ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
Timothy Joseph Jones
Applicant
– and –
Catherine Jones
Respondent
Michael Cupello, for the Applicant
Nadir Sheikh, for the Respondent
HEARD: February 23, 2026, at Thunder Bay, Ontario
The Honourable Madam Justice C.M. Brochu
Decision on Motion
Overview
1Both parties have brought motions seeking various reliefs. The only motion that proceeded was the respondent’s motion for the sale of the camp property located at Q41 East Sunny Slopes in Shebandowan (the “camp property”).
2The applicant has been residing at the camp property since separation.
3He is resisting the sale.
Background
4The parties were married on August 8, 1987, and separated on June 16, 2024. They have two adult children.
5Since separation, the applicant has been residing at the camp property and the respondent at the matrimonial home.
6The camp property is owned jointly by the parties. The matrimonial home is solely in the name of the respondent.
7It is believed that the camp property has an estimated market value of $1.5 million and that the matrimonial home has an estimated market value of $1.3 million. There is no mortgage registered on either title to these properties.
8The parties are also equal share owners of Tim's Meat, Deli and Groceries Inc. The commercial property was sold on May 5, 2025, for $600,000. The parties agreed to a partial release of $75,000 each, as well as $5000 to pay a retainer to the corporation's insurance lawyer. The remainder of the proceeds from the sale are being held in trust by counsel.
Parties’ Positions
9The respondent has been seeking the sale of the camp property since August 2024. She is now anxious to sell the property prior to the summer season. She has raised some concerns as to the state of the camp property as she has not been allowed to attend at the property since separation.
10The respondent also indicates that she has an interested purchaser, which would result in the parties saving significant real estate costs.
11The respondent is amenable to the property being listed with a realtor should that be necessary. It has also been suggested that an advance could be provided to both parties from the sale proceeds and the remainder be held in trust by counsel.
12The applicant is resisting the motion for the partition and sale of the camp property. It is advanced that there are issues to be determined as it relates to settlement funds from a motor vehicle accident litigation, of which $200,000 would have been used by the applicant towards the purchase of the camp property. In this regard, the applicant has indicated that he intends on amending his application to include a claim in trust for both the camp property and the matrimonial home. This has yet to be done.
13Furthermore, the applicant indicates being unable to work due to health issues. He indicates that he is struggling to make ends meet. He advances that he has no access to the equity in the matrimonial home or the bulk of the parties’ savings as they are in the respondent’s name alone and the sale proceeds from the sale of the business are being held in trust by counsel.
Sale of the Camp Property
The Law
14The law is clear that a joint tenant has a prima facie right to an order for the partition or sale of property held with another joint tenant.
15Generally, the party opposing the sale must show malicious, vexatious, or oppressive conduct relating to the partition and sale issue, in order to avoid the sale.
16There are other factors that a court is to consider when deciding, prior to trial, on the sale of property in the family law context. The applicable legal principles have been succinctly set out in Dhaliwal v. Dhaliwal, 2020 ONSC 3971, at para. 16; see also Belford v. Johnson, 2024 ONSC 7157, at paras. 17-18.
17The principles set out in the case law that are applicable to this matter include the following:
a. Section 2 of the Partition Act empowers the court to order the sale of a jointly owned property, including a matrimonial home.
b. A joint tenant has a prima facie right to an order for the partition of sale of property held with another joint tenant.
c. A court is required to compel partition and sale unless the opposing party has demonstrated that such an order should not be made.
d. The onus is on the party opposing the sale to establish that there is a sufficient reason, recognized in law, as to why the court should exercise its discretion to refuse sale.
e. In family law cases, an order under the Partition Act should generally not be made until any dispute related to the property has first been determined.
f. The Family Law Act does not displace the Partition Act. But in family cases a partition application should generally not be granted where it can be shown that a legitimate family law claim would be unfairly prejudiced.
g. In assessing and guarding against potential prejudice, the court must take a realistic view of the potential impacts of a sale - both positive and negative - in relation to the interests of both joint tenants and the family as a whole. Where the financial or other circumstances of the parties are such that a sale would be the inevitable result at trial, there is little justification for delaying the sale.
h. The court must consider the impact of a proposed sale on children or a vulnerable spouse, including the emotional impact, and the fundamental need to ensure that they have appropriate housing. The availability and affordability of alternate housing must be considered.
i. Orders for the sale of a matrimonial home at the interim stage should not be made as a matter of course. The court must be mindful of the whole of the proceeding, and the need to achieve a final resolution for the family as fairly and expeditiously as possible.
j. Timing can be a relevant consideration in dealing with a motion for sale at a temporary stage. The availability of a trial within a short period might reduce the pressure for an immediate sale
k. A request for sale during summer months may entail some timeliness if seasonal market conditions are favourable.
l. The court must consider and attempt to guard against potential prejudice. Are there realistic issues or claims yet to be determined on a final basis, which would be prejudiced or precluded if a property is ordered to be sold at the temporary stage.
