Andrew William Campbell Mason

The accused, A.A., brought an application for a stay of criminal charges under s. 11(b) of the Charter, alleging a violation of the right to trial within a reasonable time, citing the R. v. Jordan framework.

The total delay from arrest to anticipated trial end was 28.8 months, exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling for provincial courts.

The court analyzed periods of delay attributable to the defence's inefficiency and indifference (12.5 months) and recognized the COVID-19 pandemic as an exceptional circumstance not attributable to the Crown.

Deducting defence delay, the net delay was 16.3 months, which, even with a margin of error, was deemed permissible considering the pandemic's impact.

The application for a stay was dismissed.

The accused, charged with sexual assault and common assault, brought an application under section 278.94 of the Criminal Code seeking leave to cross-examine the complainant about an alleged consensual sexual encounter that occurred months after the alleged offences.

The accused argued the evidence was relevant to the complainant's credibility and supported his defence that the assault never occurred.

The court dismissed the application, finding that admitting the evidence would violate the myth-based reasoning prohibition in section 276(1) and that the evidence lacked significant probative value to outweigh its prejudicial effect.

In an application challenging the validity of an elderly father's powers of attorney, the respondent brought a motion to dismiss parts of the application.

A preliminary issue arose regarding whether the applicant could cross-examine the deponents of the respondent's affidavits before the motion was heard.

The respondent argued that the applicant must first meet the minimum evidentiary threshold test established for will challenges.

The court held that the minimum evidentiary threshold test under Rule 75 does not apply to power of attorney disputes under the Substitute Decisions Act, and permitted the cross-examination as of right under the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The appellant appealed the passage of a site-specific zoning by-law amendment that facilitated the redevelopment of a marina on Lake Rosseau.

The appellant argued the amendment was inconsistent with provincial policies, did not conform to the official plan, and would result in overbuilding, incompatible development, and negative environmental impacts.

The Tribunal dismissed the appeal, finding that the proposed development would improve environmental protection through enhanced wastewater and stormwater management, maintain the character of the area, and represent good land use planning.

The Tribunal accepted the evidence of the municipal and applicant planners over the appellant's planner.

The moving party sought to enforce an unsigned settlement agreement arising from a dispute over the validity of competing wills.

The moving party argued that an agreement on the essential terms had been reached through correspondence between counsel.

The responding parties opposed the motion, arguing that counteroffers were still being made and no final agreement was reached.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that there was no meeting of the minds on all essential terms and that the responding parties never agreed to the terms in the draft minutes of settlement.

The Crown appealed an acquittal for assault, arguing that the trial judge's reasons were insufficient for appellate review and revealed reliance on impermissible stereotypical thinking about how victims of domestic abuse behave.

The Superior Court found that the trial judge's sparse reasons frustrated meaningful appellate review and that the comment regarding the complainant's failure to report the "gravamen of the offence" to officers could reflect an impermissible stereotypical inference.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittal quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The Commissioner of the OPP applied for certiorari to quash a warrant of committal that ordered an offender to serve an intermittent sentence at the Pikangikum OPP detachment.

The Superior Court of Justice granted the application, finding that the sentencing judge erred in law on the face of the record.

The court held that under the Ministry of Correctional Services Act, sentences of imprisonment must be served in a correctional institution, and under the Criminal Code, intermittent sentences require appropriate accommodation, which a temporary police lock-up facility does not provide.