CITATION: R. v. Anderson, 2026 ONSC 1057

COURT FILE NO.: CR-24-0070-000

DATE: 2026-02-18

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

B E T W E E N:

HIS MAJESTY THE KING

Lillian Taylor, for the Crown

• and -

DAVID THOMAS EDWARD ANDERSON

Michael Hargadon, for the Accused

HEARD: February 4, 2026, in Thunder Bay, ON

Madam Justice T. J. Nieckarz

Reasons For Sentence

OVERVIEW:

1On March 23^rd, 2023, Meagan Happy died tragically when the vehicle she was a passenger in left the road while travelling at a high rate of speed and collided with a tree. David Anderson, unlicensed and impaired, was the driver of the vehicle.

2Mr. Anderson left the scene of the accident without calling for help for Ms. Happy or himself, and without reporting the accident to police. Fortunately for him, Mr. Anderson suffered only minor injuries.

3At the time of the accident, Mr. Anderson was bound by a Release Order made on December 21, 2022, which provided for a curfew. He was also bound by a Probation Order dated June 28, 2022, which prohibited contact or communication with Ms. Happy. At the time of the accident, he was in breach of both of those orders.

4Mr. Anderson was charged with the following offences under the Criminal Code of Canada:

a) Dangerous driving causing death, contrary to s. 320.13(3);

b) Driving while impaired causing death, contrary to s. 320.14(3);

c) Failure to stop after an accident causing death, contrary to s. 320.16(3);

d) Failure to comply with the terms of a Release Order, contrary to s. 145(5)(e); and

e) Failure to comply with the terms of a Probation Order, contrary to s. 733.1(1).

5On October 31, 2025, Mr. Anderson pleaded guilty to three of these charges, namely dangerous driving causing death, breach of a Release Order, and breach of a Probation Order.

6The Crown and the Defence disagree as to the sentence to be imposed on Mr. Anderson for the offences he has pleaded guilty to. I made findings of guilt with respect to these offences on February 4, 2026. The Crown argues that I should impose a total sentence of 8 – 9 years, while the Defence argues that 7 years is a just and fit sentence. Both agree that the sentence proposed by the other is within the acceptable range for offences of this nature. The Defence does not contest the ancillary orders sought.

7Before I go any further, I wish to express my sincere condolences to the family and friends of Meagan Happy. You have suffered a loss beyond measure. I recognize that no sentence imposed by this Court can restore the life that was so tragically taken from you. No matter how carefully chosen, no sentence can undo the profound loss you experience or lessen the depth of your grief and enduring pain that now accompanies you every day.

8It is this Court’s duty to impose a fit and lawful sentence. The Court must impose a sentence that is consistent with the framework established by law. A judge is guided by many considerations, beginning with principles set out in the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, and in the case law that courts have developed over the years. I will attempt to explain the principles and considerations that have guided my decision as to the sentence to be imposed on Mr. Anderson.

9Upon consideration of the applicable principles, I find that a just and fit sentence is 7 ½ years, in addition to a lifetime driving prohibition, and the requirement to submit to DNA testing.

FACTS:

Circumstances of the Offence:

10In determining an appropriate sentence, I must consider the circumstances of the offences that Mr. Anderson has pleaded guilty to.

11The circumstances of the offences are set out in greater detail in the Statement of Agreed Facts dated February 4, 2026. Based on the Statement of Agreed Facts, and for the purpose of sentencing I make the following findings:

a) On March 23, 2023, at approximately 2:32 a.m., the Thunder Bay Police Service (TBPS) responded to a call notification from an Apple Watch of a collision in the area of Lyon Boulevard East, at Rita Street.

b) Superior North Emergency Medical Services arrived on scene first and located a grey Honda UAX. The vehicle had left the road and collided with a tree with such force that severe crush damage was caused to the roof and the entire passenger side of the vehicle was destroyed.

c) Ms. Happy was found buckled into the front passenger seat of the vehicle. She had no vital signs. She was extricated from the vehicle and transported to the Thunder Bay Regional Heath Sciences Centre (TBRHSC).

d) No driver was found at the scene. The operator of the vehicle had left the scene without reporting the accident to police.

