ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
NEVIDA ROY
Applicant
– and –
LUKE ANTHONY ROY
Respondent
Michael J. Stangarone, Tiffany Guo, for the Applicant
Sunshiyaa Aiteeneyas, for the Respondent
HEARD: February 25, 2026
M. Kraft. j.
Nature of the Hearing
1The applicant father, Luke Anthony Roy, seeks a declaration that the parties’ two young children – L.J., age 2, and A., age 1 - were wrongfully removed by the respondent mother, Nevida Roy, to Ontario. He asks this Court to order their prompt return to their habitual residence of Lumberton, Texas, pursuant to Article 3 of the Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, 25 October 1980, 1343 U.N.T.S. 89, Can. T.S. 1983 No. 35 (the “Hague Convention”).
2The parties agree that prior to the children’s retention in Ontario, the children were habitually resident in Texas. On August 24, 2025, the mother left Texas with the children for Ontario. The father had consented to a temporary visit with the mother’s extended family. Once in Ontario, however, the mother informed the father by phone that she did not intend to return the children to Texas as planned on September 20, 2025.
3The mother asserts that the relationship was characterized by family violence. She testifies that she experienced physical, financial, and emotional abuse, including threats, degradation, and isolation by the father, and that these circumstances left her traumatized and fearful of seeking help from authorities. She further alleges that the father sexually abused their daughter at two months of age and that he engages in inappropriate sexual behaviour with his teenage daughter from a prior relationship. The mother submits that returning the children to Texas would expose them to a serious and grave risk of physical and psychological harm that would be intolerable.
4The mother submits that although she commenced a Hague Application pursuant to this Court’s direction, she lacked jurisdiction to do so. In her view, only the left‑behind parent - here, the father - may invoke the Hague Convention by applying to the Central Authority in Ontario or Texas for assistance in securing the children’s return under Article 8 of the Hague Convention. She argues that, as a result, this Court retains jurisdiction to make a parenting order under s. 23 of the Children’s Law Reform Act (“CLRA”) if satisfied, on a balance of probabilities, that the children would suffer serious harm if returned to the father in Texas. She maintains that the Court cannot confer jurisdiction on her to initiate a Hague proceeding when the Convention does not permit it. She further submits that the “serious harm” threshold under s. 23 of the CLRA is lower than the “grave risk of harm” exception under Article 13(b) of the Hague Convention, but in any event, she says she meets the evidentiary burden under either standard.
5The father rejects the mother’s position. He argues that because the parties agree the children were habitually resident in Texas immediately before their wrongful retention in Ontario, this Court must order their return unless the mother establishes the Article 13(b) exception under the Hague Convention, namely, a grave risk that return would expose the children to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place them in an intolerable situation. He submits that the mother has not met this heavier burden. He asserts that the child protection agency in Texas has ruled out her allegations of sexual abuse of their infant daughter and that her allegations of physical abuse lack credibility. The father further maintains that the Texas courts are fully capable of addressing any issues of family violence and ensuring the children’s safety.
6Canada and the United States are both contracting states to the Convention. The Hague Convention is implemented as part of Ontario's domestic law under s. 46 of the CLRA.
7The object of the Convention is to secure the prompt return of children wrongfully removed or retained in any contracting state and to ensure that rights of custody and access under the law of one contracting state are effectively respected in the other contracting state: see Article 3 of the Hague Convention and Tariq v. Basharat, 2025 ONSC 7164, at para. 8.
8The purpose of the Hague Convention is to protect and enforce custody rights by securing the prompt return of children who have been wrongfully removed or retained: Ludwig v. Ludwig, 2019 ONCA 680, 437 D.L.R. (4th) 517, at paras. 19-20. Prompt return mitigates the harms associated with wrongful removal, deters parents from relocating a child in the hope of creating new jurisdictional ties and obtaining custody, and ensures that the merits of custody and access disputes are determined in the child’s habitual‑residence forum. The Convention does not address the substance of custody rights, and Article 16 expressly prohibits a court seized with a Hague Application from determining those rights until it has first decided that the child is not to be returned: Ludwig, at para. 19; Office of the Children’s Lawyer v. Balev, 2018 SCC 16, [2018] 1 S.C.R. 398.
9Determining where a child is habitually resident also permits the court to assess whether the retention of a child is wrongful. See: Parmar v. Flora, 2022 ONCA 869. As the parties agree that the children’s habitual residence immediately before the mother’s wrongful retention in Ontario was Texas, the first stage of the Hague analysis – to determine the children’s habitual residence - is unnecessary.
Issues to be Determined
10The issues for me to determine are as follows:
a. Should the mother be able to seek relief under s.23 of the Children’s Law Reform Act in the circumstances of this case?
b. What weight, if any, should be placed on the return orders the father obtained in Texas?
c. If the answer to a. is no, is there a grave risk of harm that the return of the children to Texas would expose them to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the children in an intolerable situation pursuant to Article 13(b) of the Hague?
d. If the court is inclined to order the children to be returned to Texas, what undertakings should be incorporated into the return order?
Summary of my decision
11For the reasons that follow, I find as follows:
a. The children were removed from Texas at the end of August 2025.
b. At the time of the removal, the children were habitually resident in Texas.
c. Given that the father initiated a Hague Application in response to the mother’s Hague Application, the grave risk of harm is the onus the mother has to meet.
d. The Texas orders are not dispositive on this Court.
e. There is grave risk that return to Texas would expose the children to risk of physical and psychological harm or place the children in an intolerable situation.
Background
12The parties married in Texas in 2021. They have two children: L.J., age 2, and A., age 1. The mother has an 18‑year‑old daughter, A.M.., from a previous relationship. The father has a 17‑year‑old daughter, A., from a previous relationship.
13The parties met online through a Christian Bible group while the mother was living in Toronto and the father in Texas. They began a long‑distance relationship in July 2019, which continued for approximately two years before their marriage. In August 2021, the mother and her daughter A.M. relocated to Texas.
14L.J. was born on June 20, 2023, and A. was born on September 20, 2024.
15Both children are dual Canadian‑American citizens. The father is an American citizen, and the mother is a Canadian citizen who holds a U.S. green card.
16Early in the relationship, the father disclosed to the mother that he had been sexually abused as a child. Beginning as early as October 2020, the mother raised concerns about the way the father looked at teenage girls and what she perceived as an attraction to minor females; the father denied this. She also expressed concerns about sexualized behaviours she believed she observed between the father and his daughter, A., from a previous relationship, which the father also denied. The father’s position is that the mother created issues between herself and A. by creating this false narrative. These issues were a recurring source of tension in the marriage
17It is agreed that the mother was the primary caregiver of the parties’ two children. The father testified that after each child’s birth, the mother remained at home to care for them while he worked full time. She was responsible for their daily routines, breastfeeding, feedings, medical appointments, and all aspects of their physical and emotional care. The father worked full time and travelled extensively for work. He testified that in 2022, 2023, and 2024 he worked in Florida on a hurricane relief program and later entered the trucking industry, which required him to be away from home for weeks at a time, sometimes up to six weeks straight. When he was away, he relied on the mother to manage all appointments and activities for the children, and testified that he had no concerns about her care of the children. He further stated that he has never cared for the children on his own or had overnight care of them without the mother present
18The mother’s evidence is that she was isolated in Texas without family or a support network. It is agreed that she was wholly financially dependent on the father. To earn some additional income, she began making cheesecakes and selling them through DoorDash. The father acknowledged that he controlled the family’s finances.
