Danilo Popadic

The defendants brought a motion to transfer the action from the City of Toronto to the City of London.

The plaintiff's action alleged a conspiracy in awarding contracts for forestry operations in the City of London, seeking $31 million in damages.

The court applied the factors under Rule 13.1.02(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure and found that all enumerated factors favoured the transfer, as the events, damages, subject-matter, and witnesses were all located in London.

The motion was granted and the action was ordered transferred.

Danforth (London) Ltd. ("Danforth") sued the City of London ("City") for $53 million in damages, alleging negligence and failure to act fairly and in good faith regarding a proposed development and rapid transit (RT) routing.

Danforth's related company had applied for a zoning by-law amendment in 2015, but withdrew it after City staff requested significant street dedications for a then-proposed RT route.

In 2017, the City approved a different RT route that did not require these dedications.

Danforth claimed that an earlier routing decision would have allowed its development to proceed.

The City moved for summary judgment, arguing no duty of care was owed in negligence and that Danforth could not complain about the exercise of discretionary power as the application was withdrawn before a council decision.

The court granted summary judgment, finding that the City's RT routing decisions and the pre-approval process were "core policy" decisions, immune from negligence claims, and that no private law duty of care was owed.

The claim of unfairness or bad faith also failed because no final decision was made by City council, and there was no evidence of bad faith in staff's earlier requests.

The court also noted statutory protection under the Municipal Act, 2001.

The applicant health unit sought to relocate its headquarters by entering into a new lease.

The respondent County, which was the applicant's current landlord and an unsuccessful bidder for the new location, refused to consent to the lease under s. 52(3) of the Health Protection and Promotion Act.

The court determined that a lease constitutes 'holding real property' under the Act, thus requiring municipal consent.

However, the court set aside the County's refusal, finding it was made in bad faith and with a reasonable apprehension of bias due to the County's direct financial interest in keeping the applicant as a tenant.

The self-represented applicant appealed a Make Safe Order and demolition permit issued by the City of London for properties owned by Rygar Properties, which were previously listed on the City's heritage inventory.

The applicant argued the permit violated the Planning Act and Building Code Act, and that the City committed 'demolition by neglect'.

The court dismissed the application, finding the City acted reasonably, in good faith, and within its statutory authority when issuing the orders and permits.

Costs were awarded to the respondents.

The moving party, acting under a s. 38 BIA order in the bankruptcy of a general contractor, moved for a final order that a release executed by the bankrupt's trustee did not bar a claim for damages against the respondent municipality.

The moving party also sought an order nunc pro tunc for leave to amend the bankrupt's statement of defence to add a crossclaim against the municipality.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the action had already been dismissed following a settlement, and a crossclaim could not stand alone under the Construction Lien Act.

Furthermore, the comprehensive release executed by the trustee barred the crossclaim, and the court declined to exercise its discretion under s. 37 of the BIA to reverse the trustee's decision.