e) Police quickly determined that the Apple Watch was registered to David Anderson, of 420 Rita Street, Thunder Bay. Furthermore, there was a blood trail travelling from the vehicle, eastbound to Rita Street, some 2.5 blocks from the accident.

f) Police attended at 420 Rita Street, knocking loudly and calling out to the occupants. When no response was received, police breached the door to check on the welfare of the individual who had left the blood trail. Police found the doors barricaded with furniture, but eventually entered the kitchen of the residence and found a male and two females.

g) Mr. Anderson was found inside the residence bleeding from an injury to his head. He was also found to have blood on his hands. He initially denied involvement in the collision. At 3:39 a.m. he was placed under arrest for dangerous driving. He was cautioned, read his rights to counsel, and then transported by ambulance to TBRHSC for treatment of his injuries.

h) Police determined that Mr. Anderson was showing multiple signs of impairment by drug. At 4:27 a.m. he was re-charged with impaired driving causing bodily harm, dangerous driving causing bodily harm, and failing to remain at the scene causing bodily harm. A blood demand was made, at which point Mr. Anderson acknowledged being impaired. At 4:42 a.m. a blood sample was drawn, which later confirmed that Mr. Anderson had cocaine and benzoylecgonine in his body.

i) At 4:52 a.m. Ms. Happy was formally pronounced deceased due to the multiple internal and external injuries sustained in the collision. These included significant injuries to her head, thorax, and abdomen.

j) At 5:00 a.m. Mr. Anderson was advised that he was now being arrested for the offences of impaired driving causing death, dangerous driving causing death, and failing to remain at the scene of a collision causing death. Mr. Anderson and Ms. Happy had been in a relationship. He became upset, repeating “I’m sorry Meagan” three times.

k) A Technical Collision Report was completed by police, which determined that the vehicle was travelling in a high rate of speed, the road was mostly clear and dry, visibility was clear with no obstructions other than darkness, the vehicle lost control and slid off the roadway through the snowbank to collide with a tree.

l) Mr. Anderson has admitted that he was the driver of the vehicle, drove in a manner dangerous to the public, colliding with the tree, and causing the death of Ms. Happy.

m) At the time of the accident Mr. Anderson was bound by a Probation Order dated June 28, 2022, for the offences of Assault, Uttering threats, and Theft, that included as a condition a prohibition against contact or communication with Ms. Happy except with her written consent filed with Probation. While no consent was ever filed, there is no evidence that Ms. Happy was in the vehicle against her will.

n) At the time of the accident Mr. Anderson was also outside of his residence contrary to a curfew requirement in his Release Order made December 21, 2022.

Circumstances of the Offender:

12The circumstances of the offender must be taken into consideration in determining a fit sentence.

13There was no Pre-Sentence Report or Indigenous Sentencing Report (commonly referred to as a “Gladue” report). Mr. Anderson’s counsel advised as to his personal circumstances during submissions. The Crown did not object.

14At the time of sentencing Mr. Anderson is a 38-year-old resident of Thunder Bay. His mother was of Aboriginal descent from the Fort William First Nation. I do not know his father’s background.

15Mr. Anderson advised his counsel that his parents were hard-working, and he believed he had a good childhood. A deeper dive into his circumstances revealed more challenging circumstances.

16Mr. Anderson was placed into foster care several times between the ages of 5 and 12 years’ old. He reported to his counsel that this was his mother’s way of coping with behavioural challenges he presented with. During one of those placements, he was the victim of sexual interference. He left school at age 12 or 13, with either a grade 7 or 8 education. It was around this time he started to use substances. He has been diagnosed with alcohol neurological disorder, which has features consistent with a lack of impulse control. In other words, he is on the fetal alcohol disorder spectrum.

17Mr. Anderson’s parents separated when he was 11 years’ old. There was violence in the home perpetrated by his mother, against his father. He lived with his father for a period, and then his grandparents until he was 17 or 18 years’ old. He worked at a variety of jobs until approximately 7 or 8 years ago when his addictions became so severe he was unable to hold a job.

