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The court refused to qualify a proposed expert on Aboriginal history due to a lack of independence and reliance on unverified information from an interested party.
The defendants sought to qualify Dr. Sidney Harring as an expert on the existence and territory of the Amikwa Nation to support their Section 35(1) aboriginal rights claim.
The Crown opposed.
The court applied the two-stage test for expert evidence admissibility from White Burgess and R. v. Abbey (Abbey #2).
The court found Dr. Harring's evidence failed the threshold requirement for proper qualification due to lack of impartiality, independence, and bias, stemming from his reliance on secondary sources, unverified information from an interested party (Stacey McQuabbie), and contradictions with source documents.
The court also found the evidence would be excluded at the gatekeeper stage due to unreliability.
Consequently, Dr. Harring was not qualified as an expert.
The court upheld a trespassing conviction, finding that a woodlot on agricultural land and a boundary fence provided automatic notice prohibiting entry.
The appellant was convicted of trespassing on private agricultural property under the Trespass to Property Act after following a wounded coyote across a split rail fence onto the respondent's property.
The trial justice found the property was a woodlot on land used primarily for agricultural purposes and that the fence indicated the occupier's intention to exclude persons.
The appellant appealed, arguing errors in statutory interpretation regarding whether the woodlot fell within the Act's automatic prohibition provisions and whether the fence constituted adequate enclosure.
The appeal court upheld the conviction, finding the trial justice properly interpreted the legislation and that the findings were supported by evidence and owed deference.
Application alleging age discrimination in fishing licence exemptions dismissed for no reasonable prospect of success.
The applicant alleged age discrimination after being fined for fishing without a licence, arguing that exemptions for individuals under 18 or over 65 are discriminatory.
The respondent requested the application be dismissed at a summary hearing for having no reasonable prospect of success.
The Tribunal found that the Human Rights Code explicitly permits the age-based distinctions in question and that the applicant could not demonstrate disadvantage.
The application was dismissed.
The court granted the Crown leave to withdraw regulatory logging charges against Indigenous defendants but awarded $390,000 in costs against the Crown for unacceptable delay.
The Crown sought leave to withdraw charges against four defendants (three members of Batchewana First Nation and one self-identified Métis individual) for unlawfully harvesting forest resources in Crown forests without proper licenses, contrary to the Crown Forest Sustainability Act.
The defendants opposed the withdrawal, arguing the prosecution was a vehicle to establish aboriginal and treaty rights.
The court granted the Crown leave to withdraw the charges, finding it was in the public interest to resolve such complex aboriginal issues outside the criminal forum.
However, the court awarded substantial costs against the Crown for its delay in withdrawing the charges and for failing to reassess its position when it received the defendants' expert report in May 2014.
The court awarded $90,000 to Clinton Robinson and $300,000 to the three other defendants.
The doctrine of acquired rights is a municipal law concept that cannot be used as a defence against provincial environmental regulatory offences.
The Crown appealed acquittals on two counts of operating an all-terrain vehicle (ATV) in Pinery Provincial Park without written authorization, contrary to Ontario Regulation 347/07 under the Provincial Parks and Conservation Reserves Act.
The respondent owned a cottage on land bordering the park and claimed an "acquired rights" defence based on a 33-foot right-of-way that predated the park's establishment.
The trial court found the acquired rights defence available and acquitted the respondent.
The appellate court reversed, holding that the doctrine of acquired rights is a municipal law concept not applicable to provincial environmental legislation, and that the regulation of the right-of-way did not constitute an expropriation requiring compensation.
The court dismissed the Crown's appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the acquittals for unlicensed livestock dealing.
The Crown appealed acquittals on charges of acting as livestock dealers without a licence contrary to the Livestock and Livestock Products Act.
The accused purchased and sold approximately 2,156 cattle for $1,367,000 and sold 2,811 cattle for approximately $1,619,000 over an 11-week period in 2007.
The trial judge found the Crown had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused were engaged in the business of buying or selling livestock, as opposed to operating as livestock producers.
The appellate court upheld the acquittals, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence.
The court acquitted a landowner of building a berm without a permit due to an agricultural exemption but convicted his corporation for an unexempted armour stone wall.
The Crown charged Timur Leckebusch with two counts of unlawfully undertaking development without a permit in a Development Control area under the Niagara Escarpment Planning and Development Act: construction of an earthen berm and construction of a retaining wall.
The Crown also charged 819743 Ontario Inc. with unlawfully undertaking development without a permit for construction of an armour stone wall.
The defendants argued that the structures were exempt from the permit requirement as accessory structures to general agricultural development under Ontario Regulation 828.
The court found that the Crown proved the actus reus of all three offences beyond a reasonable doubt.
However, the court found that Leckebusch successfully established the exemption for both the berm and retaining wall on a balance of probabilities, resulting in acquittals on both counts.
The court found that 819743 Ontario Inc. failed to establish the exemption for the armour stone wall and was convicted.
The court admitted search warrant evidence under section 24(2) despite finding a section 8 breach.
The defendant was charged with 46 counts under the Fish and Wildlife Conservation Act.
He brought a Charter application challenging the validity of a search warrant executed on his residence, arguing that the search violated his s. 8 rights against unreasonable search and seizure.
The defendant contended that the Information to Obtain lacked sufficient evidence that his residence was also his place of business, and that the search was therefore a fishing expedition.
The Crown argued that the Information to Obtain, reviewed holistically, contained sufficient credible and reliable evidence to support issuance of the warrant.
The court found that while the defendant's s. 8 Charter rights were violated due to insufficient evidence linking the residence to the business location, the evidence should not be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter, as the violation was minimal, the state did not act in bad faith, and society's interest in adjudication on the merits was strong.
The court dismissed the commercial fisherman's appeal of his overfishing convictions and sentence, finding he failed to rebut the statutory presumption of liability.
The appellant, a holder of an Ontario commercial fishing license, was convicted after trial of two counts of unlawfully failing to comply with a condition of the license by overfishing.
He was sentenced to fines totalling $4,000 and a ten-year prohibition from participating in commercial fishing activities.
On appeal, the appellant challenged the convictions on multiple grounds, including that he was not the operating mind of the business, that there was a breach of section 7 of the Charter and an abuse of process, that the trial court conducted the trial unfairly and with bias, and that crown counsel behaved improperly.
The appellant also appealed the sentence as harsh and excessive.
The appeal court dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld both the convictions and the sentence.