Lillian Taylor

The Crown brought an application alleging that the accused breached a Conditional Sentence Order by sending a text message to his son in violation of a no-contact condition.

The accused denied sending the message, testifying that while the email account used to send the message was associated with his business, he had never used it to contact his son and could not cancel the account as it was owned by his former spouse.

The court found that the Crown had not established the identity of the sender on a balance of probabilities and dismissed the application.

The applicants brought a motion for a stay of proceedings pursuant to s. 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging a violation of their right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b).

The applicants were charged with serious drug trafficking and firearms offences.

The total delay from charge to the date of hearing the application was 38.5 months.

The Crown argued that certain periods constituted defence delay, which would reduce the net delay below the presumptive ceiling of 30 months established in R. v. Jordan.

The court found that the defence delay attributable to the applicants was approximately 5.7 to 5.85 months, resulting in a net delay of 32.65 to 32.8 months, which exceeded the presumptive ceiling.

The court granted the application and stayed the charges.

The accused was charged with second-degree murder in the shooting death of Antoine Bouchard on January 23, 2022, in Thunder Bay.

The accused admitted to shooting the victim but claimed self-defence, asserting that the victim and two others were attempting to rob him while armed.

The Crown presented forensic evidence, including post-mortem examination findings and ballistics analysis.

Key witnesses included the alleged robbers and the accused.

The court found that the accused reasonably believed force was imminent, acted for the purpose of self-defence, and that his response was proportional to the threat faced.

The accused was acquitted of second-degree murder.

The decision concerns the conviction of Ja’Coy Stevenson for possession of cocaine and fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking, possession of proceeds of crime, and several firearm offences.

The court found that Stevenson and Boris Kljujic were running a drug trafficking operation out of a Thunder Bay apartment, based on circumstantial evidence including the presence of large quantities of drugs, cash, drug paraphernalia, and a loaded firearm.

The court rejected the defence that Stevenson was merely a user, finding the only reasonable inference was that he was a trafficker with constructive possession of the drugs and firearm.

The accused, Jessica Werpny, was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and operating with a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) over 80 mg per 100 ml of blood.

The key issues were whether the Crown could prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was operating the vehicle and whether the accused could rely on the statutory exception under section 320.14(5) of the Criminal Code, which applies if alcohol was consumed after ceasing to operate the vehicle.

The court found that the accused remained in care and control of the vehicle and did not cease operating it, despite being stuck and consuming alcohol while seated in the driver's seat.

The presumption under section 320.35 applied and was not rebutted.

The accused was found guilty of the over 80 offence but not guilty of impaired operation, as the Crown failed to prove impairment beyond a reasonable doubt.

The applicant, Brayden Lawson, sought a judicial stay of proceedings under sections 7 and 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms due to the loss of relevant evidence (water bottles allegedly containing MDMA).

The Crown conceded a section 7 breach and consented to a judicial stay for the two charges related to administering MDMA.

The court granted the stay for those two counts, finding the lost evidence clearly relevant and its loss attributable to state negligence.

However, the court dismissed the application for a stay on the remaining six charges, concluding that while the lost evidence was not irrelevant to the complainants' credibility, the applicant's ability to make full answer and defence was not impaired to the extent that a fundamentally fair trial could not be held, given other available evidence for cross-examination.