Chantal M. Brochu

The applicant brought a contempt motion and sought to have the respondent's Answer struck pursuant to r. 1(8)(c) of the Family Law Rules for persistent failure to comply with multiple court orders requiring financial disclosure.

The proceedings had been ongoing since 2019, with orders from 2019, 2020, and 2021 remaining outstanding, and the respondent had twice received further opportunities to comply in early 2025.

Despite repeated court orders, the respondent refused to produce business records and corporate financial documents material to unresolved issues of spousal support and equalization.

The court found the respondent's non-compliance to be willful and egregious, and held that it would be futile to issue yet another disclosure order.

The respondent's Answer was struck, and the matter was directed to proceed to an uncontested trial.

The respondent father brought a motion for compliance with a consent temporary parenting time order dated April 12, 2024, and sought make-up parenting time for time that was withheld.

The applicant mother countered with a motion to vary the parenting time order and impose supervised parenting time.

The central issue involved allegations of family violence and coercive control by the father.

Following a high-risk committee meeting on March 12, 2025, the mother withheld the child and supervised parenting time was implemented.

The Children's Aid Society initially required supervision but subsequently changed its position and stated it was not taking a position on parenting time.

The court found that while the father had engaged in reprehensible conduct in the past, his recent behavior demonstrated a shift, he had cooperated with authorities, undertaken counselling and programming, and there was no evidence of continued violations of court orders.

The court dismissed the mother's motion for supervised parenting time, ordered the mother to comply with the April 12, 2024 order, and denied the father's request for make-up time.

A police inspector brought a defamation action against a law student for an X post commenting on allegations of discriminatory treatment of officers on mental health leave at the Thunder Bay Police Service.

The defendant moved to dismiss the action under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act (anti-SLAPP motion).

The court found that while the expression related to a matter of public interest, the defendant established a valid defence of justification based on publicly available information from news articles and Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario proceedings.

The court also found that the public interest in protecting the defendant's expression on matters of significant public concern outweighed any harm to the plaintiff's reputation.

The motion was granted and the defamation action was dismissed.

The applicant brought a motion for the sale of the matrimonial home and related relief, including disbursement of sale proceeds.

The respondent brought a cross-motion for child and spousal support, sought to set the parties' respective incomes, and requested dismissal of the sale motion.

Both parties sought orders restraining disparaging comments.

The court declined to order the sale of the matrimonial home, finding that doing so would prejudice the best interests of the child who has special needs requiring stability.

The court ordered the parties to continue sharing expenses for the home equally.

No temporary spousal support was awarded, but child support was ordered on an offset basis.

Both parties were ordered to refrain from disparaging comments and to provide complete financial disclosure.

This is a costs endorsement following a motion brought by the City of Thunder Bay seeking to compel production of documents and to determine that the deemed undertaking rule would not apply.

The respondents opposed production of certain documents (ATR Applications) but agreed to inspection of the 2017 Settlement Agreement.

The court's prior decision found in favour of the respondents on both issues.

The respondents sought costs on a partial indemnity basis, claiming $9,863.08.

The City argued for a reduced award of $3,000.00.

The court awarded costs of $6,000.00 inclusive of fees, disbursements, and HST on a partial indemnity scale, finding that while the respondents were successful, there was some duplication of effort between senior and junior counsel that should be accounted for.

The decision addresses a motion regarding the production and inspection of documents in an interpleader application brought by McAsphalt Industries Limited, a tenant on lands leased from the Fort William First Nation Development Corporation.

The City of Thunder Bay sought production of a 2017 Settlement Agreement and certain Addition to Reserve (ATR) Applications.

The court held that the 2017 Settlement Agreement should be produced for inspection, subject to the deemed undertaking rule, but refused to order production of the ATR Applications, finding they were not referred to in the relevant pleadings or affidavits and that their production was premature.

The court also declined to exempt the City from the deemed undertaking rule at this stage.

This decision addresses interim parenting time and school attendance for two children in a high-conflict family law matter.

The court maintains a week on/week off shared parenting schedule, with the caveat that if the mother fails to ensure the children’s school attendance, the father will have primary care during the school week.

The court declines to order a change of school or police enforcement at this stage, and orders the involvement of the Office of the Children’s Lawyer (OCL) to ascertain the children’s views and preferences.

The accused, Jessica Werpny, was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and operating with a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) over 80 mg per 100 ml of blood.

The key issues were whether the Crown could prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was operating the vehicle and whether the accused could rely on the statutory exception under section 320.14(5) of the Criminal Code, which applies if alcohol was consumed after ceasing to operate the vehicle.

The court found that the accused remained in care and control of the vehicle and did not cease operating it, despite being stuck and consuming alcohol while seated in the driver's seat.

The presumption under section 320.35 applied and was not rebutted.

The accused was found guilty of the over 80 offence but not guilty of impaired operation, as the Crown failed to prove impairment beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused, R.M., was charged with sexual assault and touching a person under 16 for a sexual purpose, involving his adoptive daughter, H.G. The trial focused on the credibility and reliability of the complainant and the accused.

The court found the police interview of the child complainant to be highly suggestive and leading, diminishing the weight of her statement.

The accused's testimony was found credible and consistent with the complainant's limited recollection regarding bedtime routines.

The Crown failed to prove the allegations beyond a reasonable doubt, leading to the accused's acquittal on both counts.

The accused, K.C., was charged with sexual assault and sexual interference involving A.B., who was 15 years old at the time of the alleged offence.

The accused admitted to sexual intercourse but raised the defence of honest but mistaken belief in the legal age of consent.

The court analyzed the defence under the principles of R. v. Morrison and R. v. Hason, finding that the accused failed to take all reasonable steps to ascertain the complainant's age and relied on impermissible stereotypical reasoning.

Consequently, the defence of mistaken belief in age was unavailable.

The court found that the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was reckless as to the complainant's underage status, establishing the requisite mens rea.

The accused was found guilty on both counts, with a stay of conviction entered for sexual assault under the Kienapple principle.