18Mr. Anderson has a criminal record dating back to 2013. His record includes the following convictions:

a) August 22, 2013 assault

b) April 17, 2015 fail to comply with undertaking

fail to comply with probation order

c) June 28, 2022 theft under $5000

assault

uttering threats

d) October 31, 2022 breach of conditional sentence order

19Despite never having had a drivers’ licence, Mr. Anderson also has prior driving convictions on October 12, 2021, for speeding (139 kmh in a 90 kmh zone) and driving without a licence.

20While there is no specific evidence of family residential or day school attendance, the Defence submits that the intergenerational issues of substance abuse, problems with primary education, foster care and related abuse, the disconnect with culture, and general instability experienced by Mr. Anderson in his life, are all hallmarks of the impact of colonialization. The Defence further submits that Mr. Anderson’s offending pattern is consistent with substance abuse.

21Having said this, the Defence argues that Mr. Anderson presents as a very different individual today than he did in March 2023. He has been in jail since his arrest on March 23^rd and has made wise use of his time. He has graduated from high school. He has completed numerous programs. He has engaged in significant volunteer work. He is sober and hopes to find stable employment when he has finished serving his sentence.

22Filed by the Defence were the following letters in support of Mr. Anderson:

a) Robert Zaporzan, Recreational Officer at the Thunder Bay Correctional Centre (TBCC)

Mr. Zaporzan confirms that Mr. Anderson is an active participant in daily recreational programs. He is also described as an “essential volunteer for organizing” numerous recreational events for other inmates. The letter confirms that Mr. Anderson also busies himself by attending social work programs and improving his education. He is a recreation cleaner, who is punctual and efficient. He participates in tending to the garden and watering it in the evening. He has plans to attend a treatment program in Guelph and ultimately work as an exterior finishing carpenter. He is described as “active, polite, and busy…”

b) Courtney Chiodo, Addiction Counsellor at the TBCC

Ms. Chiodo confirms Mr. Anderson’s participation in ongoing addictions counselling since January 2025. She also confirms the services and supports available at the TBCC, and upon release, for relapse prevention support.

c) Samantha Gee, Program Officer at the TBCC

Ms. Gee provided a lengthy list of programs completed by Mr. Anderson since he was incarcerated in 2023. These include completion of various booklets, educational sessions, and training programs. Subject matters range from workplace matters, life skills, addictions subjects, anger management, healthy relationships and habits, to bible studies and fellowship.

Victim Impact:

23Three victim impact statements were entered as exhibits and read at the sentencing hearing. Those statements came from Ms. Happy’s parents, and from her 17-year-old daughter. Any portion of those statements that are inadmissible were still read by, or on behalf of the author, but were not factored into my decision.

Betty Happy:

24Betty Happy is Meagan’s mom. Her statement was read by Melanie Aube, Meagan’s best friend. This statement indicated that “great personal harm” has been caused by Mr. Anderson to himself and others.

Martyn Happy

25Martyn Happy is Meagan’s dad. His statement was read by the Crown. Mr. Happy has suffered the unfathomable loss of two children within a few years of each other. He has only one child surviving. He struggles to care about what happens in life anymore and knows that his home will never be the same. His devastation was evident as he sat in the body of the court.

26Mr. Happy’s statement speaks to the “huge hole” in his heart left by Meagan’s death. He spoke about how she was “Daddy’s girl”, and how despite some hard times, they always managed to work through them together. He talked about how Meagan called him each night at 8:00 p.m., but that those calls no longer come.

27Mr. Happy is now legal guardian to Meagan’s daughter. He speaks to his sadness about Isabella no longer having her mother in her life, and Isabella’s need for therapy. He sees a loneliness in his granddaughter that speaks to how much she misses her mother.

Isabella Martell

28Isabella is the 17-year-old daughter of Meagan Happy. She suffered the loss of her mother when she was only approximately 15-years-old. She read her own victim impact statement.

29Isabella’s victim impact statement recognized the struggles her mother had with addictions and the impact on their relationship, but also the bravery and determination Ms. Happy showed in battling her addictions. Isabella recognized her mother’s intelligence and resiliency. Despite her mother not being in her life consistently, she was Isabella’s best friend, and she misses her desperately. She feels anger for all the experiences and milestones she will not share with her mother – high school graduation, going to university, celebrating successes, only to name a few. She feels shame because despite her efforts, she struggles to cope with her mother’s death. She fears she is not as brave as her mother and is not living up to some of the lessons her mom taught her to deal with hard times. She often lacks motivation and feels that she has been robbed of hopes and dreams, as well as her childhood.

