Tiffany (Shi Han) Guo

The respondent mother sought to stay the Court of Appeal's order requiring the return of a five-year-old child to the United Kingdom pursuant to the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, pending her application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The father had successfully appealed a Superior Court decision that dismissed his application for the child's return, on the basis that the father had consented to or acquiesced in the child's retention in Canada.

The Court of Appeal found that the application judge erred in conflating consent to relocation with consent to retention.

The motion judge dismissed the mother's stay motion, finding no serious issue to be tried, no irreparable harm, and that the balance of convenience favoured the child's return to the jurisdiction of habitual residence.

The court granted an application under the Hague Convention for the return of a child wrongfully removed from Michigan to Ontario by her mother.

The judge found that Michigan was the child’s habitual residence immediately prior to removal, rejecting the argument that the child’s ties to her primary caregiver in Ontario were determinative.

The court also found that the mother had not established a grave risk of harm or intolerable situation if the child were returned, and ordered the child’s return to Michigan with undertakings to protect the mother and child’s interests pending further proceedings in Michigan.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed the appeal of A.A. regarding the return of her child to Bangladesh under the Children’s Law Reform Act (CLRA) while refugee applications were pending.

The court found that the motion judge erred by failing to consider the impact of the outstanding refugee claims, the allegations of domestic violence, and the potential for serious harm to the child if returned.

The decision clarifies that the existence of a refugee claim does not automatically stay CLRA proceedings but is a significant factor in the analysis.

The matter was remitted for a new hearing.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal of Terrence Chapman, who sought a 50% share in real estate and corporate assets held with Sandra Ing, his former partner in both business and personal life.

The trial judge found that the parties were not involved in a joint family venture and that Chapman would be unjustly enriched by an equal division, given Ing’s substantial contributions to the value of the property in question.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge’s decision, finding no juristic reason for Chapman’s enrichment under the Ontario Business Corporations Act and confirming the appropriateness of a proprietary remedy in favour of Ing.

This is a panel review of a single judge's order dismissing a motion to stay a return order for an infant child to Bangladesh, pending appeal.

The Court of Appeal majority granted the review, set aside the stay dismissal, and granted a stay of the return order.

The majority found that the single judge erred in principle by giving insufficient weight to the serious issue of the relationship between the Children's Law Reform Act and pending refugee claims, and by misapplying the irreparable harm and balance of convenience tests, particularly regarding the child's best interests and the potential loss of refugee status.

The dissenting judge argued that the majority conducted a de novo review rather than applying deference to the single judge's discretionary order.

The applicant father sought the return of his son to Mexico under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, alleging wrongful retention by the respondent mother in Ontario.

The respondent opposed, claiming a grave risk of harm under Article 13(b) due to the applicant's alleged abusive conduct and the inadequacy of the Mexican justice system.

The court found that the Article 13(b) exception did not apply, as the alleged domestic violence was dated and not severe enough to meet the high threshold, and the Mexican legal system was deemed capable of protecting the child and mother.

The father's application was granted, ordering the child's return to Mexico with specified undertakings.

The Applicant sought the return of the children to Singapore pursuant to the Hague Convention, arguing Singapore was their habitual residence.

The Respondent contended the children's habitual residence was Ontario, asserting the move to Singapore was temporary for family support during pregnancy.

The court applied the hybrid approach to habitual residence, considering all circumstances including parental intentions and the children's connections.

The court found that the parties' intention was always to return to Canada, supported by evidence such as storage of belongings and daycare registrations.

The Hague application was dismissed, and the Ontario court was found to have jurisdiction over custody and access, as the children were habitually resident in Canada.

The Court of Appeal heard cross-motions within an appeal concerning a child's return to Bangladesh.

The mother (appellant) sought to stay a lower court order for the child's return, arguing a pending refugee claim should preclude the order, and also requested initials and a publication ban.

The father (respondent) sought security for costs for the appeal.

The court dismissed the mother's stay motion, finding no evidence of merit to the refugee claim or irreparable harm, and that the child's best interests favored return to Bangladesh.

The court granted the mother's request for initials and a limited publication ban.

The father's motion for security for costs was dismissed, as it would impede access to justice.

The Respondent Mother, entirely successful in a prior Hague Application, sought costs from the Applicant Father.

The Mother requested $50,714.80, arguing for substantial recovery up to her offer to settle and full recovery thereafter, citing the Father's alleged bad faith.

The Father disputed the amount and denied bad faith, arguing the offer did not meet Family Law Rules requirements for full indemnity.

The court, applying Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules, found the Mother presumptively entitled to costs.

While acknowledging the Father's unacceptable conduct, the court determined it did not meet the high threshold for bad faith warranting full recovery costs.

The Father's claims of inability to pay were not substantiated due to a lack of financial disclosure.

The court ultimately awarded the Mother $37,500.00 in all-inclusive costs, representing a slightly higher award than on a partial indemnity basis.