Sheparski v. Sheparski, 2026 ONSC 2064

CITATION: Sheparski v. Sheparski, 2026 ONSC 2064

COURT FILE NO.: CV-25-0202-00

DATE: 2026-04-08

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

Christopher Gordon Sheparski

Applicant

– and –

Gordon Douglas Sheparski

Respondent

Anthony Russo, for the Applicant

Jordan Lester, for the Respondent

HEARD: October 2, 2025, at Thunder Bay, Ontario

The Honourable Madam Justice C.M. Brochu

Decision on Application

Overview

1The Applicant, Christopher Gordon Sheparski, and the Respondent, Gordon Douglas Sheparski, are father and son. In 2004, they jointly acquired property municipally known as 250 Gore Street West, in the City of Thunder Bay (the “property”).

2This property was used in connection with the business operation of Sheparski’s Auto Body. The applicant and respondent were at one time partners. Subsequently, the business was incorporated. In 2005, the respondent gifted his shares in the corporation to the applicant. The property was never transferred to the corporation, remaining in the joint name of the parties until its sale in 2025.

3From 2005 until the sale of the property, the corporation paid for all expenses, maintenance, and improvements in relation to the property. The applicant continued to conduct his business from the property.

4In or around 2007-2008, the applicant realized that the property continued to be held in the joint names of the parties. He attempted to have the respondent transfer his interest in the property. The respondent refused. He did not pursue the transfer.

5The property was sold on January 24, 2025, for $450,000. The validity of the sale is not in dispute. The parties disagree on the distribution of the sale proceeds which are being held in trust.

6The applicant advances a claim of unjust enrichment seeking an equitable distribution of the sale proceeds, with a majority share awarded to the applicant.

7The respondent advances that the claim is statute-barred and the applicant cannot succeed on the claim of unjust enrichment.

8I have found that the claim is statute-barred.

9For the following reasons, the Application is therefore dismissed.

Background

10The respondent is a retired journeyman autobody technician. He owned and operated Sheparski’s Auto Body as a sole proprietorship from 1999 until 2004.

11The parties subsequently operated Sheparski’s Auto Body as an unincorporated auto body repair business (the “partnership”).

12On April 30, 2004, the property was acquired jointly for $150,000 in connection with the operation of the partnership. The purchase was financed through a mortgage registered in favour of the Royal Bank of Canada. Neither party contributed personal funds toward the down payment.

13On December 29, 2004, Sheparski’s Auto Body Inc. (the “Corporation”) was incorporated under Ontario’s Business Corporations Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. B.16.

14On July 15, 2005, the respondent transferred his shares in the Corporation to the applicant, resulting in the applicant becoming the sole shareholder, director, and officer of the Corporation. It is the respondent’s position that he gifted his shares in the Corporation to his son, the applicant.

15The property was never transferred to the Corporation. Furthermore, the respondent never transferred his ownership interest in the property.

16The applicant submits that from July 2005 onward, he assumed sole responsibility for the financial and operation management of both the Corporation and the property.

17It is acknowledged that the Corporation paid all expenses related to the property and not the applicant personally.

18The respondent continued to work in the shop as its only licensed journeyman.

19In 2007, the parties had a falling out. Since that time, the respondent has not been involved with the applicant or the Corporation. It was his evidence that when he departed, he left all the equipment he had supplied the business with, except for his personal toolbox and two cars.

20In or around 2007-2008, the applicant became aware that the respondent remained on title to the property. He retained a lawyer, on more than one occasion, to prepare a transfer for the property. The respondent refused to sign.

21The applicant did not pursue the matter. During his cross-examination in 2025, he conceded that he “just let it go until last year” and that he “put it on the back burner”.

22The property was sold on January 24, 2025, for $450,000.

Position of the Parties

Applicant’s Position

23It is advanced by the applicant that this is not a propriety claim as there is no land left to recover, and all the applicant is looking to accomplish is the distribution of the proceeds in an equitable fashion. As a result, it is argued that the Real Property Limitations Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.15, (“RPLA”) and the related case law does not apply.

