SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO
RE: Chantel MacDonald, Applicant
AND:
Michael McGarrity, Respondent
BEFORE: Brochu J.
COUNSEL: Samantha Filipovic, for the Applicant
Self Represented Respondent
HEARD: December 17, 2025, Additional information received January 29, 2026
ENDORSEMENT ON MOTION
Overview
1The parties’ respective motions were partially heard on December 17, 2025.
2The reliefs dealing with decision making responsibility and parenting time were adjourned to March 31, 2026, at 10:00 a.m. for a half day motion.
3I released an endorsement on December 19, 2025 and provided an order relating to specific issues for parenting time.
4I indicated in that endorsement that I would address the other reliefs argued and sought by the mother, which included child support, s. 7 expenses and a restraining order, in a future endorsement.
5The parties appeared before me, on January 29, 2026, on another motion. I was informed at that time that the respondent had dealt with his outstanding criminal charges. I was provided with a copy of the Conditional Sentence Order (“CSO”) and Probation Order dated January 12, 2026. It was agreed that these documents could be considered for the purpose of this endorsement.
Child Support and s. 7 Expenses
6The respondent’s support obligations are presently based on an income of $25,200, resulting in child support payments of $200 per month. The quantum of child support has not been updated since 2020, despite a substantial increase in the respondent’s income.
7The financial information filed by the respondent indicates that his 2023 income was $100,616.17 and his 2024 income was $95,591.
8The applicant submitted that the child support obligations should be adjusted to reflect the significant change in the respondent’s income.
9The respondent stated that his income in 2024 was inflated. He is self employed and to be able to purchase a new home and qualify for a mortgage, he did not deduct all the expenses he would have been entitled to deduct from his income. This has resulted in an inflated value. He also indicated that the business had some difficulties in 2025 and that his income will be substantially less for 2025.
10There is insufficient evidence before the Court for me to properly assess the position put forth by the respondent. Furthermore, the respondent cannot make declarations to CRA on his income and then attempt to circumvent them for the purpose of child support.
11The respondent also indicated that the child was now gainfully employed by Thomas Outdoor Construction (his business) and in accordance with the separation agreement, she would no longer be receiving child support. The child is nine years of age. I have given no consideration to this argument.
12I find that there is no reason why child support should not be in accordance with the Federal Child Support Guidelines (“CSG”). The child is in the care of the applicant for more than 60% of the time. As a result, the respondent has an obligation to pay child support.
13The child support will be based on the respondent’s income for 2024 in the amount of $95,591.
14The applicant requests that the support order commence on August 1, 2025, given that her motion was originally returnable on July 17, 2025.
15I find that the respondent shall pay child support in the amount of $876 per month for the month of August and September 2025 based on the CSG in effect at that time, and that commencing on October 1, 2025, the child support shall be paid in the amount of $891 based on the 2025 CSG that came into effect on October 1, 2025.
16The parties shall pay their proportionate share of s. 7 special and extraordinary expenses, based on their respective incomes for 2024 of $95,591 for the respondent and $62,017 for the applicant. The proportionate share being 39.3% for the applicant and 60.7% for the respondent.
17The issues of retroactive child support and contribution to s. 7 expenses remain. This order is made without prejudice to either party’s claim for adjustments and retroactive child support and s. 7 expenses.
Restraining Order
The Law
18The applicant is seeking a restraining order pursuant to s. 46 of the Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3, which reads as follows:
Restraining order
46 (1) On application, the court may make an interim or final restraining order against a person described in subsection (2) if the applicant has reasonable grounds to fear for his or her own safety or for the safety of any child in his or her lawful custody.
Same
(2) A restraining order under subsection (1) may be made against,
(a) a spouse or former spouse of the applicant; or
(b) a person other than a spouse or former spouse of the applicant, if the person is cohabiting with the applicant or has cohabited with the applicant for any period of time.
Provisions of order
(3) A restraining order made under subsection (1) shall be in the form prescribed by the rules of court and may contain one or more of the following provisions, as the court considers appropriate:
Restraining the respondent, in whole or in part, from directly or indirectly contacting or communicating with the applicant or any child in the applicant’s lawful custody.
Restraining the respondent from coming within a specified distance of one or more locations.
Specifying one or more exceptions to the provisions described in paragraphs 1 and 2.
Any other provision that the court considers appropriate.
