a motion seeking temporary and permanent leave to relocate with the children from the Region of Waterloo to the City of Oakville in the Region of Halton, and to change their school.

The applicant (father) brought a cross-motion to dismiss the relocation request and sought expanded access.

The court granted the respondent's motion for relocation, finding it to be in the children's best interests, considering the mother's role as primary caregiver, her support network in Oakville, and the minimal impact on the father's access.

The court also adjusted the parenting schedule, increasing the father's access time on alternate weekends.

The appellant mother appealed an order made following a finding of contempt against her for failing to comply with a child access schedule.

The motion judge had ordered the appellant to purge her contempt by transferring 122 days of access to the respondent father over a two-year period.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside the order, finding that the motion judge failed to adequately consider the best interests of the children when making such a substantial change to the custodial arrangements.

The matter was remitted for a fresh hearing.

The applicants brought a motion for leave to argue a motion for summary judgment mid-trial, and the respondent brought a motion for directions seeking a trial de novo following a mistrial declared by the previous trial judge.

The court dismissed the motion for leave for summary judgment, interpreting Rule 16(1) of the Family Law Rules to mean that such motions must be brought before a trial commences.

The court also dismissed the respondent's request for a trial de novo, ordering that the trial continue from the point where the evidence concluded, in accordance with a prior Divisional Court order.

The appellants appealed a mistrial ordered by the trial judge in a civil fraud proceeding within a matrimonial context.

The trial judge declared a mistrial after thirteen days of evidence, citing the impact of extensive delay as the trial would have to continue on an installment basis.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly exercised her discretion and her decision was entitled to great deference.

The court provided directions for the new trial to minimize further delay, including preserving the evidence and rulings from the mistrial.

The applicants brought two motions: one to vacate a longstanding non‑dissipation order secured against their property and another seeking an extension of time and leave to appeal an interlocutory mistrial order declaring a mistrial after thirteen days of trial.

The court considered the test under Rule 62.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and found that the mistrial decision raised serious and important issues regarding whether trial length and scheduling constraints could justify terminating a trial.

The court granted both the extension of time and leave to appeal, finding the proposed appeal open to serious debate and of significance to the administration of justice.

The court also vacated the non‑dissipation order, concluding that the evidentiary basis for the order had been discredited and that there was no ongoing risk of asset dissipation warranting such security.

Following several days of motion proceedings in a civil action, the court addressed the issue of costs.

The judge found that both sides engaged in blameworthy conduct that wasted court time and caused unnecessary expense, including inadequate particularization of a motion and delayed production of a redacted response to a demand for particulars.

After the production of the redacted response, the majority of the hearing time was spent on the applicants’ motion to strike the entire action, which the court dismissed.

The court concluded that substantial indemnity costs were not appropriate but awarded the respondent partial indemnity costs for the motion.

Costs were fixed at $22,138.96, representing four-fifths of the amount requested, payable at the end of trial.

The applicant brought a motion seeking to strike the respondent’s pleadings and to vest his one-half interest in the matrimonial home in her, alleging breaches of prior court orders including a non-dissipation order and failure to pay spousal support and costs.

The respondent had sold assets listed in his financial statement to fund the purchase of a property in Florida and withdrew funds from an investment account despite a court order restraining dissipation of assets.

Although the court accepted that the withdrawal of funds from the investment account was used for urgent medical treatment for the parties’ child, it found that the purchase and encumbrance of the Florida property constituted a blatant violation of the prior court order.

The court concluded that striking the pleadings would be disproportionate but that protective relief was required.

The respondent’s interest in the matrimonial home was vested in the applicant pending trial, subject to the trial judge’s ultimate determination.

The applicants brought a motion at the outset of a scheduled trial seeking to strike the respondent’s allegations of fraud relating to a prior family law settlement and order.

The respondent alleged that the applicants intentionally failed to disclose income, assets, and bank accounts when the minutes of settlement were executed, thereby fraudulently inducing the settlement.

The court held that the issue of fraud had not previously been adjudicated and therefore cause of action estoppel did not apply.

The court further found that issues such as inducement, due diligence, alleged joint ventures, and inconsistencies in prior evidence required a full evidentiary record.

The motion was dismissed and the matter was directed to proceed to trial on the fraud allegations.

In family litigation following separation, the applicant brought a motion seeking enforcement of prior disclosure orders and requested a daily monetary penalty for non-compliance under Rule 1(8) of the Family Law Rules.

The court reviewed the respondent’s disclosure relating to two corporations and inter‑company financial transactions and found significant deficiencies, including missing invoices, incomplete financial records, and failure to provide a detailed general ledger.

The court concluded that the respondent had not complied with earlier disclosure orders and that the explanations provided were insufficient.

The respondent was ordered to produce specified financial records and explanations by a set deadline, failing which daily penalties of $500 would apply.

The respondent was also directed to bring a motion requiring a third party associated with a related corporation to produce corporate financial records.

The appellant wife appealed a trial judgment finding that the respondent husband had a fifty percent beneficial interest by way of resulting trust in a property, and failing to order retroactive child support for a specific period.

The respondent cross-appealed the trial judge's decision to award no costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no prejudice in the failure to plead resulting trust and no error in the trial judge's appreciation of the evidence regarding the property or child support.

The cross-appeal was also dismissed, as the offers to settle would not have affected the costs outcome.

Following a successful appeal and cross-appeal, the appellant sought costs.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario ordered the respondent to pay the appellant's costs fixed in the amount of $20,000, inclusive of GST and disbursements.

The parties built a new matrimonial home on property owned by the appellant prior to the marriage.

The cost of construction significantly exceeded the market value of the property, leaving it subject to substantial debt.

The trial judge declared the respondent a fifty percent equitable owner based on resulting trust principles and ordered the appellant to pay $160,000 if he remained in the home, explicitly departing from the equalization provisions of the Family Law Act.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred in failing to follow the statutory equalization process.

Under the Family Law Act, the appellant's net family property was zero, meaning no equalization payment was owed.

The respondent's cross-appeal for unjust enrichment was dismissed as the appellant was not enriched.

The parties separated in 1992 and the limitation period for an equalization claim expired in December 1998.

The appellant retained counsel in September 1998, and negotiations regarding the respondent's pension continued past the limitation period.

When negotiations failed, the appellant commenced an action and sought an extension of time under s. 2(8) of the Family Law Act.

The motions judge dismissed the motion, finding bad faith and prejudice.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the motions judge erred by focusing only on the pre-1998 delay and by finding prejudice where the respondent had notice of the claim before the limitation period expired.