24The applicant acknowledges that he knew in 2007-2008 that the respondent remained on title to the property. He disputes that the limitation crystalized at that time. He submits that the respondent’s refusal to transfer the property did not cause deprivation. There was no unjust enrichment until the sale proceeds were realized, and the respondent sought to get half.

25Furthermore, the payments and improvements effected by the applicant were not a one-time event – they continued throughout the years. Consequently, there would be an ongoing course of deprivation and enrichment with the limitation crystalizing upon receipt of the sale proceeds and demand by the respondent for one half.

26It is the applicant’s position that the matter is not statute-barred.

27The applicant submits that it was the intention of the parties that the property would be transferred to the Corporation. However, this was never completed.

28It is argued that the applicant is not seeking a windfall. His loss is concrete. He is the one who solely, through the Corporation, bore the financial burden of maintaining and improving the property. But for his contribution, the sale proceeds would not have been realized.

29He relies on the doctrine of unjust enrichment in advancing that the sale proceeds should be distributed in accordance with the parties’ respective beneficial interests, with a majority share awarded to the applicant, and a split of $435,500 and $14,500 respectively.

Respondent’s Position

30The respondent submits that the Application is statute-barred under both the RPLA and, alternatively, the ultimate limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002, S.O. 2002, c. 24, Sched. B.

31It is advanced that any cause of action arose in or around 2007-2008 when the applicant discovered that the title to the property remained in the names of the applicant and respondent. The applicant chose not to pursue the matter after the respondent refused to sign a transfer. The Application was not commenced until 17-18 years later in 2025.

32It is also argued that the claim of unjust enrichment fails on every element. It is stated that the applicant entered the autobody trade through the respondent’s mentorship. He obtained his Red Seal certification under the respondent’s guidance and inherited the Corporation as a gift. The respondent supplied the business, the equipment, and the goodwill.

Issues

33These are the issues:

1. Is the Application statute-barred by virtue of the RPLA, or in the alternative, the Limitations Act?

2. Has the applicant proven unjust enrichment?

34It should be noted that the applicant raised the issue of resulting trust in his Application. However, this argument was not pursued at the hearing, nor was it addressed in the applicant’s factum.

Discussion

Is the Application statute-barred?

35Section 4 of the RPLA provides:

4 No person shall make an entry or distress, or bring an action to recover any land or rent, but within ten years next after the time at which the right to make such entry or distress, or to bring such action, first accrued to some person through whom the person making or bringing it claims, or if the right did not accrue to any person through whom that person claims, then within ten years next after the time at which the right to make such entry or distress, or to bring such action, first accrued to the person making or bringing it.

36Given the circumstances of this matter, it is less important to determine whether it is the RPLA or the ultimate Limitations Act that applies. If I find that the cause of action commenced in 2007-2008, the applicant’s claim is statute-barred under both legislations.

37However, considering the submissions of the applicant that there is a “rolling” limitation period every time he makes a payment or improves the property, I believe it is important to determine the issue of whether this is a claim that falls within the purview of “an action to recover any land” and the ambit of the RPLA.

38The courts have recognized that a trust claim in relation to property is “an action to recover any land” within the meaning of s. 4 of the RPLA. An alternative claim for monetary compensation based on a trust entitlement to real property has also been held to be within the scope of s. 4 of the RPLA: see McConnell v. Huxtable, 2014 ONCA 86 (“McConnell”); Gomes v. Da Silva, 2024 ONCA 792 (“Gomes”), most recently reaffirmed in Sidhu v. Jain, 2026 ONCA 151, at paras. 19-20.

