COURT FILE NO.: FS-10-102-02

DATE: 2025-10-02

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

B E T W E E N:

Laurel Ristimaki

Applicant

• and -

Dominic Foresta

Respondent

G. Marchak, for the Applicant

Self rep, for the Respondent

HEARD: September 25, 2025, at Thunder Bay, ON

Madam Justice R.A. Lepere

Decision on Motion

Background Information

[1] The parties were previously in relationship. I have limited details about the history of their relationship from the materials. They have one child together, Alexis Foresta ("Alexis"), born June 11, 2009. She is currently 16 years old. It appears that the Respondent has another adult child from a prior relationship.

[2] It appears that the parties' relationship ended not long after Alexis was born. The Respondent asserts that in April 2010 a court order was made establishing a 4on/4off parenting time schedule for Alexis as between the parties.

[3] The Respondent asserts that the Applicant did not abide by this schedule, but he remained in Alexis' life until the summer of 2021 when the Applicant moved Alexis to Manitoba without his knowledge or consent. The Applicant was suffering from addiction issues at this time and Alexis was living with the Respondent's former partner.

[4] Regardless, the move to Manitoba resulted in the Respondent obtaining an order for the return of Alexis back to Thunder Bay, Ontario. She was returned to his care in August 2021. On December 10, 2021, Fregeau J. made a final order for the following:

a. sole decision making for Alexis to the Respondent;

b. that Alexis was to be in the primary care of the Respondent;

c. that any communication/parenting time between Alexis and the Applicant was at the discretion of the Respondent and was to be supervised;

d. that the Applicant was not permitted to remove Alexis from the immediate area of Thunder Bay, Ontario without the consent of the Respondent or court order; and

e. that a restraining order be issued preventing the Applicant from harassing, molesting, and annoying the Respondent and/or Alexis except to make arrangements for parenting time and communication with Alexis (the "Final Order").

[5] The Applicant had not seen Alexis since the summer of 2021 until August 2025.

Procedural History

[6] The Applicant has brought a Motion to Change wherein she seeks to change the Final Order. More specifically, she is requesting the following:

a. that the parties shall have joint decision-making for Alexis;

b. that the parties shall share parenting time with Alexis;

c. that the order preventing the Applicant from removing Alexis from within the immediate are of the City of Thunder, including, but not limited to Murillo, Ontario be set aside; and

d. that the restraining order be set aside.

[7] With respect to the Motion to Change a Case Conference was held on April 14, 2025. At the Case Conference Brochu J. indicated that the Applicant could contact the Trial Co-Ordinator to schedule a motion for parenting time.

[8] On June 5, 2025, Wojciechowski J. heard the Applicant's interim motion for parenting time. It was agreed by the parties that the Final Order would be amended to provide space for Alexis and the Applicant to re-connect. The Final Order was amended on a temporary basis for a period of 60 days to allow several phone calls between the Applicant and Alexis at scheduled times and then subject to Alexis' agreement thereafter. It also indicated that the Applicant and Alexis could have face to face contact as agreed upon by Alexis.

[9] The motion was to be back before the Court on August 14, 2025, in Regional Motions Court.

[10] The Applicant did not bring the motion back to Regional Motions Court on August 14, 2025. Instead, she filed an Amended Notice of Motion and made the motion returnable to today. On this motion the Applicant seeks the following:

a. an interim Order for parenting time in favour of the Applicant with respect to Alexis, including telephone calls, facetime calls, ability to text message, unsupervised visitation within the community and a day or two of parenting time per week leading up to a 4 on/4 off rotation; and

b. an Order permitting the Applicant to have access to all records concerning the health, welfare and education of Alexis.

[11] There has been no Case Conference on this motion. It is the position of the Applicant that a Case Conference is not necessary as the issues on this motion have already been case conferenced on April 14, 2025.

Positions of the Parties

[12] It is the position of the Applicant that the calls and visit that took place after June 5, 2025, with Alexis went well and the Final Order should be set aside or amended to allow the Applicant to have unsupervised contact, communication and parenting time with Alexis on an interim basis. She is seeking an interim order whereby she would have parenting time with Alexis two nights per week (Monday and Tuesday nights) which would increase from there.

[13] The Applicant argues that there is no active risk that would require ongoing supervision. The Applicant asserts that she is sober and has been for some time and it is in Alexis' best interests to re-connect with her and her side of the family.

