CITATION: C.H. v. A.B., 2026 ONSC 2655

COURT FILE NO.: FS-25-0067-00

DATE: 2026-05-05

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

B E T W E E N:

C.H.

Crystal Kennedy, for the Applicant

Applicant

• and -

A.B.

Self-Represented, for the Respondent

Respondent

HEARD: April 1, 2026, at Thunder Bay, ON

Madam Justice R.A. Lepere

DECISION ON MOTION

Introduction & Background

1The parties¹ were in a relationship from 2013 to November 2017. They were never married. They have one child together, K., born December 12, 2012 (the “Child”). He is currently 13 years old and is in Grade 8. During their relationship, the parties lived together in Manitoba.

2After separation, the Child lived with the Applicant in Manitoba. The Respondent moved to Kenora, Ontario in September 2019. The Respondent had parenting time with the Child in Kenora, Ontario on alternating weekends.

3The Child was removed from the care of the Applicant in March 2023 further to a safety plan developed with Winnipeg Child and Family Services. The Safety Plan is dated March 8, 2023, and pursuant to same, the Child and his sibling were to be in the primary care of his maternal grandparents. Any visits by the Applicant were to be supervised.

4The Respondent picked the Child up from school on March 20, 2023, for his regularly scheduled parenting time. He was not returned at the conclusion of his regularly scheduled parenting time.

5The Applicant started court proceedings in Manitoba on April 19, 2023, wherein she was seeking an order for the return of the Child. The Petition was served on the Respondent on April 23, 2023 (the “Manitoba Proceeding”). The Respondent was present at an emergency hearing that took place on May 3, 2023. The Respondent was self-represented, appeared on the phone and had not filed any responding materials.

6On May 3, 2023, Dunlop J. of the Manitoba King’s Bench (Family Division) made the following Interim Order:

a. the Applicant’s motion for an order that the Respondent forthwith return the Child to her care in Manitoba or that the child be returned with the assistance of police was denied;

b. a finding that the Child was habitually resident in Manitoba and has a real and substantial connection to the Province of Manitoba;

c. the Manitoba’s King’s Bench shall determine an application for a parenting order for the Child; and

d. the Applicant shall have parenting time with the Child every second weekend from Friday evening to Sunday evening commencing May 12, 2023, until further order of the Court with the visits to be supervised by the Child’s maternal grandmother in Winnipeg, Manitoba (the “Interim Order”).

7The Applicant asserts that the visits occurred for a period of time and then they became sporadic or stopped altogether for periods of time. The Respondent asserts that the visits stopped as they were no longer being supervised as required by the Court and the Applicant would oftentimes not even be present at the visits.

8The Child’s sibling was returned to the care of the Applicant in June 2024. She has since had a third child.

9The Applicant did not take any steps to advance the Manitoba Proceeding or to enforce the Interim Order between May 2023 and early 2025.

10On December 20, 2024, the Applicant’s new lawyer sent an email to the Respondent which stated the following:

“I have been retained by [the Applicant] to deal with custody/access issues regarding [K.]. I understand there is currently an interim court order that requires you to bring [K.] to Manitoba to spend alternate weekends with his mother. Unfortunately, I also understand that this has not been happening consistently. I’m hoping early in the New Year, we can have a discussion about why that is and how we can make sharing custody easier on you. [The Applicant] would like to have [K.] returned to her primary care. She is willing to guarantee he has regular access with you. I am hoping you are prepared to reasonably discuss matters with me. Of course, if you have a lawyer, please have your lawyer contact me asap.

In the interim, I trust you are making reasonable efforts for [K.] to spend extended time with his mother and maternal side of the family over the holidays.

Please make those arrangements directly with [the Applicant]. I would, however, request that you contact me to confirm receipt of this email and confirm that you are prepared to have discussions in the New Year about long term plans.”

11The Respondent did not respond.

12On January 15, 2025, the Applicant’s lawyer sent the following correspondence to the Respondent:

“Firstly, this will confirm that you have not responded in any way to my correspondence of December 20, 2024 (below).

Furthermore, you did not contact [the Applicant] or make any arrangements for [K.] to spend any time in Winnipeg with his maternal family over the holidays. This is extremely disappointing and completely unfair to [K.].

[K.] has not been able to see his mother since August and you are without question, in direct contempt of the Court of King’s Bench Order of Justice Dunlop.

By failing to communicate, we are left with no other option but to bring forward a motion to have you held in contempt and penalized. Among other penalties available to the court, you will most likely be facing a very sizeable Order of court costs.

I am preparing the paperwork to return to court and you can expect to be served shortly. [The Applicant] and I remain prepared to discuss a reasonable resolution with you, however it is imperative that you (or a lawyer acting on your behalf) contact me asap.”