39Consequently, the applicability of the RPLA does not depend on whether the property has been sold or not. It is the interest that is being claimed that is of importance and whether it is “an action to recover any land”. This has been clearly stated by the Court of Appeal for Ontario in Studley v. Studley, 2022 ONCA 810, at para. 35 (“Studley”):

35 I acknowledge that this case differs somewhat from McConnell and Bakhsh. In those cases, the properties had yet to be sold; here, they were sold by the appellant after the date of separation. Nonetheless, I agree with the motion judge that an otherwise tenable trust claim in land, one that would be sheltered by s. 4 of the RPLA, cannot be defeated by the sale of that land. This conclusion is supported by both McConnell and Bakhsh. Moreover, a contrary interpretation might incentivize strategic, covert sales designed to reduce the limitation period from 10 years to two, extinguishing an otherwise viable claim. I do not suggest that this happened here. However, it is a foreseeable consequence of the appellant's position on the operation of s. 4 of the RPLA. [Emphasis added.]

40In Gomes, the mother had transferred shares of the home to all of her children in 2008. The application by one of the children for a resulting trust was brought in 2019. The Court held that the claim for resulting trust was statute-barred under the RPLA.

41Gomes is instructive, and the salient paragraphs state the following:

11The trial judge found that in 2008, when legal title to the property was held equally between the parties' mother and the appellant as tenants in common, the appellant, on the advice of his financial advisor, contacted his mother in writing seeking her consent to borrow against "[his] portion" of the property. He stated that if she did not consent, he would be "forced to take appropriate action" to obtain credit against "[his] part of the ownership of the property." The parties' mother responded, in writing, that she did not consent. She proposed that either she or the appellant purchase the other's half interest or that the property be sold. The trial judge rejected the appellant's oral evidence that his mother told him in 2008 that it was his house, finding this inconsistent with the written communications.

12The trial judge correctly stated that s. 4 of the RPLA creates a ten-year limitation period for "an action to recover any land". This includes claims advanced by way of resulting or constructive trust. She held that even if the parties' mother held her interest in the property on a resulting trust for the appellant, the limitation period would have expired in 2018, ten years after her correspondence that put the appellant on notice regarding her view of the ownership of the home, and well before the appellant filed his statement of defence and counterclaim in December 2019. The trial judge found that, "[the appellant] had knowledge starting in 2008 that Maria da Silva did not have the intention to honour such a trust", if indeed there was one. He referred in his 2008 letter to "taking appropriate action" but chose not to enforce his alleged rights. The trial judge correctly concluded that the appellant's choice not to take steps in 2008 to assert his property claim did not stop the running of the limitation period. [Emphasis added.]

42It is conceded by the applicant in this case that he approached his father in 2007-2008 to have the property transferred and the respondent refused. I find that this is when the applicant was put on notice that the respondent would not cooperate and/or willingly transfer his share of the property. Put another way, the appellant had knowledge starting in 2007-2008 that the respondent did not have the intention to transfer his share in the property.

43Despite the foregoing, the appellant carried on with his business, and the Corporation paid all expenses, maintenance, and improvements for the property. The appellant chose to put this issue on the “back burner” and did not commence a claim until the property was sold in 2025. This is well outside of the 10-year limitation period under the RPLA.

44The applicant states that since there is no land left to recover, this is not a proprietary claim. It is advanced that he is only looking to adjust the equitable share of the sale proceeds.

45In stating that a tenable trust claim in land cannot be defeated by the sale of land, the Court in Studley went on to indicate that a contrary interpretation might incentivize strategic, covert sales designed to reduce the limitation period and extinguish otherwise viable claims. An analogy can be made here, wherein the applicant seeks to circumvent the applicable RPLA and the limitation period by claiming that the unjust enrichment is not related to land but to proceeds.

46It is also advanced that the refusal by the applicant in 2007-2008 did not cause deprivation and that the subject matter only arose in 2025 when the proceeds were collected and the respondent sought to collect half.

47I do not agree that the unjust enrichment, if made out (I will address the unjust enrichment claim below), would not have been discovered from the time of the respondent’s refusal in 2007-2008. The applicant knew that his father was refusing to transfer title to the property. Regardless, he continued to maintain and improve the property. He knew then that the respondent was not contributing to those expenses.