[14] The Respondent is prepared to consent to the lifting of the restraining order as it applies between the Applicant and Alexis. This would allow Alexis to have contact with the Applicant at her discretion. However, he maintains that any visits should remain limited to daytime visits, in a pubic place, with supervision. The schedule for any visits would be pursuant to Alexis' wishes and preferences. He takes the position that a few phone calls and one supervised visit is not sufficient to have no safeguards in place given the history of this matter.

Decision on Interim Motion

Restraining Order

[15] On consent, I am prepared to amend paragraph 6 of the Final Order to lift any restraint against contact or communication between the Applicant and Alexis. I am however, not prepared to set aside the restraining order as between the Applicant and the Respondent. Communication between the parties remains poor and subject to hostility. It would not benefit Alexis to have the parties communicating directly. However, since Alexis and the Applicant will now be able to have contact, it is necessary for there to be communication as between the parties. The parties agree that this can be facilitated through a third party. Both have agreed that communication regarding Alexis can occur as between the Applicant and the Respondent's partner, Andrea Schafer.

[16] Paragraph 6 of the Final Order shall be deleted and replaced with the following:

"6. An Order shall issue that the Applicant, Laurel Ristimaki, shall be restrained from molesting, annoying or harassing the Respondent Dominic Foresta, except to allow the Applicant to communicate with the Respondent on matters pertaining to the child, Alexis Foresta through a mutually agreed third party."

[17] The Restraining Order dated December 10, 2021, shall be amended as follows:

a. paragraph 1 shall be amended to state the following:

"1. The Applicant shall not molest, annoy, or harass the Respondent, Dominic Foresta, directly or indirectly, except in accordance with any Order regarding parenting time and/or communication between Laurel Ristimaki and the child, Alexis Foresta."

b. paragraph 3 shall be deleted; and

c. paragraph 4 shall be amended to delete the reference to "Alexis Foresta".

Decision-Making

[18] While the Respondent does not seek an interim order for joint decision making, she does seek an order providing her with access to all records concerning the health, welfare and education of Alexis.

[19] Limited submissions by the Applicant's lawyer were made on this issue at the motion.

[20] I am not prepared to grant this relief sought by the Applicant, at this time, for the following reasons:

a. Alexis and the Applicant have just recently re-connected after several years of no-contact and while the contact so far has been positive more time should pass before any order is made regarding decision making or access to records;

b. while the Applicant asserts that she is engaged in treatment and has been sober for some time, documentation from her health care providers (while provided to the Respondent) has not been filed as evidence on this motion and therefore, I have no basis to corroborate the statements of the Applicant;

c. I have no evidence before me to establish that the Applicant requires access to these records and/or information for any reason (i.e. concerns about decisions the Respondent is making for Alexis); and

d. Alexis is 16 years old and if she wishes to share any necessary or important information with the Applicant she can do so directly.

Parenting Time

[21] Currently the Final Order states the following at paragraph 3 with respect to parenting time:

"3. Any communication and/or parenting time between the Applicant, Laurel Ristimaki and the child, Alexis Foresta, shall be supervised by a person agreed to between the parties or in accordance with a Court Order. Such communication and/or parenting time be at the discretion of the Respondent, Dominic Foresta."

[22] The sole consideration for the determination of parenting decisions under the Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 3 (2nd Supp) (the "Act") is the best interests of the child. There are factors enumerated in s. 16(3) of the Act for the court to consider. In considering these factors, s. 16(2) of the Act states that "the court shall give primary consideration to the child's physical, emotional and psychological safety, security and well-being."

[23] Section 16(6) of the Act states that "in allocating parenting time, the court shall give effect to the principle that a child should have as much time with each spouse as is consistent with the best interests of the child". This is known as the "maximum contact principle". This principle does not create a presumption in favour of a shared parenting arrangement, as it cannot be used to take away from the child-centric nature of the inquiry when determining parenting time. The court must still consider whether a shared parenting arrangement is in the best interests of the child, taking into consideration the factors provided for in the Act: see Barendregt v. Grebliunas, 2022 SCC 22, [2022] 1 S.C.R. 517, paras. 133–134.