30Isabella’s eloquent writing and poise in delivering her statement, along with her insight into the impact of the loss she has suffered, belied her short 17 years and would have made her mother proud. She has no reason to feel shame.

SENTENCING PRINCIPLES:

31Sentencing is a highly individualized process. It is one that calls for a delicate balancing of various sentencing principles and objectives. The fundamental sentencing principle set out in s. 718.1 of the Criminal Code is that a “sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender”: R. v. Altiman, 2019 ONCA 511, at para. 42, citing R. v. Suter, 2018 SCC 34, [2018] 2 S.C.R. 496, at para. 4.

32Proportionality is determined both on an individual basis, in relation to the accused himself and to the offence committed by him, and by comparison to sentences imposed for similar offences committed in similar circumstances: Section 718.2(a) and (b), and R. v. Altiman, at para. 45, citing R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 1089, at para. 53.

33In determining a fit sentence, the sentencing objectives set out in s. 718 of the Criminal Code and the other sentencing principles set out in s. 718.2 must be considered and weighed.

34Section 718 of the Criminal Code provides that the purpose of sentencing is to protect society and to contribute to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society. Sentences must reflect one or more of the following objectives:

a. to denounce unlawful conduct and the harm done to victims or to the community that is caused by unlawful conduct;

b. to deter the offender and other persons from committing offences;

c. to separate offenders from society, where necessary;

d. to assist in rehabilitating offenders;

e. to provide reparations for harm done to victims or to the community; and

f. to promote a sense of responsibility in offenders, and acknowledgment of the harm done to victims or to the community.

35Counsel agree that in sentencing Mr. Anderson, the Court must give primary consideration to the objectives of denunciation and deterrence. Dangerous driving causing death is an extremely serious offence. A life has been lost, and Parliament and the courts have recognized that it is an offence that places the community at large at great risk. There is a strong societal interest in denouncing such conduct and trying to prevent it from happening again with both this offender and others.

36Further sentencing principles that must guide the Court in determining the offender’s degree of responsibility are set out in s. 718.2 of the Criminal Code.

37Section 718.2(a) requires that a sentence be increased to account for any aggravating factors or reduced to account for any mitigating circumstances. Aggravating circumstances generally tend to make the offence more troubling while mitigating circumstances moderate the severity of the offence.

38Section 718.2(d) requires restraint in sentencing, acknowledging that sentences are not only intended to be punitive, but also remedial.

39Section 718.2(e) directs sentencing judges to undertake the sentencing of Aboriginal offenders differently. This section is intended to address the unique systemic and background factors that may have played a part in bringing the offender before the court.

40In determining the moral blameworthiness of an Aboriginal offender, the court must apply the principles from R. v. Gladue, 1999 679 (SCC), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688, and R. v. Ipeelee, 2012 SCC 13, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 433. Systemic and background factors that have played a role in bringing the Indigenous person before the court may have a mitigating effect on moral blameworthiness and different sanctions may be more effective in achieving sentencing objectives.

ANALYSIS:

41Having carefully considered the circumstances of the offence, the offender’s background, the victim impact statements, and the applicable sentencing principles, I turn now to make findings as to the aggravating and mitigating factors. I will then balance all the relevant factors, objectives and principles to determine a proportionate sentence for Mr. Anderson that reflects the gravity of the offences he committed and the degree of his responsibility.

Aggravating Factors:

42In this case, there are significant factors aggravating the offence of dangerous driving causing death. I find that they make an already very serious offence more serious and increase Mr. Anderson’s level of responsibility.

43Mr. Anderson was impaired by illegal drugs. He got into a car to drive both himself and Ms. Happy. The operation of a vehicle while impaired by drugs is extremely concerning and demonstrates a disregard for Mr. Anderson’s own life, Ms. Happy’s life, and other people on the road. The risk that Mr. Anderson’s actions posed to Ms. Happy, regardless of the fact that she got into the car voluntarily, caused her to pay the ultimate price. It seems trite to state that the irresponsibility of his actions and the risk that his actions posed to the community at large are serious.