19In A.M. v. S.D., 2020 ONCJ 479, at para. 95, Sherr J. summarized the applicable principles in determining whether a restraining order is appropriate:
[95] The legal principles for the court to apply are as follows:
a) Restraining orders are serious and should not be ordered unless a clear case has been made out. See: Ciffolillo v. Niewelglowski, 2007 ONCJ 469.
b) A restraining order is serious, with criminal consequences if there is a breach. It will also likely appear if prospective employers conduct a criminal record (CPIC) or vulnerable persons search. This could adversely affect a person's ability to work. It may affect a person's immigration status. See: F.K. v. M.C., 2017 ONCJ 181.
c) It is not sufficient to argue that there would be no harm in granting the order. See: Edwards v. Tronick-Wehring, 2004 ONCJ 195.
d) Before the court can grant a restraining order, it must be satisfied that there are "reasonable grounds for the person to fear for his or her own safety or for the safety of their child. See: McCall v. Res, 2013 ONCJ 254.
e) The person's fear may be entirely subjective so long as it is legitimate. See: Fuda v. Fuda, 2011 ONSC 154, 2011 CarswellOnt 146 (Ont. SCJ); McCall v. Res, supra.
f) A person's subjective fear can extend to both the person's physical safety and psychological safety. See: Azimi v. Mirzaei, 2010 CarswellOnt 4464 (Ont. S.C.).
g) It is not necessary for a respondent to have actually committed an act, gesture or words of harassment, to justify a restraining order. It is enough if an applicant has a legitimate fear of such acts being committed. An applicant does not have to have an overwhelming fear that could be understood by almost everyone; the standard for granting an order is not that elevated. See: Fuda v. Fuda, supra.
h) A restraining order will be made where a person has demonstrated a lengthy period of harassment or irresponsible, impulsive behaviour with the objective of harassing or distressing a party. There should be some persistence to the conduct complained of and a reasonable expectation that it will continue without court involvement. See: Purewal v. Purewal, 2004 ONCJ 195. However, there was no need for the applicant to sit back and let that behaviour continue for months before issuing an application, just so that she could argue that the bad behaviour continued for a lengthy period of time. Where serious behaviour has continued for "some period of time", that will be sufficient. See: Proevski v. Roffel, 2020 ONCJ 310.
i) A restraining order cannot be issued to forestall every perceived fear of insult or possible harm, without compelling facts. There can be fears of a personal or subjective nature, but they must be related to a respondent's actions or words. A court must be able to connect or associate a respondent's actions or words with an applicant's fears. See: Fuda v. Fuda, supra.
j) Courts should have regard for the passage of time. Events that once triggered a temporary restraining order may not be so compelling on the issue of a permanent order. See: D.C. v. M.T.C., 2015 ONCJ 242.
k) In borderline cases, the court must consider what other protections may be available if a restraining order is not granted. See: D.C. v. M.T.C., supra.
l) It is appropriate, in borderline cases, to consider the balancing prejudice to the respondent, if the restraining order is granted. See: D.C. v. M.T.C., supra.
m) A no-contact or communication order made pursuant to section 28 of the Act is not as wide-ranging as a restraining order. It can limit contact and communication between the parties, but it cannot restrain a party from harassing the other party to third parties. See: F.K. v. M.C., supra.
n) A court is not precluded from making a final restraining order if a party has complied with a temporary order under section 28 of the Act. On a temporary motion the court does not have the benefit of the fulsome record it has at trial. Cross-examination at trial can provide valuable information in the court's risk assessment. Further, the court should be alert to the fact that parties may improve their behaviour when the eyes of the court are on them. This might not continue once the case ends. See: F.K. v. M.C., supra.
Discussion
20This is a high conflict matter wherein the Court had to intervene on many occasions to address issues mainly related to parenting time and communication between the parties.
21The applicant submits that the respondent was abusive. It is her position that he has continued to harass her. The police have been involved with the parties on several occasions.
22The respondent has been charged criminally for his conduct. It is unclear from the record what the outcome of those charges have been. The applicant indicates that the respondent was found guilty of an assault in 2019, which resulted in an absolute discharge. In late 2020, he was charged with criminal harassment, threat to cause death, and failure to comply with a release order and undertaking. In June 2022, he was found guilty of the offences of failing to comply with his release order and undertaking, and was placed on a two-year probation term.
23On January 12, 2026, the respondent pleaded guilty to one count of harassing telephone calls and three counts of failing to comply with a probation order. He was sentenced to a six-month CSO, followed by probation for a period of 18 months. The terms of the CSO and the probation order include a no contact order with the applicant and that he not be within 10 meters of any place where he knows the applicant to live, work, go to school, frequent or any place he knows her to be. The following exceptions apply: pursuant to a family court order made after the date of the order, in the presence or through legal counsel, and for the purposes of making contact arrangements (or through a mutually agreed upon third party) for, or having contact with, his children.
24The above history shows a pattern of ongoing domestic violence and harassment. There is no question that the parties have no abilities to properly communicate with one another.