19The mother’s evidence is that the relationship was marked by family violence, including physical assaults and verbal abuse by the father. She alleges, among other incidents, that he caused her a black eye. The father admitted to destroying the mother’s property, including smashing her cellular phone, threatening her with physical harm and with cutting her off financially, and regularly denigrating her by calling her names. He testified that he knew the mother was afraid of him because of his behaviour and that she was reluctant to contact the police. He further acknowledged that there was physical violence in the marriage, that he engaged in physical outbursts, and that he believes in physically disciplining the children to instill good behaviour.
20During cross‑examination, the father acknowledged that the mother had raised concerns with him throughout the marriage about what she perceived as his sexualized behaviours toward young girls, including his own daughter, A., and that she genuinely believes these concerns to be real. He denies engaging in any sexualized or inappropriate behaviour with A..
21The father kept a loaded gun in his bedside table. He testified that he does not know where that gun is now but confirmed that he owns firearms. The mother’s evidence is that she feared the children could access the weapon and that the father might use it if she angered him.
22On October 9, 2025, the father obtained a temporary restraining order against the mother from the Texas court without notice to her. The order granted him exclusive possession of the matrimonial home and vehicle; prohibited the mother from contacting him directly or indirectly; barred her from attending at the matrimonial home or using the vehicle; and prevented her from withdrawing or accessing any funds from the parties’ joint accounts. The father testified that the restraining order is no longer in effect. There is no evidence on the record to confirm whether that is accurate. It appears that the mother did have a family law lawyer in Texas who attended court at some point in those proceedings.
23The father did not invoke the Hague Convention or seek assistance from the Central Authority in either jurisdiction to secure the children’s return to Texas. His evidence was that he believed this was unnecessary because he had already obtained return orders in Texas. However, he did not bring a motion in Ontario to have the Texas order recognized and enforced under s. 41 of the Children’s Law Reform Act. Having not commenced a Hague Application, he also did not seek any ancillary order supporting the Texas return order.
24In his Texas divorce application, the father seeks, among other relief, exclusive possession of the matrimonial home; sole decision‑making responsibility for the children; restrictions on the mother’s parenting time, including that any parenting time be supervised; an order preventing her from removing the children from Texas; an order requiring her to surrender the children’s passports; and an order that she undergo a psychological assessment. In his supporting affidavit sworn October 2, 2025, the father makes numerous allegations about the mother, including: (a) that the mother and her older daughter had no known association with males; (b) that the mother accused him of affairs, of looking at other women, and of looking at his own daughter, which became a source of conflict; (c) that there was no normalcy in their marriage and constant conflict over his actions; (d) that the marriage was tumultuous; (e) that the mother and maternal grandmother are ‘separatists’ who believe men are not to be trusted; (f) that there were physical outbursts between the parties; and (g) that the mother has an undiagnosed mental illness or psychotic fixation.
Issue One: Should the mother be able to seek relief under s.23 of the Children’s Law Reform Act in the circumstances of this case?
25In Kirby v. Woods, 2025 ONCA 601, at para. 127, the Court of Appeal confirmed that Ontario courts may assume jurisdiction to make parenting orders under s. 23 of the CLRA even in cases involving another Hague Convention signatory state.
26Section 23 of the CLRA provides that despite ss. 22 and 41 of that Act, a court may exercise its jurisdiction to make or vary a parenting or contact order with respect to a child if (b) the court is satisfied that the child would, on a balance of probabilities, suffer serious harm if (iii) the child is removed from Ontario.
27I agree with the mother that only the father, as the left‑behind parent, could invoke Article 3 of the Hague Convention. In this case, however, the mother was previously directed by this court to commence a Hague Application, despite not having standing to do so. The father did not notify either the Texas or Ontario Central Authority to seek the children’s return under Article 3. Although he obtained Texas orders requiring the mother to return the children, he did not pursue the Hague process to enforce that order. Nevertheless, in responding to the mother’s Hague Application, the father sought relief under the Hague Convention. Accordingly, while s. 23 of the CLRA would initially have governed the analysis, once the father advanced his own Hague claim, the burden shifted to the mother to establish that one of the Hague exceptions applies - specifically, that returning the children to Texas would expose them to a grave risk of physical or psychological harm or otherwise place them in an intolerable situation within the meaning of Article 13(b).
Litigation History
28Given how this case started in this Court, it is helpful to go through the litigation history of this matter, which was as follows:
a. On October 6, 2025, after learning that the mother would not return the children to Texas, the father commenced a divorce application there. He obtained a temporary restraining order against the mother on October 9, 2025, and served her with the Texas application on October 10, 2025. That order required the mother to return the children to Texas and to surrender them to the father at Toronto Pearson Airport on November 30, 2025. The mother did not comply.
b. The mother then brought an urgent, ex parte motion before this Court, prior to issuing an application, and was directed to attend an urgent case conference.
c. On October 21, 2025, Justice Stevenson heard the urgent case conference. The Endorsement noted that the preliminary issue was whether Texas or Ontario had jurisdiction. The mother was granted leave to bring a motion in Canada on proper notice to the father. She was also directed to correct her notice of motion, which referred to incorrect statutory provisions, including repealed statutes, and did not address the relief required for a jurisdictional determination
d. On November 27, 2025, the mother’s urgent motion came before Justice Nakonechny. Despite Justice Stevenson’s direction on October 21, 2025, the mother did not serve her motion materials on the father in accordance with the Family Law Rules, and the father did not attend. The mother also failed to correct her notice of motion and had not yet issued an application, although one month had passed since the urgent case conference. Justice Nakonechny granted a temporary restraining order on an interim‑interim, without‑prejudice basis. The Endorsement also noted that the father had obtained an order from the Texas court dated November 24, 2025, directing the return of the children. Pending the hearing of the mother’s Hague Application, the children were ordered to remain in Ontario in the mother’s primary care. The motion was adjourned to December 15, 2025.
e. It is noteworthy that although Justice Nakonechny’s Endorsement referred to the mother’s “Hague Application,” the mother had not issued any application by November 27, 2025. No proceeding had been initiated by her identifying whether she sought relief under s. 37 of the Children’s Law Reform Act or whether she intended to rely on an exception under Article 13(b) of the Hague Convention.
f. Although the father had obtained an order in Texas directing the return of the children, he did not commence a Hague Application seeking their return. He did not notify the Central Authority in either Texas or Ontario responsible for Hague matters. As the left‑behind parent of children wrongfully removed from their habitual residence, he was the only parent withstanding to invoke the Hague Convention. He has never sought a chasing order under the Hague.
g. On December 15, 2025, the mother’s motion returned before me. By that date, two months after the urgent case conference, the mother had still not commenced an application under the Children’s Law Reform Act or a Hague Application, nor had the Central Authority in Ontario been notified. During the hearing, the mother’s counsel initially advised that she wished to abandon the motion. The mother then changed her position, and counsel argued that this Court should decline to follow the Texas order and should refuse to order the children’s return on the basis that doing so would expose them to a grave risk of physical or psychological harm or otherwise place them in an intolerable situation under Article 13(b) of the Hague Convention. I determined that the Court lacked jurisdiction to grant the relief sought in the absence of an application properly before it. I directed the mother to issue a Hague Application by December 19, 2025; the father to serve and file responding materials by December 26, 2025; the mother to serve and file any reply by December 31, 2025; questioning to occur by January 6, 2026; and the Hague hearing to proceed before me, in person, on January 13, 2026. I assumed, incorrectly, that the father’s Texas order constituted a chasing order and that he had notified the Central Authority of the wrongful retention of the children in Ontario.
h. On January 13, 2026, the mother’s counsel was involved in a slip and fall accident and was, therefore unable to attend the scheduled Hague hearing. As a result, the hearing was adjourned to February 3, 2026.
i. On January 30, 2026, the mother advised the Court that she had retained new counsel and would seek an adjournment of the February 3, 2026, Hague hearing. On February 3, 2026, agent for her new counsel appeared and requested the adjournment. The hearing was adjourned to February 25, 2026. I directed the mother to serve and file a supplementary affidavit by February 13, 2026, and the father to serve a supplementary reply affidavit by February 20, 2026, solely to provide updated information to the Court. The parties were also directed to serve and file their Facta by February 23, 2026. I set out the procedure for the Hague hearing: the parties would make oral opening submissions; rely on their affidavits as their evidence‑in‑chief; conduct cross‑examinations viva voce; and deliver oral closing submissions.
