Deanna R. Miller

The plaintiffs brought a motion seeking a declaration that the defendants' commencement of a competing action in Toronto, while the plaintiffs' action was pending in Kenora, was an abuse of process.

In the alternative, the plaintiffs sought to transfer the Toronto action to Kenora and consolidate the proceedings.

The court found no abuse of process but determined that Kenora was the proper venue, as the disputed property was located there and Toronto had no rational connection to the matter.

The court ordered the Toronto action transferred to Kenora and consolidated with the Kenora action.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision that dismissed her motion to set aside a prior consent dismissal order.

The respondents moved to dismiss the appeal for delay.

The Divisional Court found that the appellant could not appeal a consent order without leave under s. 133(a) of the Courts of Justice Act.

Furthermore, the order dismissing the motion to set aside the consent order was interlocutory, not final, and therefore could not be appealed to the Divisional Court under s. 31 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The appeal was quashed without costs.

The appellant, Melissa Bell, appealed the summary dismissal of her action against her former lawyer, Neda Amini, for negligence, malpractice, and defamation.

The solicitor-client relationship broke down after 13 days due to the appellant's unreasonable litigation strategy and accusation of collusion.

The motion judge found the lawyer was entitled to withdraw and her communications with Legal Aid Ontario were truthful.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding no evidence of negligence or defamation, and affirmed the motion judge's application of summary judgment principles.

The respondent, William Fuhgeh, brought a motion to strike over 50 paragraphs from the applicants' affidavit and a portion of their Notice of Application in a vexatious litigant proceeding.

The applicants, Marie-Hélène Godbout and Marc Coderre, opposed the motion.

The court dismissed the motion, reiterating the principle that pre-emptive motions to strike affidavits are generally discouraged unless the material is clearly improper or would cause unreasonable effort/cost to respond.

The court deferred the questions of admissibility, weight, and relevance of the impugned evidence to the judge hearing the main vexatious litigant application.

The appellant sought a determination on whether a transcript was required for her appeal from a summary judgment and an extension of time to perfect the appeal.

The respondent opposed, citing lack of merit and the appellant's litigation conduct.

The court ruled that no transcript was required as the summary judgment motion was heard on a paper record.

A 30-day extension to perfect the appeal was granted, considering the appellant's prompt action, self-representation, and entitlement to appeal as of right, finding no specific prejudice to the respondent.