48The applicant’s decision to not take any steps in 2007-2008 in the face of his father’s refusal to transfer title did not stop the running of the limitation period. Nor did the applicant’s choice to continue, through the Corporation, to pay the expenses, maintain, and improve the property create a “rolling” limitation period.

49In McConnell, a claim was advanced for unjust enrichment in which the claimant sought a remedial constructive trust, and in the alternative, a claim of monetary compensation. It was found that the claim for unjust enrichment seeking a remedial constructive trust was “an action to recover any land”. It was also found that the alternative claim for monetary compensation sheltered under the claim for recovery of land: see McConnell, at paras. 38-41.

50I find that the applicant’s cause of action arose in or around 2007-2008. The claim was commenced beyond the 10-year limitation period under the RPLA. As a result, the applicant’s claim is statute-barred.

Has the applicant proven unjust enrichment?

51Given my finding above, I will only briefly address the argument of unjust enrichment.

52If I had not found that the claim was statute-barred, I would not have granted the claim for unjust enrichment for the following reasons.

The Law

53The parties agree on the law governing a claim of unjust enrichment.

54The test requires the applicant to establish the following three elements:

1. An enrichment of or benefit to the respondent;

2. A corresponding deprivation of the applicant; and,

3. The absence of a juristic reason for the enrichment.

See Kerr v. Baranow, 2011 SCC 10, at para. 3.

Discussion

55Firstly, there is no enrichment or benefit to the respondent. He is a joint owner of the property. He did not get the use of the property for almost 20 years. As a joint owner, he had the same risks as the applicant. Should there have been an accident on the property, a lien, a fire, or any other issue, he would have been liable.

56On the other hand, the respondent benefitted from the use of the property to operate his business.

57Secondly, there is no deprivation of the applicant. It is admitted that the parties did not use any personal funds to purchase the property. The applicant conceded that the Corporation paid all expenses, maintenance, and improvements to the property.

58The Corporation is a separate entity in law. Despite the fact that the applicant is the sole director, officer and shareholder, it remains that he did not personally expend money. As a result, there is no deprivation of the applicant.

59Lastly, the applicant must show that there is no reason by law or justice for the respondent’s retention of the benefit conferred by the applicant, making the retention unjust. The property is legally owned by both parties. It was acquired jointly and has remained throughout.

60The applicant, through the Corporation, continued to make payments for the expenses, maintenance, and improvement, knowingly. He never made any demand for contribution from the respondent. Since 2007-2008, he has been aware that the property was jointly held. He had the peaceful use of the property and carried on with the business. The respondent, assisted by contributing to the goodwill, and did not interrupt the business affairs.

61Throughout, the applicant never communicated to the respondent that he would expect to receive a greater share of any sale proceeds.

62The applicant has failed to establish the third element.

63Consequently, given the above, I would have found that the applicant has failed to prove his claim for unjust enrichment.

Conclusion

64I have found that the applicant’s claim for unjust enrichment is statute-barred pursuant to s. 4 of the RPLA.

65Furthermore, should I have found otherwise, I would nonetheless have determined that the applicant failed to establish his claim for unjust enrichment.

66The Application is therefore dismissed.

Costs

67If the parties cannot agree on costs, the respondent shall serve and file costs submissions within 15 days of the release of these reasons. The applicant’s submissions shall be served and filed within 15 days of the receipt of the respondent’s submissions. Any reply submissions shall be served and filed within 7 days of receipt of the responding submissions. All costs submissions shall not exceed three pages, not including any offers to settle or bills of costs.

68Submissions received beyond these deadlines will not be considered. Costs will be deemed settled.

The Hon. Madam Justice C. M. Brochu

Released: April 8, 2026

CITATION: Sheparski v. Sheparski, 2026 ONSC 2064