[24] I must also take into consideration that this is a temporary motion and parenting determinations on such motions are challenging, as they are being made without the benefit of a full evidentiary record. The status quo is usually maintained unless there is material evidence that the best interests of the child requires a change: see Viveash v. Vivieash, 2021 ONSC 7456, at para. 24.

[25] Compelling reasons to change the status quo on a temporary basis pending a trial could include mental health issues in connection with one of the parents, drug or alcohol addictions on the part of one of the parents, the child being at risk of physical or emotional harm while in a parent's care, or clear evidence that the child is doing poorly under the temporary parenting order: see Moniz v. Amyot, 2024 ONSC 5299, at para. 83.

[26] I find that the parenting time order made in the Final Order shall remain until further order of this Court subject to two amendments which I will articulate below. I do not find that a change in the Final Order on this interim motion would be in the best interests of Alexis for the following reasons:

a. I do not have any evidence before me to demonstrate a compelling reason to alter the Final Order as requested by the Applicant at this interim stage;

b. to impose the order requested by the Applicant upon the parties would require a high level of communication and coordination between the parties and given the present dynamics between the parties, I am not satisfied that this is possible, even with the assistance of a third party facilitator;

c. the Applicant has not provided a clear plan of care for Alexis if she were to have increased, unsupervised parenting time (i.e. how Alexis would get to and from school, specific details about living arrangements, etc.);

d. while the Applicant has asserted that her requests are consistent with the wishes of Alexis, I have no evidence to confirm same and the Applicant's lawyer indicated on the motion that they were not interested in having a Voice of the Child report completed;

e. Alexis appears to be exceling at school and in all aspects while under the care of the Respondent and it is not clear to me that a change in the parenting schedule would be in her best interests;

f. it is difficult to impose a parenting time schedule on a child who is 16 years old without having evidence of their wishes and preferences (apart from what the parents state) as it would be difficult to enforce same and the Respondent could be found in breach, if Alexis chose not to comply; and

g. while the Applicant has stated that she is sober and has been for some time, there is no independent evidence regarding same before me on this motion.

[27] As noted above, I am however, prepared to make two changes to paragraph 3 of the Final Order.

[28] Firstly, communication as between Alexis and the Applicant does not need to be supervised given that Alexis is now 16 years old and any restraint on communication between them has been lifted.

[29] Secondly, given that Alexis is now 16 years old, communication and parenting time will be at the discretion of Alexis, not the Respondent. Parenting time with the Applicant, while still subject to supervision by an agreed upon third party, shall be in accordance with the wishes and preferences of Alexis.

[30] As such, paragraph 3 of the Final Order shall be deleted and replaced with the following:

"3. Any parenting time between the Applicant, Laurel Ristimaki and Alexis, shall be supervised by a person agreed to between the parties or in accordance with a Court Order. Any communication or parenting time between the Applicant and Alexis shall be at the discretion of Alexis in accordance with her views and preferences."

Conclusion

[31] To summarize, I make the following Orders:

a. paragraph 6 of the Final Order of Fregeau J. dated December 10, 2021, shall be deleted and replaced with the following:

"6. An Order shall issue that the Applicant, Laurel Ristimaki, shall be restrained from molesting, annoying or harassing the Respondent Dominic Foresta, except to allow the Applicant to communicate with the Respondent on matters pertaining to the child, Alexis Foresta through a mutually agreed third party."

b. the Restraining Order dated December 10, 2021, shall be amended as follows:

i. paragraph 1 shall be amended to state the following:

"1. Molest, annoy, or harass the Respondent, Dominic Foresta, directly or indirectly, except in accordance with any Order regarding parenting time and/or communication between Laurel Ristimaki and the child, Alexis Foresta."

ii. paragraph 3 shall be deleted; and

iii. paragraph 4 shall be amended to delete the reference to "Alexis Foresta".

c. paragraph 3 of the Final Order of Fregeau J. dated December 10, 2021, shall be deleted and replaced with the following:

"3. Any parenting time between the Applicant, Laurel Ristimaki and Alexis, shall be supervised by a person agreed to between the parties or in accordance with a Court Order. Any communication or parenting time between the Applicant and Alexis shall be at the discretion of Alexis in accordance with her views and preferences."

Costs

[32] Costs of this motion shall be reserved to the judge hearing the Motion to Change.

The Hon. Madam Justice R.A. Lepere

Released: October 2, 2025