29For this Hague hearing, the court received four affidavits from the mother1, two affidavits from the father2 and a Factum from each party.
30At the outset of the hearing, the mother brought a motion to strike specific paragraphs and exhibits from the father’s supplementary reply affidavit on the basis that it was not correct reply. She also objected to the father having attached a third-party affidavit as an Exhibit to his supplementary reply affidavit.
31Pursuant to Rule 14(20) of the Family Law Rules, a party may serve reply evidence to “any new matters raised by the evidence served by the party responding to the motion.” The mother argues that the father’s supplementary reply affidavit simply amplifies the evidence he has already placed before the Court, or it is evidence that he could have provided to the Court at first instance. As such, it is not proper reply and ought to be struck because the mother was deprived of a fair process since she did not have the opportunity to respond to new allegations raised by the father.
32I find that the affidavit from the third-party, namely, the godmother of the father attached as Exhibit “C” to the father’s supplementary reply affidavit ought to be struck. I further find that many paragraphs in the father’s supplementary reply affidavit were not proper reply. I did not give these paragraphs any weight as they simply reiterated information contained in the father’s earlier affidavit.
33Exhibit “B” to the father’s affidavit sworn on February 20, 2026, is a Texas Incident Report from the Lumberton Police Department dated November 25, 2024. The mother objected to this report being attached to the father’s affidavit as a new document since it could have and should have been an Exhibit to his original affidavit, sworn on December 9, 2025, and not in his reply affidavit. There is another CFS History Search Report from the Hardin County Sheriff’s Office from the dispatch of the police from November 25, 2024, that was also on the record and produced by the mother. These reports are third-party corroborative pieces of evidence regarding an incident of physical family violence. Given its relevance and probative value, it was agreed that the mother would be given an opportunity to address the contents of the Incident Report orally in chief so the father’s counsel could cross-examine her on it.
Issue two: How much weight, if any, should this Court give to the orders made in Texas?
34Chasing Orders are governed by Article 15 of the Hague Convention which provides:
“The judicial or administrative authorities of a Contracting State may, prior to the making of an order for the return of the child, request that the applicant obtain from the authorities of the State of the habitual residence of the child a decision or the determination that the removal or retention was wrongful within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention, where such a decision or determination may be obtained in that State. The Central Authorities of the Contracting States shall so far as practicable assist applicants to obtain such a decision or determination.”
35As set out in Thomson v. Thomson, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 551, at para. 44, the S.C.C. defined a chasing order as an order “made solely to bolster an application under the Hague Convention”. The Hague Convention proceedings must first be commenced in Ontario, which is where jurisdiction lies. While a chasing order obtained, at the request of this Honourable Court of Ontario, and during the course of the Ontario proceedings, may bolster a Hague Convention Application, it has no binding authority. There is nothing in the Hague Convention that requires a court to even recognize a Chasing Order.
36In B.S.P. v. C.M., 2017 SKQB 179, at para. 29; and Thomson v. Thomson, supra at para. 73, the Court found that the chasing orders made after the children were removed from North Dakota were of limited relevance and were not binding on its decision regarding the father’s Hague Application. Citing the Supreme Court in Thomson, the Court stated: “[t]here is nothing in the Convention requiring the recognition of an ex post facto custody order of foreign jurisdictions.”
37Following the ruling in Thomson, the Court in Hage v. Bryntwick, 2014 ONSC 4201, at para. 56, found that the father had obtained a temporary Order in the Superior Court of California after the mother left the jurisdiction, thereby making it a chasing order. The Court therefore concluded that the Order of the California court did not in and of itself establish wrongful retention.
38In Bearisto v. Cook, 2018 NSCA 90, at para. 105, the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal held that it was irrelevant to the analysis under the Hague Convention that the Washington Superior Court had already issued a final divorce order with a parenting plan that granted custody to the father. Relying on Thomson, the Court reiterated that the existence of a ‘chasing order’ from one State does not make the removal or retention of a child in another State wrongful, nor is such an order a prerequisite to fix a date of putative wrongful retention.
39“Chasing Orders”, which are custody orders made after a child has been removed or retained in another country, do not create rights of custody or make retentions/removals wrongful. Indeed, such orders may complicate obtaining the child’s return from a foreign state.
40There is an order by the Texas Court made on November 19, 2025 for the mother to surrender the children to the father on November 30, 2025 at 12:00 p.m. at the airport in Toronto; the father to return with the children to Texas; and the father to have exclusive possession of the children until January 2, 2026 at which time he is to surrender the children to the mother at the family residence. A final hearing date was scheduled to be heard on January 8, 2026. It appears that the mother had counsel present at that hearing in Texas, named Mel Shelander. The mother attached correspondence from the Texas courts to her supplementary affidavit confirming that the parties’ matrimonial case was not on the Texas docket pending the determination from this Court as to jurisdiction.
41I find that the ‘Chasing Order’ issued by the Texas Court is not dispositive or binding on this Court in its analysis under the Hague Convention regarding whether a return Order should be made for the children. That analysis is appropriately undertaken by the Hague Application judge in the jurisdiction in which the child is taken, which in this case is Ontario. In this case, any return order must be issued in the first instance by this Honourable Court, now that a full hearing has been conducted pursuant to the procedure set out in the Hague Convention.
Issue Three: If this Court takes its jurisdiction under the Hague Convention, is there a grave risk of harm that the return of the children to Texas would expose them to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the children in an intolerable situation pursuant to Article 13(b) of the Hague?
Analytic Framework under the Hague
42In Ludwig v. Ludwig, 2019 ONCA 680, the Court of Appeal set out the analytic framework the court should apply to a Hague Application. The first step is to determine the date of the alleged wrongful removal or retention and in which jurisdiction the child was habitually resident immediately before the alleged wrongful removal or retention. The second step is to determine if any of the exceptions in the Hague Convention apply. If no exception applies, Article 12 of the Hague Convention requires the court to order the return of the children to their country of habitual residence. While Article 13 contains exceptions to the general rule that a wrongfully removed or retained child must be returned to his or her country of habitual residence, it should not be read so broadly that it erodes the general rule: Balev v. Baggot, 2018 SCC 16, paras. 75-76.
43I find that the wrongful retention date is the end of August 2025, which is when the mother told the father that she did not intend to return with the children to Texas on September 20, 2025, as planned.
44I need not go through the hybrid test to determine the habitual residence of the children because the parties agree they were habitually residence in Lumberton, Texas before the mother retained them in Ontario.