44Further aggravating the dangerous driving causing death offence is the fact that Mr. Anderson was not a licenced driver, the terms of his Release Order meant he should not have been out in the middle of the night, the terms of his Probation Order meant he should not have been with Ms. Happy, and he left the scene of the accident without reporting it or summoning help for Ms. Happy. While no driver should get behind the wheel of a vehicle and drive while intoxicated, this applies even more so to Mr. Anderson who had no licence to drive and had no business being on the road at all.

45The fact that this is the second time Mr. Anderson has been caught driving without a licence, and both times at a high rate of speed, is further aggravating. Combined with the breach of his curfew condition in his Release Order and his Probation Order, Mr. Anderson’s actions the night of March 23rd demonstrated a significant disregard for the law. Even if he had obeyed his curfew, he would not have got into the car and driven when he did. The commission of a serious offence while subject to the supervision of the administration of justice is a breach of the Court’s trust and is a significant aggravating factor to the offence of dangerous driving causing death.

46The offence, and Mr. Anderson’s moral blameworthiness for the offence, is further exacerbated by the fact that he left Ms. Happy alone, with serious injuries in the middle of the night. His counsel argues it is likely she died instantly because of the severity of her injuries and the impact to the vehicle, while the Crown argues it is unknown if she was still alive and if so, how long she lay there. I do not have evidence to allow me to conclude whether Ms. Happy died instantly or not. But whether she did or not, does not detract from Mr. Anderson’s legal and moral obligation not to leave the scene of the accident and to call for help. I also do not have any evidence as to whether Mr. Anderson bothered to check to see if Ms. Happy was dead or alive. I do know that he ran away and barricaded himself in the Rita Street home. While I accept Mr. Anderson’s statement that he was scared, this does not change the fact that his actions demonstrated no care or concern for the person he claimed to have loved, and to have been his best friend.

47The magnitude of devastation felt by those who loved and cared for Ms. Happy is a further aggravating factor. While Mr. Anderson will have to live with the consequences of his actions, others are also left struggling to deal with the loss he caused. The loss that Ms. Happy’s parents and daughter have suffered cannot properly be put into words. The unimaginable loss of parents who have been forced to survive their daughter. A child who struggles to deal with the loss of her mother. Her young age means she will have many more years to have to cope with this loss. Their ongoing grief was palpable. Ms. Happy’s loss has left a permanent void in their lives.

Mitigating Factors:

48Having said all of this, there are also significant mitigating factors that must be factored into determining a proportionate sentence. They do not change the seriousness of the offence, but they do lessen Mr. Anderson’s degree of moral blameworthiness.

49Mr. Anderson has pleaded guilty. While he did not do so at an early stage, there were circumstances beyond his control that contributed to this delay. On the circumstances of this case, the stage in the proceedings at which he did plead guilty does not detract from the mitigation effect of his pleas. He has saved the administration of justice the resources that a trial would have required, but more importantly, he has spared Ms. Happy’s family the stress and trauma of a trial.

50He has expressed, what I believe to be, true remorse. He did so initially on March 23^rd, 2023, when notified of Ms. Happy’s death. He did so here, in court. His expression of remorse in court was one of the more heartfelt expressions that I have seen and heard. Mr. Anderson was emotional. His words focused primarily on the damage caused by his actions and the impact on Ms. Happy and her family. His words demonstrated insight. He caused the death of someone he cared about deeply, and it is evident that he will continue to be burdened by his actions long after his sentence is completed.

51It is not just Mr. Anderson’s words that have demonstrated the extent of his remorse; his actions speak volumes. In addition to acknowledging responsibility, I accept that Mr. Anderson’s efforts at rehabilitation reflect a sincere and deep remorse, and not something that is done half-heartedly merely to mitigate sentence. He has demonstrated a commitment to sobriety, improving his life and coping skills, taking on leadership roles (organizing activities), and through his hard work while incarcerated. Betty Happy’s victim impact statement expressed the hope that her daughter’s death might serve as a turning point for Mr. Anderson. The Court cannot declare that transformation complete, but the evidence does suggest that very positive and commendable steps have been taken in this direction.

