Jeremy Kirk

The applicant brought an application against the respondent, his niece and attorney for property for his mother, alleging breach of duty and conversion.

The applicant abandoned the application shortly before the hearing.

The respondent sought her costs.

The court found the allegations were unfounded and the respondent was entitled to full indemnity costs.

The court ordered the respondent's costs of $29,191.82 to be paid $5,000 by the estate and the balance by the applicant.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal the costs portion of a Small Claims Court decision.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and ordered the moving party to pay costs of $2,500 to the responding party.

The mortgagee brought a motion for an order requiring interim mortgage payments of $15,000 per month on a valid vendor take-back commercial mortgage of approximately $2.7 million arising from the purchase of a tourist lodge.

The respondents opposed, arguing the motion was an attempt to relitigate a previously dismissed partial summary judgment motion and that payments would cause financial hardship.

The court, noting the mortgage was valid, that no fraud was alleged, and that the respondents failed to provide current financial information to support their hardship claim, ordered interim without-prejudice payments of $12,000 per month commencing February 2026 until trial.

The court emphasized that contractual obligations in commercial matters are not to be lightly ignored and encouraged both parties to reassess the economic realities of the litigation.

The mortgagee brought a motion for interim mortgage payments on a valid commercial vendor take-back mortgage of approximately $2.7 million arising from the purchase of a tourist lodge.

The moving party sought $15,000 per month commencing August 2025 until trial.

The court ordered the responding parties to pay $12,000 per month commencing February 2026, finding that contractual obligations in commercial contracts are not to be lightly ignored, that the mortgagee was suffering significant economic consequences from non-payment, and that the responding parties failed to provide current financial information to support their claim of hardship.

The applicant condominium corporation sought an order for the permanent removal of the respondent's dog, alleging the respondent allowed the dog to defecate on her balcony and washed the waste onto the balcony below, creating a nuisance.

The respondent failed to participate in the hearing.

The Tribunal found the respondent violated the condominium's rules regarding pets and nuisance.

The Tribunal ordered the permanent removal of the dog within 30 days and awarded $200 in costs for the filing fee, but declined to award the requested legal costs on a full indemnity basis.

The court dismissed a motion for partial summary judgment brought by Caroline Manon Labonte regarding a commercial mortgage dispute involving Browns Clearwater West Lodge Inc. and related parties.

The court found that the motion did not meet the criteria for partial summary judgment, as it would not make the litigation cheaper, faster, or avoid inconsistent findings.

The court also enjoined Labonte from taking further steps to enforce a notice of sale and demand for possession until further court order, and addressed costs and case management issues.

The court dismissed the motion for summary judgment and partial summary judgment brought by Labonte regarding a commercial mortgage dispute.

The court found that the motion did not advance the litigation and that the issues, including the right to set off and the meaning of the contract, required a trial.

The court also enjoined Labonte from taking further steps to enforce the notice of sale and demand for possession until further court order, and addressed costs and case management going forward.

The appellant, The Corporation of the Township of Ignace, appealed a summary judgment order that awarded the respondent, Karen Dufault, damages for wrongful dismissal.

The core issue was the enforceability of termination clauses in an employment contract under the Employment Standards Act, 2000 (ESA).

The Court of Appeal affirmed the motion judge's finding that the "for cause" termination clause was unenforceable because its definition of "cause" was broader than the ESA's narrow exception for "wilful misconduct." Applying the principle from Waksdale v. Swegon North America Inc., the court held that the invalidity of the "for cause" clause rendered all termination provisions in the contract unenforceable, even though the respondent was terminated without cause.

The appeal was dismissed, upholding the original award of damages.

The moving parties (the "Browns") sought an injunction to prevent the responding parties (Labonte) from enforcing a notice of sale under mortgage.

The Browns had withheld mortgage payments, relying on a set-off clause in the purchase agreement.

The court applied the three-part RJR-MacDonald test for interlocutory injunctions.

While a serious issue to be tried existed regarding the interpretation of the set-off clause, the Browns did not fully satisfy the irreparable harm or balance of convenience tests as requested.

The court found that the Browns would suffer irreparable harm if the property was sold, but the balance of convenience did not favour granting an outright injunction due to substantial mortgage arrears and the lack of quantification of the set-off claim.

The motion was adjourned, and an interim order was made prohibiting Labonte from enforcing the notice of sale on terms that required the Browns to make substantial payments towards the mortgage arrears.

The applicant, Brown’s Clearwater West Lodge Inc., brought two motions: one to consolidate two related actions (a share purchase action and a mortgage action) and another to set aside default judgments obtained by the respondent, Caroline Manon Labonte, in the mortgage action.

The court granted both motions, finding that the default judgments were irregularly obtained and should be set aside as of right without imposing terms.

The court also found that consolidation was appropriate given the interwoven issues and common questions of fact and law stemming from the same share purchase agreement, promoting judicial efficiency and avoiding multiplicity of proceedings.