Are the children at grave risk of harm if they are returned to Texas?
45The mother alleges that her relationship with the father involved coercive control, regular threats of violence, actual physical violence, regular insults and demeaning comments. She contends that the situation in Texas is intolerable and that the Ontario courts should assume jurisdiction of the children. Further, she asserts that the children were exposed to family violence in Texas, the father sexually assaulted their youngest child and given their young ages, 2 years and 1 year, and their dependence on her as their primary caregiver, any risk to her jeopardizes their physical and psychological safety if they are returned to Texas.
46In Thompson v. Thomson, the Supreme Court of Canada set out the high standard for the test of grave risk of harm:
“In brief, although the word “grave” modifies “risk” and not “harm”, this must be read in conjunction with the clause “or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation.” The use of the word “otherwise” points inescapably to the conclusion that the physical or psychological harm contemplated by the first clause of Article 13(b) is harm to a degree that also amounts to an intolerable situation.” at p.596.
47In Jabbaz v. Moummar (2003), 38 R.F.L. (5th) 103 at para. 23, the Ontario Court of Appeal set out the test for severity of harm as “an extreme situation; a situation that is unbearable; a situation too severe to be endured.”
48The law has very clearly established that the threshold for such claims is very high, with exceptions to a return of the child being “narrow and principled in nature” as seen at paragraph 76 of Office of the Children’s Lawyer v. Balev as referenced within Bodnaruk v. Bodnaruk, 2023 ONSC 4136:
- The exceptions to the rule that the child should be returned to the country of the child’s habitual residence are just that – exceptions. Their elements must be established, and they do not confer a general discretion on the application judge to refuse to return the child.
49The case law has very clearly established the definition of the “grave risk” threshold as meaning “imminent danger” between the time of the child’s return and any custody hearing, with examples including “a zone of war, famine and disease” or “where there is a grave risk of harm to the child” with the court in the country of habitual residence being incapable of providing the children with protection. Within the case of Bodnaruk, at paragraph 11, the case of Paschel v. Paschel, 2017 ONSC 6932, at para. 83-85, aff’d 2017 ONCA 972, was referenced with regards to a consideration of the definition of “grave risk” which is defined as follows:
Article 13(b) provides that a child should not be returned to the place of habitual residence only where “there is a grave risk that his or her return would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation.” This is a stringent test with a very high threshold.
In Thompson, supra, the Supreme Court of Canada adopted a restrictive reading of the grave harm exception. In Friedrich v. Friedrich, 78 F.3d 1060 (U.S. C.A. 6th Cir. 1996), the Court of Appeal in the 6th Circuit accepted S.C.C.’s definition in Thompson. It held that “grave harm” meant that return of the child would put the child in “imminent” danger between the time of the child’s return and the custody hearing, such as returning the child to a location which is in a zone a) of war, famine or disease, or b) where there is a grave risk of harm by serious abuse or neglect, or extraordinary emotional dependence, and c) when the court in the country of habitual residence may be incapable or unwilling to give the child adequate protection. The Ontario Superior Court of Justice has also accepted this interpretation. [citation omitted].
Further, the risk the child is said to face must be greater than would normally be expected on taking a child away from one parent and passing him to another. The harm must be grave and intolerable. [citation omitted]
50The Supreme Court of Canada clarified in Thomson v. Thomson that there must be a child-centered analysis to the question of harm under the Convention. If the harm were severe enough to meet the stringent test of the Convention, it would be irrelevant from where it came. In other words, from a child-centered perspective, harm is harm.
51The onus, therefore, is on the mother to prove, on a balance of probabilities, that the children would be exposed to grave risk of harm or otherwise placed in an intolerable situation if returned to Texas. In Hassan v. Garib, 2017 ONSC 7227, para. 9, Engelking J. set out three questions the court should consider in determining if the threshold of grave risk of harm has been met:
a. Has the alleged past violence been severe and is it likely to recur?
b. Has it been life-threatening?
c. Does the record show that the father is not amenable to control by the justice system?
Has the alleged past violence been severe and is it likely to recur?
52In answering branch one, I find that the past violence, both physical and psychological, suffered by the mother has been severe and that it is likely to recur. I make these findings based on the following facts:
a. The mother described an incident on November 25, 2024, during which the father smashed her cell phone against her face, causing a black eye. Her affidavit included date‑stamped photographs of the injury. She testified that an argument began when the father attempted to leave the house with their son, L.J.. Concerned for L.J.’s safety and unsure where the father was taking him, she followed. When the father refused to tell her, she attempted to call the police; while she was on the phone with the dispatcher, the father grabbed the phone and struck her in the face with it.
b. The father testified that he was leaving the home with L.J., the mother followed him, and he intended only to “swipe” the phone from her hand but “mistakenly” hit her face. In cross‑examination, he admitted causing the mother’s black eye. When asked whether he was trying to stop her from calling the police, he denied it.
c. A Texas Incident Report, dated November 25, 2024, completed by Officer Whitehead, lists the father as the victim and the mother as the offender/arrestee. The narrative in the report confirms that the Officer observed the father holding a small child and the mother following behind him. The father advised the officer that an argument had stated at their residence, he was going to take the child to try on some clothes he had purchased; the mother got mad and an argument ensued; when the father began leaving the house with his son, the mother grabbed him by the hair and pulled his hair; the mother agreed the father was leaving the residence and she pulled his hair, however, she said the father reacted by using force back but would not elaborate what force was used. The report further stated that neither the mother nor the father wished to file charges; the father gave the child to the mother and left the residence while the mother and child stayed at the residence.
d. However, the CFS History Search Report from the Hardin County Sheriff’s Office from that same date on November 25, 2024 at 3:33 p.m., “FEMALE CALLED 911 ADVISED THAT SHE NEEDED TO [sic] POLICE WHEN DISPATCH STARTED GATEHRING INFORMATION THE FEMALE WENT TO ARGUING ABOUT A CHILD AND THEN IT SOUNDED AS IF IT TURNED PHYSICAL AND THE CALL GOT DROPPED.” The report also states at 3:35 p.m., “Dispatch attempted to get the caller back on the phone and there was not answer”; at 4:02 p.m., it states “Assisted”, at 4:06 p.m., it states “Report”, and at 4:11 p.m. it states, “Did not respond was on another detail.” From this summary, it appears that the mother called the police as the victim.
e. The mother testified that the officer told her that because the father alleged, she assaulted him first, both parties would need to go to the station if she wished to pursue charges. She stated that this response made her feel threatened and worried that she might also get into trouble, and that out of fear she did not provide further details about the force used when the father struck her with the phone.
f. The Incident Report was prepared after Officer Whitehead attended at the house. Based on the testimony of both parties and the corroborating police report, I find that this incident of physical violence was severe.
g. The mother testified that, given the father’s pattern of physically assaulting her when she attempted to call the police, she became fearful of seeking assistance from authorities. She stated that she did not file a police report after the incident on November 25, 2024, because she feared the father would further assault her and place her life in danger. I accept this evidence.
h. The mother testified that November 25, 2024, was not the only time the father destroyed her cell phone and that he did so a second time. The father admitted to breaking the mother’s phone on another occasion during his cross-examination.
i. The mother testified that on January 20, 2024, during an argument, the father placed his hands on her and injured her neck and chin. Later that same day, she stated that the father attempted to drive away with L.J. sitting on his lap in the front seat, without a car seat. Her affidavit included photographs showing bruising to her chin and chest. The father denied attempting to drive with L.J. on his lap in a moving vehicle. Although a photograph depicted him seated behind the wheel with L.J. on his lap, his evidence was that the car was not running and that he was simply sitting in the vehicle with L.J., with no intention to drive.