13The Respondent did not respond.

14On January 16, 2025, the Applicant’s lawyer served the Respondent with a Notice of Change of Lawyer.

15At no time during any of these communications with the Respondent did the Applicant’s lawyer advise him that he needed to file responding materials in the Manitoba Proceeding and if he failed to do so, they would note him in default and would proceed to have the application determined in his absence.

16The Applicant did not proceed with a contempt hearing as threatened in the email correspondence dated January 15, 2025, and did not serve the Respondent with further court materials. Instead, the Applicant noted the Respondent in default, with no advance warning and had the Manitoba Proceeding heard on an uncontested basis.

17On March 7, 2025, a Final Order was made in the Manitoba Proceeding by Berthaudin J. of the Manitoba King’s Bench (Family Division) which ordered the following:

a. the Applicant shall have the majority of parenting time with the Child;

b. the Respondent shall return the Child to Winnipeg, Manitoba to the care of the Applicant;

c. if necessary, the Applicant can request the assistance of police to locate, apprehend and deliver the Child to her;

d. the Respondent shall have parenting time with the Child at such times and under such conditions as the parties may agree;

e. the parties shall consult each other on all significant decisions respecting the Child with the Applicant having final decision making authority; and

f. the Respondent shall pay child support to the Applicant in the amount of $556.00/month commencing April 1, 2025 and shall provide annual income disclosure to the Applicant (the “Final Order”).

18The Applicant was unable to get the assistance of police in Ontario to enforce the Manitoba Order.

19The Applicant commenced this application on September 16, 2025 (the “Application”) seeking the following relief:

a. an order under s. 41 of the Children’s Law Reform Act, recognizing the order of Justice K. Berthaudin of the Manitoba Court of King’s Bench (Family Division) dated March 7, 2025 and that said order be deemed to have been made by the Ontario Superior Court of Justice and enforced as such;

b. an order pursuant to s. 36(2) of the Children’s Law Reform Act, directing the Ontario Provincial Police, or any police service, having jurisdiction in any area where the child may be, to do all reasonable things to locate, apprehend and deliver the child to the Applicant;

c. an order pursuant to s. 36(5) of the Children’s Law Reform Act, authorizing a member of the police service to enter and search any place where he or she has reasonable and probable grounds for believing that the child may be, and to use such assistance and forced as are reasonable in the circumstances for the purposes of locating, apprehending and delivering the child to the Applicant;

d. an order pursuant to s. 36(6) of the Children’s Law Reform Act authorizing a member of the police service to enter and search any place where he or she has reasonable and probable grounds for believing the child may be between the hours of 6:00 a.m. and 9:00 p.m.;

e. an order that any order made expire no earlier then January 31, 2026 at 9:00 p.m; and

f. costs of this matter on a full indemnity basis.

20At the time of the filing of the Application, she requested that it be heard on an urgent basis without notice to the Respondent. In his endorsement dated September 17, 2025, Fitzpatrick J. determined that the motion could not be heard without notice to the Respondent and that the evidence filed in support of the motion was insufficient. The Applicant was directed to serve the Respondent within 30 days and schedule the Application to be returnable in Regional Motions Court on a day after November 13, 2025.

21She thereafter filed a Notice of Motion dated October 17, 2025, seeking the same relief as the Application (the “Motion”). The Motion was returnable on November 27, 2025. It is unclear why the Application was not simply made returnable to November 27, 2025, and why a separate motion seeking the same relief was filed.

22The Applicant served the Respondent with the Application, Notice of Motion, Affidavit of the Applicant, sworn August 29, 2025, endorsement of Fitzpatrick J. dated September 17, 2025, Form 14B Motion Form dated August 29, 2025, and Affidavit of the Applicant, sworn October 9, 2025, on November 4, 2025.

23On November 27, 2025, at the return of the Motion, Newton RSJ. declined to grant the relief sought and ordered that the matter proceed to an urgent Case Conference.

24A Case Conference was then held on January 9, 2026. It was adjourned to February 11, 2026, to allow the Respondent time to retain a lawyer and file material.

25At the Case Conference on February 11, 2026, the Respondent had still not retained counsel or filed materials. The matter was scheduled for a two hour hearing on April 1, 2026 and the matter was directed to proceed regardless of whether the Respondent had retained a lawyer.

26The Respondent retained a lawyer prior to the hearing today and filed responding materials to the Application and the Motion. He requests that the Motion be dismissed. He further asserts that there has been a material change in circumstances and therefore, a superseding order in Ontario should be made to reflect the status quo. While this relief is sought in his Answer, he did not file a cross-motion seeking that relief.