Gladue:

52As indicated above, s. 718.2(e) and the principles set out in R. v. Gladue, must be followed when determining a fit sentence for Aboriginal offenders. This includes cases such as this, involving a driving offence that causes death: R. v. Altiman, at para. 77.

53Section 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code does not create a “race-based discount on sentencing”. The circumstances of the Aboriginal offender before the Court must be considered. While Aboriginal offenders need not “draw a straight line” between their ancestry and the offences for which they are being sentenced, they do need to demonstrate that the systemic and background factors affecting Aboriginal people in Canadian society have impacted the offender’s life in a way that (1) bears on moral blameworthiness, or (2) indicates which types of sentencing objectives should be prioritized in the offender’s case. Systemic and background factors do not operate as an excuse for an offence, nor do they override the fundamental principle that a sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender. They are only relevant to assessing the degree of responsibility of the offender and to considering whether non-retributive sentencing objectives should be prioritized. Gladue recognizes that evaluating the degree of responsibility of the Aboriginal offender may require a different analysis, but generally the more violent and serious the offence, the more likely it is that terms of imprisonment for Aboriginal and Non-Aboriginal offenders will be close to each other or the same: R. v. Altiman, at paras. 77-78 and 82, citing R. v. F.H.L., 2018 ONCA 83, 360 C.C.C. (3d) 189, paras. 38-40 and 47.

54In this case, in arriving at a just and fit sentence I accept the Defence submission that while the principles of denunciation and deterrence remain paramount, and while the sanction of incarceration remains appropriate, there are factors applicable to this Aboriginal offender that mitigate his moral blameworthiness to some extent. Those factors include intergenerational trauma, exposure to domestic violence at an early age, neglect, and exposure to substance abuse from an early age. While all these factors have likely played a role in bringing Mr. Anderson before the justice system once again, substance abuse played a significant role in the offences for which Mr. Anderson is now being sentenced.

Parity:

55In determining what is a proportionate sentence, I have looked at the decisions that the Crown and Defence have referred me to, to guide me. While there is no formal range of sentences for driving offences causing death, sentences typically range from 4 – 6 years, unless the offender has a prior criminal or driving offence record, in which case the range is typically 7-7 ½ to 12 years. These ranges are only guidelines. I am not bound by them but see no reason to depart from them in this case.

56In this case, Mr. Anderson has a prior driving record, and I find that this places him in the 7 to 12-year range. The Defence does not advocate for a sentence below the low-end of the range. Nor does the Crown advocate for the high end of the range. Neither disputes the aggravating factors. The difference between the proposed sentences accounts for the weight I should give to the aggravating, but more significantly to the mitigating factors and rehabilitation. The Crown argues that a sentence of 8 – 9 years sufficiently accounts for the mitigating factors of a plea, remorse, and Gladue. The Defence says that for this offender, a sentence of 7 years is one that properly balances the aggravating and mitigating factors with denunciation and deterrence and all other relevant sentencing principles.

57Both the Crown and the Defence rely on R. v. Altiman. In that case, the Ontario Court of Appeal reduced the trial judge’s sentence of 10 years to 7 years. Mr. Altiman pleaded guilty to impaired driving causing the death of two people. Two other individuals were seriously injured. Mr. Altiman caused the violent collision while travelling at a speed of 187 kmh. He was a 31-year-old offender with no prior criminal or driving offence record. The offence was described as “totally out of character” for him. His Aboriginal ancestry was not found to diminish his moral culpability.

58The Defence argues that while Mr. Altiman had no prior criminal or driving record (a distinguishing factor from Mr. Anderson’s case), if a sentence of 7 years is appropriate for two counts of impaired driving causing death, with no significant Gladue factors, then 7 years’ incarceration is a more than just sentence for Mr. Anderson given the significant mitigating factors. While the Crown relies on R. v. Altiman for the principles stated by the Court of Appeal, Ms. Taylor argues that the aggravating factors present in Mr. Anderson’s case distinguish the result. I agree that the aggravating and mitigating factors present in this case distinguish the result. Having said this, R. v. Altiman and the guidance offered by that case has been considered by me.

59The following cases were also cited. Similar to R. v. Altiman, while each case was factually different, the underlying principles and results help guide me in determining Mr. Anderson’s sentence:

a) R. v. Norris, 2024 ONSC 1284 (P.J. Moore J.)