j. On January 27, 2024, the mother’s evidence is that during another argument, the father left a bruise on her upper chest, near her collarbone. Attached to her affidavit are pictures of this bruising time stamped.
k. On May 27, 2024, while the mother was six months pregnant with A. and caring for L.J., the father became enraged after she raised concerns about his inappropriate behaviour toward a female minor. The mother testified that during the argument, the father threw her belongings out of the car, including kicking her purse across the street. The father’s family was present, and the mother stated that the paternal grandmother defended him. In cross‑examination, the father admitted that he threw the mother’s belongings and kicked her purse across the street.
l. The mother testified that on November 4, 2024, the father’s birthday, she personally witnessed him sexually abusing A., then an infant. She stated that she had fallen asleep beside the father, who was holding A. in the middle of the night. When she awoke, she saw the father grazing and groping A.’s vaginal area over her diaper with his fingers. According to the mother, when she looked directly at him, he immediately reacted by saying, “Oh my god,” as though in response to being caught. The mother testified that, in an effort to process what she had seen, she turned her head and asked the father to hand A. to her so she could put the baby to sleep. She placed A. on the other side of the bed, away from the father. She stated that she was horrified by what she witnessed, which she believed was not related to a diaper change, and that she intentionally did not react in the moment for fear of being physically harmed by the father.
m. The mother’s evidence is that the next day, on November 5, 2024, she contacted the Texas Abuse hotline for assistance to understand whether what she witnessed was abuse and to ask for guidance. She was told by the operator to take the children and go to a women’s shelter. The mother did not follow this advice. She testified that she did not do so because she felt the circumstances in the shelter were not safe, the children were very young, and she feared the father.
n. On July 31, 2025, two weeks prior to the mother leaving for Ontario with the children, the police report shows that the mother’s older daughter, Am. called the police during a fight the parties were having to report that the father was assaulting the mother. The notes read as follows:
“Assault in progress. Stepdad is assaulting her mom.”
o. In addition to physical violence, the mother attached pictures to her affidavit of text messages between the parties where the father threatened her and called her demeaning names, which include the following:”
i. On February 15, 2025, he sent the following threatening messages to ruin her property and cut her off financially:
“I hiding [sic] all ur wigs and hair when I get back.”
I’m blocking all your transaction no more door dash for you.”
“Vida keep biting the hand that fees you see how that works for you.”
ii. On March 25, 2025, he sent the following threatening messages to cut off her cell phone and demeaning remarks:
“ur phone will be cancelled today if that what ur going to do all day u need help. Seriously u need help your elevator doesn’t go all the way up.”
“U got the brain the size of a peanut.”
“Maybe one day you can read with understanding”
“Go join the single ladies club like I said your understanding is bad.”
p. During cross‑examination, the father admitted to sending the mother demeaning text messages and threatening her with financial control and repercussions. He also admitted to making physical threats toward her, including statements such as “I am going to break your jaw,” and taking her phone while saying, “When you get done, I’m going to knock your face up.” The mother attached audio recordings to her affidavit that corroborate these statements. According to the mother, these threats of physical violence occurred in the presence of their newborn infant.
q. During the cross-examination, the father admitted and acknowledged that he has suggested to the mother’s mother and to the courts in Texas that the mother has an undiagnosed metal illness and psychotic fixations.
53On cross examination, the father admitted that physical violence occurred during the relationship and that he has used physical discipline on his eldest daughter and the mother’s eldest daughter. He admitted to whipping a child with a belt, describing this to be a religious or Biblical method of teaching, telling the mother that “this is how we discipline our children in Texas.” Although he attempted to portray that he adopted non‑physical methods over time, he did not deny that this form of punishment remains part of his disciplinary approach. Attached as Schedule “A” to these Reasons are excerpts from the father’s cross-examination.
54While the Supreme Court of Canada allows parents to use “reasonable” physical force for correction, the force must be minor, “transitory and trifling”, non abusive, not involving objects (such as belts or rulers) and not applied to the head3. I am persuaded that the father’s description of having whipped both his and the mother’s elder children was beyond “reasonable” physical force for correction as contemplated by the Supreme Court of Canada, particularly since it involved objects. Given his views about corporal punishment, I am satisfied that it is highly probable that the father will resort to physically disciplining the two younger children at some point to teach them the difference between right and wrong, as he did with the two older children.
55The father’s testimony establishes:
a. An admitted pattern of verbal, emotional, and physical abuse toward the mother.
b. An acknowledgment of yelling and threatening the mother, including “knock her face off” and “break your jaw”,
c. An admission to throwing the mother’s belongings out of a car while she was 6 months’ pregnant, kicking her purse, and making threats to block her financial transactions, cancel her phone, hide her wigs, smashing her phone, and restrict her access to money.
d. While he denies hitting the mother, he admits causing her a black eye and agrees that the bruising shown in a photograph was caused by him.
e. An admission that he confiscated the older daughter’s phone when she called the police in July 2025 to report his assault of her mother.
f. Admission of repeated conflict in the marriage, and agreement that his behavior is inappropriate and causes fear in the mother.
56Excerpts of the transcripts from the father’s cross-examination highlighting these admissions are attached to these Reasons at Schedule “A”.
Is the alleged violence likely to recur?
57The evidence establishes that the physical violence was not an isolated incident triggered by a single stressor. Rather, it arose in the context of conflict between the parties and was accompanied by the father destroying the mother’s property, making threats of financial control, and directing demeaning language toward her. This escalating conflict occurred in the presence of the parties’ young children and each party’s older child from a previous relationship.
58Despite admitting to the family violence he perpetrated against the mother, the father demonstrated no insight into the impact of his conduct or his controlling patterns of psychological abuse on the mother or on the two very young children who were present for these incidents. In these circumstances, I am persuaded that the family violence is likely to recur.
Has it been life-threatening?
59As this pattern of conflict and physical and psychological violence between the parties continue and escalates, I am persuaded on a balance of probabilities it could amount to life threatening actions. It also appears that despite the mother contacting the police and authorities, she has not been able to get the help and supports she needs to leave the father.
60In Kirby v. Woods, 2025 ONCA 601 it was held at para. 50 that the grave risk threshold may be met by the actions or pattern of behaviour of a parent, with or without physical violence against a child. In Pollastro v. Pollastro (1999), 43 O.R. (3d) 485 (C.A.), this court held that a continued pattern of escalating abuse, combined with threats against the mother and her family were sufficient to create an intolerable situation for the child, where the child had not, himself, been physically abused by the father: see also Husid v. Daviau, 2012 ONCA 655.
61A risk of harm to the primary caregiver can constitute a risk of harm to the child establishing an Article 13(b) defence: Pollastro v. Pollastro, at paras. 22, 25-27; also cited in Husid v. Daviau, at para 23, the Ontario Court of Appeal applied the “harm is harm” approach and permitted the wife to remain in Ontario after she came here from California. The Court of Appeal found the domestic violence perpetuated against the mother had an impact on the child. The Appellant alleged that the Respondent had ongoing problem with drugs and alcohol abuse, anger management difficulties and a general lack of basic parenting skills. The Court stated that “returning a child to a violent environment places that child in an inherently intolerable situation, as well as exposing him or her to a serious risk of psychological and physical harm.”