Procedural Issue

27It was unclear whether the Motion or Application or both were before me today. I addressed this with counsel for the Applicant at the outset of the hearing and questioned whether the relief sought by the Applicant could be determined on an interim motion. It was the position of the Applicant that she was prepared to proceed today to determine the relief sought in the Motion and the Application. From her perspective, it did not matter which proceeding was before the court as the relief sought is the same and the issues can be determined via affidavit evidence.

Relevant Legislation

28The parties were not married so the applicable legislation is the Children’s Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C. 12 (the “CLRA”).

29Part III of the CLRA deals with decision making responsibility, parenting time, contact and guardianship. Section 19 of the CLRA states:

Purposes, Part III

19 The purposes of this Part are,

a) to ensure that applications to the courts respecting decision-making responsibility, parenting time, contact and guardianship with respect to children will be determined on the basis of the best interests of the children;

b) to recognize that the concurrent exercise of jurisdiction by judicial tribunals of more than one province, territory or state in relation to the determination of decision-making responsibility with respect to the same child ought to be avoided, and to make provision so that the courts of Ontario will, unless there are exceptional circumstances, refrain from exercising or decline jurisdiction in cases where it is more appropriate for the matter to be determined by a tribunal having jurisdiction in another place with which the child has a closer connection;

c) to discourage the abduction of children as an alternative to the determination of decision-making responsibility by due process; and

d) to provide for the more effective enforcement of parenting orders and contact orders, and for the recognition and enforcement of orders made outside Ontario that grant decision-making responsibility, parenting time or contact with respect to a child.

30Section 41(1) of the CLRA provides for the recognition of extra-provincial orders granting decision-making responsibility, parenting time or contact. It states:

Enforcement of extra-provincial orders

41 (1) Upon application by any person in whose favour an order granting decision-making responsibility, parenting time or contact with respect to a child has been made by an extra-provincial tribunal, a court shall recognize the order unless the court is satisfied,

a) that the respondent was not given reasonable notice of the commencement of the proceeding in which the order was made;

b) that the respondent was not given an opportunity to be heard by the extra-provincial tribunal before the order was made;

c) that the law of the place in which the order was made did not require the extra-provincial tribunal to have regard for the best interests of the child;

d) that the order of the extra-provincial tribunal is contrary to public policy in Ontario; or

e) that, in accordance with section 22, the extra-provincial tribunal would not have jurisdiction if it were a court in Ontario.

31Section 42(1) of the CLRA gives the court jurisdiction to supersede an extra-provincial order in relation to decision-making, parenting time or contact where certain requirements are met. The section states:

Superseding order, material change in circumstances

42 (1) Upon application, a court by order may supersede an extra-provincial order in relation to decision-making responsibility, parenting time or contact with respect to a child where the court is satisfied that there has been a material change in circumstances that affects or is likely to affect the best interests of the child and,

a) the child is habitually resident in Ontario at the commencement of the application for the order; or

b) although the child is not habitually resident in Ontario, the court is satisfied,

i. that the child is physically present in Ontario at the commencement of the application for the order,

ii. that the child no longer has a real and substantial connection with the place where the extra-provincial order was made,

iii. that substantial evidence concerning the best interests of the child is available in Ontario,

iv. that the child has a real and substantial connection with Ontario, and

v. that, on the balance of convenience, it is appropriate for jurisdiction to be exercised in Ontario.

Discussion: Should the Final Order from Manitoba be Recognized in Ontario?

32The Applicant seeks an order pursuant to s. 41(1) of the CLRA to recognize the Final Order in Ontario. Section 41(1) states that the Final Order shall be recognized in Ontario unless one or more of the five circumstances noted therein are applicable.

33As such, the starting point is that the Final Order is to be recognized in Ontario unless one or more of the five circumstances noted in s. 41(1) apply.

34I find that items (c), (d) and (e) in s. 41(1) are not applicable in this case and would not prevent the Final Order from being recognized in Ontario. I will therefore, in these reasons, only address items (a) and (b).

Was the Respondent Given Reasonable Notice of the Commencement of the Proceeding in Which the Final Order was Made?

35I find that the Respondent was given reasonable notice of the commencement of the Manitoba Proceeding in which the Final Order was made.

36The Manitoba Proceeding in which the Final Order was made was commenced by the Applicant via Petition on April 19, 2023. The petition was served on the Respondent on April 23, 2023, and proceeded to an urgent hearing on May 3, 2023. While the Respondent did not file materials in response, he was present at the May 3, 2023, hearing and therefore, clearly had reasonable notice of the commencement of the Manitoba Proceeding.