Discussion
18The respondent has a prima facie right to the order she seeks for the sale of the camp property, subject to consideration of the above principles.
19There is no evidence that the respondent’s request for the sale of the camp property is motivated by vexatious, oppressive, or vindictive conduct.
20It is the applicant, who is resisting the sale, that has the onus of satisfying the court that there would be prejudice should the camp property be sold.
21The main issue to be determined in this case is the potential impact of a sale and whether the applicant would be unfairly prejudiced by the sale of the camp property.
22In opposing the sale, the applicant is relying largely on his recent position that he intends on advancing a trust claim relating to both the camp property and the matrimonial home. No further details were provided as it relates to this trust claim. He did not append a draft of the proposed amendments to his affidavit or pleadings, nor did he outline the particulars of his trust claim.
23As it relates to the camp property, he stated that the parties purchased the camp property in 2017 for $525,000. It is his position that he used $200,000 from his settlement monies, received from a motor vehicle accident claim, towards the initial purchase price of the camp property.
24The applicant provided evidence that a Statement of Claim was issued, with him as a Plaintiff, the respondent, and their two children as FLA claimants. There was another claim commenced at the same time, however, that Statement of Claim was not appended to the materials.
25Both matters were settled at mediation on April 8, 2014, for $800,000. The settlement funds were paid to the applicant’s counsel’s law firm. Subsequently, on May 16, 2014, a cheque was sent by his counsel in the amount of $604,777.32 payable to Timothy Jones and Catherine Jones. The applicant states that the respondent had demanded that the cheque be made payable to both of them. They each deposited half of the settlement proceeds in their respective accounts with CIBC. It is his belief that the entirety of the settlement funds was for him on account of his injuries resulting from the motor vehicle accident.
26He is advancing that he needs to look further into the details of this settlement and contribution towards the purchase of the camp property. It was suggested that depending on the information received, he could be alleging that the camp property should be excluded property.
27On the other hand, the respondent indicates that they were both parties to the motor vehicle accident, that she also suffered injuries and that the settlement funds were for the settlement of both their claims. She has made efforts to obtain the file and information on the breakdown of the settlement. This had not been received at the time of the motion hearing.
28The respondent further states that she also used $200,000 from her settlement funds towards the purchase of the camp property. She provided evidence of a withdrawal in the amount of $200,000 from her account in 2017, which she states were funds used for the purchase of the camp property. It is her evidence that the purchase of the camp property was funded by both parties advancing $200,000 each from the settlement funds, and $200,000 from a joint bank account.
29Furthermore, the applicant states that his ill health has resulted in his inability to work. He has back issues, which will require back surgery, he is unable to walk due to an infection in his foot, recommendations have been that he amputate his leg, and he has been in and out of the hospital since November 2025.
30He states struggling to make ends meet. He cannot work due to his health and the assets and money earned during the marriage were primarily put in the respondent’s name. He does not have access to his share of equity in the matrimonial home or the bulk of their savings, including the proceeds of sale from the business which are being held in trust by counsel.
31It is advanced that in light of his health and inability to work, he does not have the means to obtain alternate accommodations.
32However, the applicant has not provided any information whatsoever as to what he has done to inquire about alternate accommodations and costs associated with other accommodations. The applicant has filed no evidence that he would be unable to find alternative housing for himself.
33He states having paid all the expenses associated with the camp property since separation. He has also made repairs and improvements to the camp property, including paying an invoice in the amount of $75,000 for renovations.
34It should be noted that the respondent questions the veracity of the applicant’s evidence. In this regard, amongst other things, she questions the legitimacy of the invoice for $75,000 for work performed at the camp property. She alleges that the respondent was likely working after the business closed in 2024 and earning money. She has also received a notice of unpaid taxes for the camp property for the year 2025, which is contradictory to the evidence of the applicant that he has paid all expenses as it relates to the camp property, including property taxes.