62In the recent decision of Tariq v. Basharat, 2025 ONSC 7164, at paras. 66-81, this Court declined to order the children returned to their habitual residence in Texas based on the finding that such a return would expose them to grave risks of harm or an intolerable situation, per Article 13(b). This Court assumed jurisdiction over the parenting issues. The exception under Article 13(b) was met due to the father’s history of physical, verbal, financial and emotional abuse. The mother’s affidavit and oral evidence was found to be more credible than the father’s. The Court found that the abuse rose to the level of grave risk of harm as contemplated by Article 13(b) notwithstanding that it was not able to conclude that there was a pattern of physical violence, and notwithstanding the father’s participation in the Caring Dads program. The Court stated: “The children are dependent on their mother. Requiring the children to return to a situation where their mother is at continued risk of violence places the children at risk of physical and psychological harm.”
63In Achakzad v. Zemaryalai, Justice Murray of the Ontario Court of Justice invoked Article 13(b) and dismissed the Husband’s Hague application. Her Honour refused the return order finding that it was probable that past violence would continue in the future if the Wife returned to California with the child. The Court found that a risk of harm to the Applicant as primary caregiver would constitute a risk of harm to the child. It has also been recognized that the probability of a recurrence of abuse is high when the perpetrator does not admit to his past wrongdoing, and the risk of domestic violence may increase after separation. In the present case, the father has admitted his past abuse of the mother and the parties’ older children from other relationships, which also constitutes a risk of harm to the children.
64In Husid v. Daviau, 2012 CarswellOnt 1107 (SCJ), at 44-52 (aff’d 2012 ONCA 655), at para. 37, the trial judge found the parties’ home in Peru before the separation was "a place of unhappiness, oppression and abuse for the mother at the hands of the father for many months", with the child there to witness and experience it. The father was controlling of the mother and demanded apologies for perceived transgressions. He verbally abused the mother, threatened her and forced her to fund the family’s expenses out of her savings. The trial judge found that the mother had made out that the child’s return to Peru would expose her to grave risk of being in an intolerable situation, the situation being the mother’s fear of being accosted and publicly berated in the child’s presence by the father. The Court of Appeal for Ontario upheld the decision, commenting that the trial judge’s findings “paint the picture of a violent family dynamic.” The Hague application was dismissed despite there being an ongoing family court proceeding in the Contracting State, being Peru.
65In Husid, upheld on appeal, the Superior Court rejected the notion that children must be at grave risk of “being pushed beyond the limits of endurance before the court could decline an order for return”. The Court instead adopted an approach focused on the circumstances and sensibilities of the child before the Court, suggesting that the appropriate interpretation of an “intolerable situation” is a situation where a “particular child in these particular circumstances should not be expected to tolerate”: at para. 103.
66In defining “grave risk of harm” as contemplated in the Convention, the Court in Pollastro and in Husid did not express the need for the party claiming harm to demonstrate that the grave risk of harm cannot be protected by way of the returning states’ legal services. Further, Article 13(b) of the Convention itself does not set out such a requirement.
67In Harley v. Harley, 2023 ONSC 3564, at para. 156-157, 160-161, 166 and 173, this Court found there would be grave risk of physical or psychological harm if the child were returned to the father in Ohio. The Court made this determination after a detailed review of the evidence that indicated the father controlled the marital home in Ohio in a significantly cruel and abusive manner. The Court concluded that the mother and the child were captives in their own home and refused the return on the basis that it would create an intolerable situation.
68In F. v. N., 2022 SCC 51, at paras. 11, 33, 76-80, 82-23, the Supreme Court of Canada recognized that a child’s separation from his/her primary caregiver can rise to the level of serious harm under section 23 of the Children’s Law Reform Act, warranting nonreturn. The SCC has directed that courts must consider “all barriers to the return of the primary caregiver” and has stated that a parent “may have legitimate and reasonable reasons for not returning to the foreign country, such as significant obstacles to employment or risks to safety, including evidence showing that the left-behind parent is responsible for child abuse or intimate partner violence to the primary caregiver”.
69I find that the father’s pattern of behaviour in the household represents coercive and controlling behaviour and fits the expanded definition of “family violence” as defined in the Divorce Act. The broad definition of family violence recognizes the profound effects that all forms of family violence can have on children. These consequences can be both direct, if a child is exposed to the family violence, or indirect, if the victimized parent's physical, emotional and psychological well-being are compromised, since these consequences in turn often negatively impact their ability to meet the child's physical and emotional needs: see McBennet v. Danis, 2021 ONSC 3619, at paras. 85-86.
70In McIntosh v. Baker, 2022 ONSC 4235, a para. 18. Fowler Byrne J. in referring to the recent Supreme Court decision Barendregt v. Grebliunis made clear that the suggestion that domestic abuse or family violence has no impact on the children and has nothing to do with the perpetrator’s parenting ability is untenable. I am persuaded that the risk of harm to the mother as the primary caregiver to these very young toddlers, ages 2 and 1, constitutes a risk of harm to both children. I am persuaded that the probability of a recurrence of family violence is high given that the father has admitted to his past wrongdoing and does not appear to demonstrate any insight to the impact of his behaviours on the mother or children. The mother’s testimony, the police incident reports, and the father’s viva voce evidence paint a clear picture of a violent and psychologically abusive family dynamic. I find that if required to return to Texas the children would be an intolerable situation.
71I find based on the facts of this case that the father’s repeated pattern of physical violence toward the mother and each party’s older children from previous relationships, coupled with the pattern of threats to leave the mother without any finances; of destroying her phone to prevent her from being able to contact authorities, and the fact that this family violence took place in front of the infant children, all points to a level of abuse and family violence that has risen to the children being in grave risk of harm as contemplated by Article 13(b) if made to return to Texas. Further, the father has weaponized the mother’s mental health to advance his position in the Texas proceedings. Making such suggestions without any basis or diagnosis has been found by this court to be controlling behaviour and in my view, is another form of coercive control and family violence: see Dimitrievski v. Dimitrievski, 2023 ONSC at para 19, 24-27 and Sadkali v. Sadkali, 2023 ONSC 4639.
Does the record show that the father is not amenable to control by the justice system?
72The record shows police involvement but it does now show the father being charged with any crimes. As a result, it does not appear that the justice system in Texas has tried to control the father.
73It appears based on the incident reports from the Hardin County Sheriff’s Office that the police were called at least three times regarding incidents at the parties’ home. Further, given the father’s admission that he caused the mother’s black eye, and the report authored by Officer Whitehead on November 25, 2024, even though the mother had a black eye, the father was listed as the “victim” and the mother as the “offender”. The dispatch incident report seems to suggest that the mother called 911 as the “victim”. Given these inconsistencies and the mother’s evidence, I am satisfied that the mother did not feel protected from the father’s physical violence even with the presence of the Police being called for that purpose. What is known is that despite the mother’s physical injuries, which the father admits to causing, the police did not charge the father and told the mother since both parties were alleging physical violence toward one another, both had to come down to the station. I accept the mother’s evidence that the suggestion from the police that she could get in trouble was sufficient for her to be to fearful to seek further protection from the police. For these reasons, it appears that the Texas police were not able to protect the mother from physical violence inflicted toward her by the father.