25Counsel for the applicant submits that the respondent will use any means to perpetrate this ongoing abuse on the applicant. In this regard, the respondent has directed behavior to the applicant’s counsel and her staff.
26I agree that the respondent’s conduct and the way he has addressed counsel, and her staff is rude, disrespectful, and hateful. I also agree that the respondent seems to lack insight into his behavior. He tends to try and blame his unacceptable conduct on the applicant.
27This is a matter in which the Court had to intervene on several occasions. This is evident from the orders made not only in criminal court, but also within these proceedings. The orders made to date have included specific terms regarding communication. These have been necessary in efforts to govern and keep any contact between the parties at a bare minimum.
28There is no question that the abuse has been ongoing – this is not a scenario wherein there is an order that is coming to an end, and the applicant is looking to ensure ongoing peace in circumstances where the respondent has been respectful of orders.
29In fact, quite to the contrary, the respondent has recently pleaded guilty to having failed to comply with a probation order. In my view, this shows the disregard that the respondent has towards court orders.
30I find that the applicant has both a subjective and objective basis to fear for her safety from the respondent.
31There are measures that have recently been ordered by the courts. This includes the CSO, which will be followed by a probation order, mirroring the terms of no contact. It also includes the communication terms imposed by this Court in its endorsement.
32There is no doubt that the stakes are high for the respondent if he was to breach the terms of his CSO. It could result in some serious jeopardy to his liberty, as he would face the potential of having to serve the remainder of his sentence, from the breach, in jail as opposed to within the community.
33I am satisfied that the risk associated with breaching the terms of his CSO should be sufficient to deter the respondent. I am not satisfied that there is such a deterrence as it relates to his compliance with his probation order. This has been a problem in the past.
34Consequently, I find that it is justified in the circumstances of this case that a restraining order be in place, especially once the terms of the CSO are completed. I realize that the CSO will be in effect until July 12, 2026. However, it would be senseless to have the parties return thereafter to address this issue.
35I have considered all of the evidence and the factors set out in the legislation and case law. I find that the applicant has a reasonable and legitimate fear arising from the history of the relationship and the ongoing issues throughout the parties’ continued dealings with one another.
36Although not advanced by the respondent, who is self-represented in this matter, I have considered whether a communication limitation under s. 28(1)(c)(i) of the Children’s Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.12, would have been sufficient to protect the respondent. I find that it would not. That is especially true once the CSO will be completed, and the only protection will be the terms of the probation order.
37Nonetheless, I am hopeful that these types of measures will not be indefinitely necessary. Given that this is a temporary restraining order, the respondent will have the opportunity to consider his behaviour and perhaps make some considerable changes.
Conclusion
38In light of the above reasons, I make the following temporary order:
a. Commencing on August 1, 2025, until and including September 30, 2025, the Respondent, Michael Thomas McGarrity shall pay to the Applicant, Chantal Maria MacDonald, child support in the amount of $876 per month for the support of the child, Charleigh Faye McGarrity, born October 5, 2016, based on the Respondent’s 2024 income of $95,591 and the Federal CSG.
b. Commencing on October 1, 2025, and on the first of each month thereafter, the Respondent shall pay to the Applicant child support tin the amount of $891 per month, for the support of the child, Charleigh Faye McGarrity, born October 5, 2016, based on the Respondent’s 2024 income of $95,591 and the 2025 Federal CSG.
c. The Applicant and the Respondent shall contribute proportionately to s. 7 expenses. Based on the Applicant’s income for 2024 of $62,017, and the Respondent’s income for 2024 of $95,591, the Applicant’s proportionate share is 39.3% and the Respondent’s proportionate share is 60.7%.
d. The above orders are without prejudice to both parties and their claims for retroactive and/or ongoing child support and s. 7 expenses.
e. A restraining order is to be issued and shall contain the following terms:
a) The Respondent is not to contact or communicate in any way, either directly or indirectly, by any physical, electronic or other means with the Applicant.
b) The following exceptions apply:
i. pursuant to a court order;
ii. in the presence or through legal counsel; and,
iii. for the purpose of making arrangements (or through a mutually agreed upon third party) for, or having contact and/or parenting time with the child, Charleigh Faye McGarrity.
Brochu J.
Date: March 27, 2026
CITATION: MacDonald v. McGarrity, 2026 ONSC 1888
COURT FILE NO.: FS-23-0066-001
DATE: 2026-03-27
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
RE: Chantel MacDonald, Applicant
AND:
Michael McGarrity, Respondent
BEFORE: Brochu J.
COUNSEL: Samantha Filipovic, for the Applicant
Self Represented Respondent
HEARD: December 17, 2025, Additional information received January 29, 2026
ENDORSEMENT on motion
Brochu J.
Released: March 27, 2026