35In response, counsel for the applicant indicates that the court can always make a specific order that the outstanding property taxes be paid and that the respondent be responsible to pay for all the expenses related to the camp property. Counsel for the applicant also remarks that the parties were given the opportunity to cross examine on the affidavits filed. They have not done so and, as a result, the evidence before the court is unchallenged.
36Regardless of the fact that the parties chose not to conduct cross-examinations, it remains that the outstanding property taxes notice is in clear contradiction to the applicant’s evidence.
37The applicant submits that there is no prejudice to either party in waiting until disclosure is complete and questioning has occurred to deal with the issue of the sale of the camp property. Basically, he is advancing that he needs additional time to figure out his potential trust claim.
38The parties have been separated since June 2024. As early as August 2024, the respondent indicated her desire to sell the camp property.
39The applicant has not expressed any desire in purchasing the respondent’s interest in the camp property. In fact, in early June 2025, through counsel, the applicant indicated consenting to the sale of the camp property. However, he wanted to complete renovations prior to the camp property being listed. It is also noted that he made a claim in his Answer for the partition and sale of both the matrimonial home and the camp property.
40It seems that it is inevitable that the camp property will be sold. It is likely the same as it relates to the matrimonial home. In fact, both parties have expressed the desire to have both properties sold.
41In issue is the timing and the impact, mainly on the applicant to have the camp property sold now.
42In Senthilvadivel v. Ranjithan, 2025 ONSC 4442, at para. 25, the Court found that a motion for partition and sale of a jointly owned property ought not to be brought (i) if a party seeks the release of proceeds before the court can determine ownership issues; (ii) without proper evidence showing the court the ranges of each party’s property entitlement; and (iii) certainly, not without draft net family property statements.
43On the record before me, I am unable to reach a conclusion on whether the sale of the camp property would prejudice the applicant’s claim. What seems clear, is that the applicant would be left without a home. I am not clear on the resources he has available to him. I know that the proceeds of the sale of the business property are held in trust. Should the camp property be sold, the proceeds would also be held in trust.
44It was suggested that the court could provide for a release of a portion of those sale proceeds. However, no evidence was provided as to what would be required or what would be reasonable to allow the applicant to obtain alternative accommodation. Furthermore, with no clear evidence on the issue surrounding the settlement funds, and the trust claims, it is unknown whether the release of sale proceeds would prejudice one of the parties’ FLA claims.
45Consequently, until the equitable claims become clearer, the motion for partition and sale is premature.
46The respondent’s motion is dismissed without prejudice to her right to return the motion once the applicant’s equitable claims have been plead, disclosure is complete, and the net family property statements can be produced with proper evidence for the court’s consideration.
47There is merit to the respondent’s position that the summer months are a prime time for the sale of the camp property.
48The applicant’s delay in this matter, and this late addition of trust claims, has not went unnoticed by the Court.
Costs
49The applicant is the successful party, which presumptively entitles him to costs.
50Nonetheless, I am exercising my discretion and make no order for costs. The applicant was only successful on this motion because of the potential prejudice to his trust claim. The parties have been separated since June 2024. The respondent has expressed her desire to sell the camp property since August 2024. This relief was also claimed by the applicant in his Answer. Despite the foregoing, the applicant has not raised the issue of a trust claim until recently.
Orders
51I make the following order:
The respondent’s motion for partition and sale is dismissed, without costs.
If the applicant is advancing a claim in trust, he shall amend his pleading, and plead the essential elements of his trust claim, within 20 days of the date of these Reasons.
Each party is granted leave to proceed with questioning of the other, limited to 2 hours each, and to be held no later then July 15, 2026.
A settlement conference shall be scheduled and held no sooner than 30 days following questioning.
The applicant shall be responsible to pay for all the expenses associated with the camp property, including the outstanding and ongoing property taxes.
52The intent of the above orders is that the parties will address in a timely manner the outstanding issues that rendered the motion for partition premature and, should it be necessary, still be able to deal with the partition and sale of the camp property prior to winter.
53It is also noted that although the only motion that proceeded was for the partition and sale of the camp property, the motions contained several other reliefs. It is believed that the parties would benefit from a further settlement conference, if not to resolve these issues, at least set out a timeframe and timelines to address some of these issues.
The Hon. Madam Justice C. M. Brochu
Released: May 5, 2026
CITATION: Jones v. Jones, 2026 ONSC 2659
COURT FILE NO.: FS-24-0159-01
DATE: 2026-05-05
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
Timothy Joseph Jones
Applicant
– and –
Catherine Jones
Respondent
decision on motion
Brochu J.
Released: May 5, 2026