Was the Respondent given an Opportunity to be heard by the Extra-Provincial Tribunal before the Order was Made?

37I find that the Respondent was not given an opportunity to be heard by the Manitoba King’s Bench prior to the Final Order being made for the reasons that follow.

38The Respondent was given notice of the commencement of the Manitoba Proceeding and attended at the initial hearing on May 3, 2023, wherein the Interim Order was made. The Applicant then did not take any further steps with respect to the Manitoba Proceeding until early 2025 (more than 18 months later).

39In December 2024, the Applicant’s lawyer contacted the Respondent via email. In that correspondence, no indication was given to the Respondent that the Applicant was moving forward with the Manitoba Proceeding. It instead included an invitation to have further discussions about resolving the issues between the parties.

40In January 2025, after not receiving a response to the December 2024 correspondence, the Applicant’s lawyer threatened contempt proceedings against the Respondent if he did not respond and advised the Respondent that court documents would be served on him shortly. No such documents were ever served on the Respondent, and the Applicant did not proceed with the contempt hearing as indicated.

41Instead in February 2025, the Applicant noted the Respondent in default and proceeded to have the Manitoba Proceeding heard in writing on an uncontested basis. No warning was given to the Respondent that she intended to do so. No demand was made of the Respondent to file responding materials, failing which the Applicant would proceed in this manner.

42This was all done with knowledge that the Respondent was self-represented and the fact that there had been more than an 18-month delay in the Applicant advancing the Manitoba Proceeding in any manner.

43Notice should have been provided to the Respondent that the Applicant intended to proceed to have the Manitoba Proceeding heard on an uncontested basis if he did not file his responding materials within a certain period of time. This is so, given the fact that he was self-represented and that a significant amount of time had passed since the Applicant had taken any steps to advance her case. Furthermore, the email correspondence from the Applicant’s lawyer in December 2024 and January 2025 did not mention the Applicant’s intention to proceed with the Manitoba Proceeding and in fact would have mislead the Respondent into thinking that another route was being taken with respect to the litigation and that further court materials would be served on him. Instead of following through on that, the Applicant proceeded to have the Manitoba Proceeding heard without the Respondent being present or at the very least being given a further opportunity to respond if he intended to do so.

44As such, I find that he was not given a reasonable opportunity to be heard by the Manitoba King’s Bench prior to the Final Order being made. For that reason, the Final Order cannot be recognized in Ontario.

Conclusion

45The Applicant’s motion is dismissed.

46The relief sought by the Applicant in her application is also denied since it is the same relief sought in the Motion. However, I am not dismissing the Application as there has been relief requested by the Respondent in his Answer that needs to be determined, including whether an order superseding the Final Order should be made in Ontario. This will include a determination of whether the court has jurisdiction to make a superseding order pursuant to s. 42(1) of the CLRA and if so, a determination of what that order should include.

47I am not prepared to determine those issues on this hearing. I find that since the Respondent’s Answer is dated March 29, 2026, wherein this relief is requested, the Applicant has not had sufficient time to respond to same. I also find that it is necessary to obtain the views and preferences of the Child given his age, the amount of time that has passed since he has been primarily residing with the Respondent, and the conflicting evidence from the parties as to his views and preferences.

48I order the parties to do the following:

a. The Applicant shall file any further materials responding to the relief requested by the Respondent within 30 days.

b. The parties shall request the involvement of the Office of the Children’s Lawyer (“OCL”) to provide a Voice of the Child Report to obtain the views and preferences of the Child.

c. The parties shall schedule a Settlement Conference upon the earlier of receipt of the report from the OCL or receipt of confirmation from the OCL that it will not be providing services. At the Settlement Conference, the parties can discuss with the judge whether the hearing should be bifurcated to firstly deal with the issue of whether the Court has jurisdiction to make a superseding order in this case or whether a hearing shall be scheduled to determine all issues between the parties.

49In the meantime, the interim without prejudice order made in my endorsement dated April 1, 2026, granting parenting time to the Applicant shall continue until further Order of this Court.

Costs

50The issue of costs was not addressed at the hearing. As the successful party on this motion, if the Respondent seeks costs, he shall deliver written cost submissions, not exceeding 3 pages (excluding copies of any Offers to Settle or Bills of Costs) within 20 days. The Applicant shall thereafter deliver responding costs submissions, not exceeding 3 pages (excluding copies of any Offers to Settle or Bills of Costs) within 10 days thereafter.

51If cost submissions are not received by the Respondent within the timeline provided herein, the issue of costs will be deemed to have been resolved.

The Hon. Madam Justice R.A. Lepere

Footnotes

1. 1Non-specific identifiers will be used to protect the privacy of the parties and the children.