9 total
Venue transfer to Kenora granted and actions consolidated; no abuse of process found in commencing competing action.
The plaintiffs brought a motion seeking a declaration that the defendants' commencement of a competing action in Toronto, while the plaintiffs' action was pending in Kenora, was an abuse of process.
In the alternative, the plaintiffs sought to transfer the Toronto action to Kenora and consolidate the proceedings.
The court found no abuse of process but determined that Kenora was the proper venue, as the disputed property was located there and Toronto had no rational connection to the matter.
The court ordered the Toronto action transferred to Kenora and consolidated with the Kenora action.
Appeal from Small Claims Court quashed because leave is required to appeal a consent order.
The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision that dismissed her motion to set aside a prior consent dismissal order.
The respondents moved to dismiss the appeal for delay.
The Divisional Court found that the appellant could not appeal a consent order without leave under s. 133(a) of the Courts of Justice Act.
Furthermore, the order dismissing the motion to set aside the consent order was interlocutory, not final, and therefore could not be appealed to the Divisional Court under s. 31 of the Courts of Justice Act.
The appeal was quashed without costs.
The Court of Appeal upheld the summary dismissal of a client's negligence and defamation claims against her former lawyer following a justified withdrawal of services.
The appellant, Melissa Bell, appealed the summary dismissal of her action against her former lawyer, Neda Amini, for negligence, malpractice, and defamation.
The solicitor-client relationship broke down after 13 days due to the appellant's unreasonable litigation strategy and accusation of collusion.
The motion judge found the lawyer was entitled to withdraw and her communications with Legal Aid Ontario were truthful.
The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding no evidence of negligence or defamation, and affirmed the motion judge's application of summary judgment principles.
The court dismissed a pre-emptive motion to strike affidavit evidence in a vexatious litigant application.
The respondent, William Fuhgeh, brought a motion to strike over 50 paragraphs from the applicants' affidavit and a portion of their Notice of Application in a vexatious litigant proceeding.
The applicants, Marie-Hélène Godbout and Marc Coderre, opposed the motion.
The court dismissed the motion, reiterating the principle that pre-emptive motions to strike affidavits are generally discouraged unless the material is clearly improper or would cause unreasonable effort/cost to respond.
The court deferred the questions of admissibility, weight, and relevance of the impugned evidence to the judge hearing the main vexatious litigant application.
The court granted a self-represented appellant a 30-day extension to perfect her appeal, clarifying that transcripts of paper-record motions are not required.
The appellant sought a determination on whether a transcript was required for her appeal from a summary judgment and an extension of time to perfect the appeal.
The respondent opposed, citing lack of merit and the appellant's litigation conduct.
The court ruled that no transcript was required as the summary judgment motion was heard on a paper record.
A 30-day extension to perfect the appeal was granted, considering the appellant's prompt action, self-representation, and entitlement to appeal as of right, finding no specific prejudice to the respondent.
Application for non-earner benefits and assessments denied; applicant failed to prove complete inability to carry on normal life.
The applicant, who was 76 years old at the time of the motor vehicle accident, sought non-earner benefits, a psychological assessment, and an orthopaedic assessment.
The Licence Appeal Tribunal dismissed the application, finding that the applicant did not suffer a complete inability to carry on a normal life, as his post-accident activities were largely consistent with his pre-accident baseline.
The Tribunal also denied the psychological assessment due to a lack of supporting medical evidence from his family physician, and denied the orthopaedic assessment because it was reasonably available through OHIP.
Application for accident benefits dismissed; tripping near a displayed vehicle at an auto show is not an accident.
The applicant sought statutory accident benefits after tripping and falling on a raised ledge near a displayed vehicle at an auto show.
The respondent denied the benefits, arguing the incident was not an 'accident' under s. 3(1) of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.
The Licence Appeal Tribunal held a preliminary issue hearing and found that the applicant's injuries did not arise out of the ordinary use or operation of an automobile.
The Tribunal concluded the purpose test was not met, as the display of a vehicle at an auto show does not constitute ordinary use or operation, and dismissed the application.
Accident benefits denied where surveillance and inconsistent evidence undermined applicant's claims of disability and income loss.
The applicant sought statutory accident benefits, including an income replacement benefit (IRB) and medical benefits, following an ebike collision.
The Licence Appeal Tribunal dismissed the application, finding the applicant's evidence regarding her pre-accident income and inability to work lacked credibility and was contradicted by surveillance evidence showing her working and riding her ebike.
The Tribunal concluded the applicant suffered predominantly minor injuries subject to the $3,500 treatment cap, which had been exhausted, and that the requested treatment plans were not reasonable or necessary.
Application for accident benefits dismissed as statute-barred due to unexplained one-year delay in notifying insurer.
The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident in December 2018 but did not apply for statutory accident benefits until December 2019.
The respondent insurer brought a motion to dismiss the application on the basis that the applicant failed to notify it of her intention to apply within seven days, as required by section 32(1) of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.
The Tribunal found that the applicant failed to provide a reasonable explanation for the delay under section 34, noting that ignorance of the law and a subjective belief that injuries would improve are not reasonable excuses.
The Tribunal concluded that the respondent was prejudiced by the delay and dismissed the application as statute-barred under section 55(1).