Carrie Lynn Watkins

The accused, Monica Spence and Daniel Debassige, were sentenced for their roles in the beating death of the victim.

Following a trial, Debassige was found guilty of second-degree murder, and Spence was found guilty of manslaughter due to intoxication and provocation after the victim sexually assaulted her.

Applying Gladue principles and considering pre-sentence reports, the court sentenced Spence to five years (with credit for pre-sentence custody, leaving 703 days) followed by three years of probation.

Debassige received a mandatory life sentence with no parole eligibility for 10 years, in accordance with a joint submission.

The offender was convicted of sexual interference against his stepdaughter, with offences occurring when she was between 8 and 12 years old.

The Crown sought a penitentiary sentence of six to eight years, while the defence proposed three to four years.

Emphasizing denunciation, deterrence, and the profound impact on the victim, the court sentenced the offender to six years' imprisonment, less credit for pre-sentence custody, along with mandatory and discretionary ancillary orders.

In a proposed class proceeding on behalf of Crown wards allegedly physically or sexually abused before and/or during wardship, the court considered whether the pleading disclosed causes of action in negligence and breach of fiduciary duty against the provincial Crown.

Applying the plain and obvious test on a motion to strike, the court held it was arguable that the Crown, as statutory guardian, owed a private law duty of care analogous to that of a parent and that its obligations could extend to protecting the wards' legal rights, including advising them of claims, preserving evidence, and considering litigation.

The court also held it was not plain and obvious that no fiduciary duty could arise, given the statutory parental relationship and the vulnerability of Crown wards.

The plaintiffs satisfied the cause of action requirement under s. 5(1)(a) of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, and the defendant's motion to strike was dismissed.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment dismissing a personal injury claim arising from a motor vehicle collision on the basis that the plaintiff was operating an uninsured vehicle.

The defendants relied on s. 267.6(1) of the Insurance Act and evidence indicating the vehicle was not insured and not properly registered to the plaintiff.

The plaintiff argued that his proof of insurance was destroyed in a post‑collision fire and that his memory loss prevented him from identifying his insurer.

The court held the defendants established a prima facie case that the plaintiff was uninsured and that the plaintiff failed to produce evidence capable of showing a genuine issue for trial.

As a result, the statutory bar against recovery applied and the claim was dismissed on summary judgment.

Sentencing decision following a guilty plea to manslaughter arising from a fatal altercation between two intoxicated individuals in a wooded area.

The victim died from a crush injury to the neck caused by prolonged pressure, resulting in asphyxia.

The court considered extensive Gladue factors, including the offender’s Indigenous background, severe childhood trauma, poverty, substance abuse, cognitive difficulties, and the broader effects of colonialism and residential schools.

Aggravating factors included the violent nature of the death, the vulnerability of the elderly victim, and the offender’s prior record for violent offences.

Balancing denunciation and deterrence with the offender’s personal circumstances and prospects for rehabilitation, the court imposed a penitentiary sentence.

The appeal concerned whether an Ontario court retained jurisdiction to vary a spousal support order made under the former Divorce Act when neither former spouse resided in Ontario and one former spouse did not attorn to jurisdiction.

The court held that the Divorce Act, 1985, including its transitional provisions, governed the variation application, and that the moving party had not commenced any variation proceeding before repeal of the former statute.

The court further held that s. 43(c) of the Interpretation Act did not preserve any acquired, accrued, or accruing right to seek variation because no steps had been taken before repeal to exercise that statutory entitlement.

As neither residency nor acceptance of jurisdiction under s. 5(1) was established, Ontario lacked jurisdiction and the variation application was dismissed.