Mr. Norris was found guilty, after a trial, of impaired driving causing death, impaired driving causing bodily harm, dangerous driving causing death, and dangerous driving causing bodily harm. There was a head-on collision with another car that resulted in one person from that car being killed, while the other was seriously injured. He was 61-years old at the time of sentencing. He had three prior convictions for impaired driving, along with a criminal record for unrelated offences.

In that decision at paragraphs 6 and 7, Justice Moore, citing R. v. Bernshaw, 1995 150 (SCC), [1995] 1 S.C.R. 254, at para. 16, noted that impaired driving continues to leave a trail of death, destruction, and heartbreak. The need to denounce and deter this conduct has led to an increase in sentences in recent years. But while the criminal justice system can denounce the conduct and attempt to deter others through increased sentences, it cannot compensate for the loss that has been suffered.

Justice Moore reviewed a number of cases with respect to impaired driving offences. Mr. Norris suffered from addiction, anxiety, and depression. It was concluded that Mr. Norris’ addiction was not a mitigating factor as he had not demonstrated that it did not operate in such a way as to reduce his moral culpability. Justice Moore noted that any steps taken to deal with an addiction that is connected to an offence would be considered a mitigator factor, but that was not the case with Mr. Morris. His prescription and non-prescription drug abuse were considered aggravating in the circumstances, as was his prior impaired driving offences. A subsequently acquired brain injury was the most significant mitigating factor.

After considering all the sentencing principles, the case law, and the aggravating and mitigating factors, Justice Moore concluded that a sentence of 8 years was appropriate for impaired driving causing death, with a 6 ½- year sentence for dangerous driving causing death, served concurrently.

b) R. v. Obermok, 2023 ONCJ 401

Mr. Obermok went through a stop sign at a high rate of speed. He struck another vehicle, causing the death of a two-year old child and serious injuries to the child’s mother. Mr. Obermok also suffered serious injuries. Police detected the odour of alcohol on his breath. An expert opinion analyzing the results of breathalyzer testing was that Mr. Obermok would have been impaired at the time of the accident. He pleaded guilty to one count of dangerous driving causing death and one count of dangerous driving causing bodily harm. He was found to be remorseful.

The Crown sought a jail sentence of 4 – 6 years. Mr. Obermok was 56 years old and had a criminal record that was dated, and unrelated. He was described by the sentencing judge as a “productive member of the community throughout his adult life”. Mr. Obermok was sentenced to 5 years’ imprisonment.

c) R. v. Rees, 2020 O.J. 3182 (O.C.J.)

Mr. Rees pleaded guilty to impaired operation of a motor vehicle causing death and dangerous operation of a motor vehicle causing death. Mr. Rees struck a pedestrian and caused her death. He narrowly missed another pedestrian, but the events caused severe emotional harm to that victim. Mr. Rees was impaired from marijuana use at the time of the offences.

At the time of sentencing Mr. Rees was 57 years old. He had a dated criminal record, which involved no driving offences. There was a dated drug-related offence. Drug and alcohol abuse were found to be longstanding issues for Mr. Rees, who also suffered from mental health issues. Mr. Rees was sentenced to 6 years’ imprisonment.

Rehabilitation:

60While the importance of rehabilitation as a sentencing objective must give way to the primary objectives of denunciation and deterrence given the seriousness of the offence, it cannot and should not be disregarded. Rehabilitation is to form part of the calculus of all criminal punishment: see R. v. Hilbach, 2023 SCC 3, 477 D.L.R. (4th) 84, at para. 38. It is one of the objectives of sentencing.

61In this case, the meaningful efforts that Mr. Anderson has made towards rehabilitation warrant some restraint in the sentence imposed. While I appreciate that jail is a very controlled environment, Mr. Anderson has made significant efforts towards addressing his addictions issues and some of the issues arising out of his troubled youth. He has taken steps to improve his education. At 38 years old, he remains relatively young and has a plan to be a productive member of society upon release from jail. He has a diagnosed condition, the implications of which for his rehabilitation are unclear to me. I am mindful that Mr. Anderson’s efforts, and hope for his rehabilitation, should not be undermined by an overly harsh sentence, but rather encouraged.