74Once the mother was in Canada, she made a report to the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (“DFPS”) reporting the sexual abuse she witnessed by the father to A. This report was made by the mother on November 11, 2025, at which time she and the children were already in Canada. Attached to the father’s affidavit is a letter from DFPS, dated December 2, 2025, which states that DFPS has completed its investigation of alleged abuse or neglect reported on November 11, 2025, involving one or more children in the family and made findings ruling out sexual abuse. The letter explains that a finding of “ruling out” means that, based on the available information, it was reasonable to conclude that the alleged abuse or neglect did not occur.” The mother claims that DFPS nor Child Protective Services, which is a division of DFPS, contacted her to speak with her after her report. It is unclear on the record as to how DFPS made a finding to “rule out” that sexual abuse did not occur to A. given that the mother was not contacted by an CPS investigator after she made the initial report. Further, no one followed up with the mother to suggest A. be seen by a doctor, which could have happened regardless of whether A. was in Ontario or Texas. I find that this Court is not bound by the DFPS ruling out sexual abuse, particularly, in this case since the DFPS did not attempt to reach the mother by phone of video to interview or speak with her. And the DFPS did not attempt to see the children even by video conference. Despite this, they made a finding ruling out the alleged abuse. I am persuaded that this is another reason the mother does not feel the children can be protected by the child protective agencies in Texas from potential abuse.
75The mother explains that if she is required to return to Texas with the children, she has nowhere to go in Texas. The father suggested in his cross-examination that he would move to his parent’s home, and the mother and children could go to the matrimonial home. That, however, would be contrary to the restraining order that was in place. There is nothing on the record to confirm that the restraining order has expired.
76The father and his counsel seem to suggest that if the mother were genuinely fearful of him, then it is unclear why she would have remained in the relationship for years and continue to have children with him. Further, the father suggests that the mother’s conduct does not align with someone who fears for her safety. He blames the mother for not reporting her concerns about the father to Child Protection Services or to the police. This ignores the fact that the mother did try and report incidents of physical violence to the police in Texas and her report to the DFPS of the alleged sexual abuse of A, once she was in Ontario. The father’s arguments regarding the mother’s behaviour completely ignores what we know to be true about victims of family violence and trauma, namely that victims often return to their abuser because of the fear of reprisal is greater than the fear of staying.
77Although the father’s position is that Texas’ legal services and Child Protection Services are equipped to deal with the alleged abuse, there is no requirement set out in Article 13b of the Hague Convention requiring the party claiming harm to demonstrate that the grave risk of harm cannot be protected by way of the returning states’ legal services. I find that based on mother’s experience of both the police in Texas and the DFPS, once she left Texas, it is reasonable that she does not feel the systems in Texas can manage the family violence. I am satisfied on the record before me that the mother’s experience with the police and child protection services in Texas have reasonably led her to conclude that the children will not be protected in Texas.
78I am further satisfied that mother and both parties’ elder children have been subjected to physical violence, and the father has engaged in a pattern of coercive control, including threats of violence, economic control and degrading insults throughout this marriage. The psychological and physical violence has taken place in front of the parties’ two toddlers, ages 2 and 1. This is an intolerable situation that would create grave risk of harm to L.J. and A if they were required to return to Texas.
79Applying the three questions in Hassan, supra to the facts of this case, the past abuse, which is not just alleged, but has been admitted to by the father, in my view meets the threshold to establish that the children will be at a grave risk of harm and placed in an intolerable situation if they return to Texas. I am satisfied that the Article 13(b) exception is applicable and accordingly, decline to order the return of the children to Texas. The children shall remain in Ontario with the mother, and this Court shall make any determinations regarding decision-making responsibility and parenting time.
ORDER
80This court makes the following final order:
a. The relief sought by Luke A. Roy pursuant to the Hague Convention is hereby dismissed.
b. This court has jurisdiction of the parenting issues with respect to the children.
c. An immediate case conference shall be scheduled through the Toronto Family Law Trial Office.
d. Pending a case conference or further order of this court, the mother shall have interim decision-making responsibility in relation to L.J. and A. and they shall both reside with her primarily. The father shall have video parenting time three times a week for 15-20 minutes each time. Pending further order of the court, neither party shall remove the children from the province of Ontario.
e. If either party seeks costs, they shall make efforts to have meaningful discussion to try and resolve this issue. If they are unable to do so, the mother shall serve and file costs submissions of no more than 3 pages, double spaced, along with a detailed Bill or Costs and any Offers to Settle within 10 days from the release of this endorsement. The father shall serve and file responding costs submissions of no more than 3 pages, double spaced, with a detailed Bill of Costs and any Offers to Settle within 7 days of being served with the mother’s costs submissions.
M. Kraft, J.
Released: March 5, 2026
CITATION: Roy. v. Roy, 2026 ONSC 1347
COURT FILE NO.: FS-25-00052438-00000
DATE: 20260305
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
NEVIDA ROY
Applicant
– and –
LUKE ANTHONY ROY
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
M. Kraft, J.
Released: March 5, 2026
Schedule “A”
Excerpts from the father’s cross‑examination during the Hague hearing before Kraft, J., dated February 25, 2026 are set out below:
Q. When you say - you’re agreeing with me then that there is - was physical violence in your marriage?
A. Yes.
Q. There were physical outbursts in your marriage?
A. Yes.
Q. You believe in physical discipline, correct?
A. Yes, at a certain age.
Q. You believe in physically disciplining your children to instill good behaviour?
A. I believe in physical discipline according to the Word of God.
Q. You’ve put belts on the children, haven’t you?
A. On which children?
Q. On any of the children, sir
Page 60, Lines 7 - 20
THE COURT: The question – have you put belts on the children, he said which children.
M. STANGARONE: And I said – and then I said “any of the children”.
A. My oldest daughter before marriage, yes.
Q. You used a belt on her?
A. Yes.
Q. And you whipped her with a belt?
A. Yes, I have.
Q. Have you used any other objects to hit her with?
A. No.
Q. Just the belt?
A. Yes.
Q. And you did that on a regular basis?
A. No.
Q. You used that as a way to punish her?
A. I used that as a way to teach her according to the Word of God.
Page 61, Lines 6-24
Q. ...you have had a discussion, you have had a discussion with Nevida about her suggestions to use other types of discipline with the children, correct?
A. Other than whipping them, right?
Q. Right.
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. And she has implored you not to physically hurt the children, sir, right?
A. Not to physically whip them.
Q. Right. But you have not taken her advice. You have said by the Word of God I have the right to whip the children, to whip them into shape, correct?
A. No, it’s only in accordance, like I addressed earlier, in a teaching type of setting, when they have done something wrong that brings on that course of punishment.
Q. The children enjoy being whipped by you, that teaching style, sir, do you think the children enjoy being whipped as a form of teaching?
A. It’s not about enjoyment, it’s about learning the consequences of somebody’s action. When you do something wrong, there is a consequence, that’s why we whip our children to teach them the difference between right and wrong.
Q. And you’re going to continue to do that, aren’t you, sir? That’s - that’s your discipline style, you’re going to continue to whip them when they do something, when they’re out of line, right?
A. No, I progressed in learning when and when not to. Some methods, I can talk to them, I can give them a time out. There is other methods that I have learned throughout the years. That’s not solely how I discipline.