Balancing:

62I have said throughout this decision and cannot overstate the seriousness of the offence of dangerous driving, particularly when someone is impaired. When those actions cause death, it is one of the most serious offences in the Criminal Code as is reflected by the maximum possible sentence of life imprisonment. Despite increased awareness and media reports of the tragedies caused by dangerous driving and impaired driving, and despite increased penal sentences, people continue to do it. This is troublesome. Because people continue to do it, people also continue to die needlessly. It is a preventable harm.

63While acknowledging the seriousness of the offence and the significant aggravating factors, I have accepted the Defence submissions with respect to the Gladue factors present, which have impacted Mr. Anderson’s decision-making and degree of responsibility. I have also accepted the Defence submission that the demonstration of remorse by Mr. Anderson and his strong efforts at rehabilitation suggests an appreciation for the seriousness of his actions and that he may be deterred from any such future conduct. But while I agree with the Defence that the Gladue, remorse, and rehabilitation factors call for a lesser sentence than the 8-9 years the Crown seeks, on the circumstances of this case I cannot say that the lowest end of the sentencing range (7 years) accurately reflects Mr. Anderson’s degree of responsibility. Despite the significance of the mitigating factors in this case, there are too many aggravating factors.

64Balancing all the aggravating and mitigating factors and applying the relevant principles of sentencing and guidance provided by other courts, I fit that a just and fit sentence that reflects the gravity of the offence of dangerous driving causing death, and degree of responsibility of this offender, is 7 ½ years. In arriving at this sentence, I have also taken into consideration that the Defence does not dispute the Crown request for a lifetime driving prohibition, which is also a significant consequence.

65It was important to take some time to reflect on this decision and set out the principles, objectives, and factors that went into this decision. This was not simply a splitting the difference between 7 and 8 years. It was a careful analysis of the facts and law, weighed to arrived at a proportionate sentence.

66I also have spent very little time on the two other offences of breach of probation and breach of release order. Counsel did not make submissions with respect to these offences specifically. Suffice it to say that in the circumstances of this case, the breach of the release order was particularly serious, with serious consequences. With respect to the breach of probation order, the parties were in a relationship and there is no evidence that Ms. Happy was not with Mr. Anderson voluntarily on March 23^rd. While this does not negate Mr. Anderson’s responsibility with respect to his probation order, it is a factor to be considered. Mr. Anderson shall be sentenced to 90 days for the breach of probation and 6 months for the breach of the release order. Both sentences shall be served concurrently with the dangerous driving sentence.

Summers Credit:

67I accept that an appropriate credit for pre-sentence custody is 1.5 days for each 1 day served, in accordance with the provisions of the Criminal Code and R. v. Summers, 2014 SCC 26, [2014] 1 SCR 575. This was not a contested issue in the sentencing hearing.

68As of February 4, 2026, Mr. Anderson had served 1,049 days of time with respect to these charges. Since then, 14 additional days have passed (including today), for a total of 1,063 days. At a ratio of 1.5 to 1, Mr. Anderson is to receive pre-sentence custody credit of 1,595 days (which is roughly 4.4 years).

SENTENCE AND ANCILLARY ORDERS:

69For the reasons outlined in this decision, Mr. Anderson is sentenced to:

a) Count #1 - incarceration for a period of 7 ½ years in a federal penitentiary, subject to a Summers credit of 1,595 days, leaving a balance of 1,146 days to be served [2,741 days – 1,595] (or roughly 3.2 years);

b) Count #4 – incarceration for 6 months, to be served concurrently;

c) Count #5 – incarceration for 90 days, to be served concurrently;

d) With respect to count #1, there shall be a lifetime driving prohibition pursuant to s. 320.24(5)(a) that shall take effect upon your release from jail.

e) He shall provide a sample of his DNA on or before March 30, 2026 (secondary designated offence).

70Given that Mr. Anderson has been and will continue to be incarcerated and unable to earn an income, I am satisfied that it is appropriate to waive the victim fine surcharge.

71In accordance with the requirements of s. 320.24(6), a copy of the driving prohibition order shall be given to Mr. Anderson, by the Court.

The Hon. Madam. Justice T. J. Nieckarz