Q. Sir, you’ve also physically disciplined my client’s eldest daughter, correct?
A. Yes.
Q. You’ve said to my client this is how we discipline our children in Texas, correct?
A. Yes.
Pages 63-64, Lines 13-21
Q. You’ve yelled at my client, correct?
A. Yes.
Q. You’ve threatened her?
A. Yes.
Q. You’ve threatened to hit her?
A. Yes.
Q. You’ve hit her?
A. No.
Q. You hit her like you hit the children, correct?
A. No.
Q. You’ve caused her a black eye?
A. Yes.
Q. You’ve threatened her that you were going to knock her face off, haven’t you?
A. Yes.
Pages 65, Lines 18--32
Q. I’m showing you on the screen a photograph at A396 of my client. You caused this bruising on her face, correct?
A. Yes.
Q. On her eye?
A. Yes.
Pages 66, Lines 28-32, Page 67, Line 1
Q. And you convinced her, didn’t you, through your threats, you told her don’t press charges, so she didn’t, right, sir?
A. No.
Q. But you acknowledge causing that black eye, but you apparently say it was by mistake?
A. Yes.
Q. So, you also assaulted her in January of 2024, right? You -- You caused marks and redness on her chin and neck, right?
A. I don’t remember that incident.
Q. You don’t remember, so it may have happened.
A. All I can say about as far as that incident, you know, I’m not proud of that our relationship was toxic and that, you know, a lot of arguing, a lot of exchange went on through our relationship and there was mutual shoving back and forth and that’s as much as I can recall about 2024.
Q. So, there was a pattern of this abusive behaviour happening in the marriage, right?
Pages 68, Lines 1-20.
Q. You threw - do you recall - I’m going to refresh your memory. In May of 2024, you threw her belongings out of the car, correct, you remember this?
A. Yes.
Q. And you kicked her purse across the street, remember that?
A. Yes.
Q. And you did that, right?
A. Yes.
Page 70, Lines 4-13
Q. You never told her that you’re going to block her financial transactions?
A. I have told her that, but the actions can show that that’s not true.
Q. Well, you threatened, “I’m blocking all your transactions, no more DoorDash for you”, you’ve made that threat to her, right?
A. That’s when she’s repeatedly used DoorDash for where it was financially hurting me, so I limited what she could do. I did not totally cut her off.
Q. Well, threat was that you were blocking all of her transactions, right?
A. Well, yes, the threat was that - but you can look in the actions of what’s taking place, over time she’s had access to my finances.
Q. You also threatened to hide her wigs and hair, do you agree with that?
A. Yes.
Pages 71-72, Lines 15 - 32
Q. You’ve told her to keep biting the hand that feeds you, you see how that works for you?
A. Yes, I did say that.
Q. And that’s a threat?
A. Yes.
Q. Right?
A. That is a threat.
Page 72, Linds 15-21
Q. You have threatened to cancel her phone plan?
A. Yes, but that never took place. I currently still pay her phone bill.
Q. But you controlled what funds would be transferred to her, correct?
A. Yes.
Q. You controlled the family bank accounts as well?
A. Yes.
Q. I put to you that you have insulted my client?
A. Yes.
Q. You have - and I’m just putting up your text messages, you see this text exchange, this is at A413? “Your phone will be canceled today if that’s what you’re going to do all day. You need help.” You wrote that, right?
A. Yes.
Q. Then you say, “Seriously, you need help, your elevator does not go all the way up”? You wrote that, right?
A. Yes. Yes.
Q. And that’s an insult, that’s you’re degrading her in that communication, correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And you say here at A414, you’ve got the brain the size of a peanut?
A. Yes.
Q. And that’s an insult?
A. Yes.
Q. That’s degrading to her, correct?
A. Yes.
Q. A415, you say, “Go join the single ladies club, like I said, your understanding is bad”, you wrote that, right?
A. Yes.
Q. You’ve accused my client of being mentally ill, haven’t you?
A. Yes.
Q. You’ve alleged that my client has an undiagnosed mental illness or psychotic fixation?
A. Yes.
Q. And this is what you’ve told the Texas court, correct?
A. Yes.
Page 72, Lines 21-32, Page 73, Lines -32, Page 74, Lines 1-13.
Q. I put it to you - will you at least agree that the conflict in the marriage was ongoing?
A. Yes.
Q. It occurred many times? It occurred many times, right?
A. Conflict?
Q. Yes, conflict.
A. Yes.
Q. It even occurred only two weeks before my client left Texas with the children, correct?
A. No, that was a misunderstanding.
Q. My client contacted the police for assistance two weeks before she fled, correct, sir?
Page 76, Lines 11-23.
Q. The incident report, sir, that your supplementary affidavit responds to, this is Exhibit B to my client’s February 13th, 2026, affidavit, A447. The date, sir, do you see it on the screen, July 31st, 2025? Assault in progress, stepdad is assaulting her mom. Do you see that, sir?
A. Yes.
Q. So, my client’s eldest daughter called the police to report that you were assaulting her mother, correct?
A. You just asked me did the client, your client, call the police.
Q. I was trying to rephrase that, but - so, then I rephrased it and I said there was police contact and then your friend - my friend objected. So, I haven’t asked you that question yet, so let me just clarify this. There was police contact two weeks before on July 31st, 2025, correct?
A. Yes.
Q. My client’s eldest daughter called the police to report that you were assaulting her mother, correct?
A. Correct.
Q. And you kicked my client’s eldest daughter out of the house after she called the police, correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And you took her phone away?
A. Yes.
Page 77, Lines 20-32, Page 78, Lines 1-11.
Q. And I put it to you, sir, you attempted to prevent my client from calling the police, do you agree with that?
A. In this situation, I was trying to prevent. It was unnecessary at the time.
Q. But you smashed her phone into pieces, sir.
A. Yes, I did.
Q. And she filed an insurance claim because the phone was destroyed.
A. Yes.
Q. And you’ve done that more than one time, breaking her phones?
A. Only - only - only one other time and that had - that had nothing to do with her calling the police. It’s just she would stay on social media all day long, watching all these crazy videos and then she would come verbally accuse me of a lot of crazy things and it just - it got overwhelming. It was tiring, this is day in and day out.
Q. It made you mad, didn’t it?
A. It made me disappointed because --
Q. Well, this - this woman is doing something that we all do, scrolling through videos on Instagram and you pick her phone up and you smash it to pieces, right, sir?
A. No, that’s not how that went.
Q. Well, you agree with me that smashing someone’s phone like that would be pretty - would be taken as a threat? It would be pretty threatening to the person from who you’ve grabbed the phone and thrown, right?
A. Yeah, but we smashed each other’s phones that day, so --
Q. Okay. So, you’re minimizing it then, you’re deflecting and you want to reference my client, but you’ll agree with me that your behaviour is what I’m asking you about, right, sir?
A. Yes, it was not appropriate.
Page 81, Lines 27-32, Page 82, Lines 1-29
Q. You understand that my client is afraid of you, correct?
A. Yes.
Q. As a result of your abusive behaviour towards her?
A. Yes.
Q. She was afraid to go to the police, right, sir?
A. Yes.
Q. She was afraid to tell the police the details of the abuse, right, sir?
A. Yes.
Q. And you have told her I am going to break your jaw, right, sir?
A. Yes.
Q. And that’s a threat, isn’t it?
Page 83, Lines 3-17.
Footnotes
- An affidavit from the mother, sworn on November 20, 2025, filed in support of her urgent ex parte motion; an affidavit from the mother, sworn on December 5, 2025; an affidavit from the mother, sworn on December 11, 2025; and an affidavit from the mother, sworn on February 13, 2026.
- An affidavit from the father, sworn on December 9, 2025; and an affidavit from the father, sworn on February 20, 2026.
- Criminal Law and Child Discipline, Government of Canada Website, found at Criminal Law and Managing Children’s Behaviour, taken from Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law v. Canada (Attorney General), 2004 SCC 4, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 76.