8 total
The court certified a class action against the Crown for systemic negligence and breach of fiduciary duty regarding former Crown wards.
The plaintiffs moved for certification of a class action against the Crown for systemic negligence and breach of fiduciary duty regarding the failure to advance compensation claims for former Crown wards who suffered abuse or neglect.
The court granted the motion, certifying common issues related to duty of care, standard of care, breach, fiduciary duty, aggregate damages, and punitive damages.
The court found a class action to be the preferable procedure, promoting access to justice, judicial economy, and behaviour modification, despite the Crown's arguments regarding over-broad class definition and alternative compensation avenues.
Consent order for anonymous party addition denied pending formal motion with notice to the media.
The moving party, applicants, and respondents sought a consent order to add another physician to a judicial review application under a pseudonym.
The court declined to grant the order, noting that notice to the media is generally required before granting any form of publication ban or anonymity order.
The court also raised concerns about the current title of proceedings, which listed the applicants as 'Several Physicians Affected Directly by the Order' without any identifying information in the court file.
The parties were directed to bring a formal motion with notice to the media.
Certification discovery was limited to relevant compensation-claim questions.
In a proposed class proceeding by former Crown wards alleging systemic failure by the Crown to facilitate compensation claims for abuse, the defendant moved to compel answers to refused cross-examination questions and to mark child welfare files as exhibits on the certification record.
The court held that questions about whether the proposed representative plaintiffs had made Criminal Injuries Compensation Board claims or civil claims, and the outcomes of any civil claims, were relevant to commonality, preferability, and representative plaintiff suitability, and ordered those questions answered in writing.
Questions about limitation periods and whether claims were still possible were held irrelevant to certification and potentially intrusive on privilege.
The request to mark the child welfare files as exhibits was dismissed as overbroad, prejudicial, and directed toward merits rather than certification issues.
Novel negligence and fiduciary claims by Crown wards were allowed to proceed.
In a proposed class proceeding on behalf of Crown wards allegedly physically or sexually abused before and/or during wardship, the court considered whether the pleading disclosed causes of action in negligence and breach of fiduciary duty against the provincial Crown.
Applying the plain and obvious test on a motion to strike, the court held it was arguable that the Crown, as statutory guardian, owed a private law duty of care analogous to that of a parent and that its obligations could extend to protecting the wards' legal rights, including advising them of claims, preserving evidence, and considering litigation.
The court also held it was not plain and obvious that no fiduciary duty could arise, given the statutory parental relationship and the vulnerability of Crown wards.
The plaintiffs satisfied the cause of action requirement under s. 5(1)(a) of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, and the defendant's motion to strike was dismissed.
Costs of $12,500 awarded to the respondent following dismissal of judicial review application.
Following the dismissal of the applicants' application for judicial review, the court determined the issue of costs.
The applicants argued no costs should be awarded as the proceeding was of broader public interest.
The court rejected this argument, finding the issue was entirely personal to the applicants' positions as cottage owners.
The court awarded the respondent costs of $12,500, reducing the requested amount of $16,565.50 to reflect the respondent's lack of success on a jurisdictional issue raised during the hearing.
Application for judicial review dismissed; Residential Tenancies Act does not bind the Crown regarding park leases.
The applicants, cottage owners in Rondeau Provincial Park, sought a declaration that the Residential Tenancies Act, 2006 applied to their land leases with the Crown, thereby invalidating a regulation terminating their leases in 2017.
The Divisional Court first determined it had jurisdiction to hear the application as it involved the validity of a regulation.
On the merits, the court held that the Residential Tenancies Act does not expressly bind the Crown, nor does the benefit/burden exception apply.
Consequently, the regulation terminating the leases was valid and the application was dismissed.
Judicial review of restraining order dismissed as subsequent hearing cured initial breach of procedural fairness.
The applicant, a private career college, sought judicial review of a Restraining Order issued by the Superintendent of Private Career Colleges.
The Superintendent had issued the order alongside a Notice of Contravention without providing the applicant prior notice or an opportunity to respond.
The Divisional Court held that the application was not premature and found that the Superintendent breached the duty of procedural fairness by failing to allow submissions before issuing the Restraining Order.
However, because the applicant was subsequently given an opportunity to be heard, which cured the procedural defect, the application was dismissed.
No costs were awarded due to the initial breach of fairness.
Appeal dismissed; motion judge had discretion under the Judicial Review Procedure Act to retain jurisdiction.
The appellant appealed a motion judge's order dismissing a motion to transfer an application to the Divisional Court.
The underlying application sought a declaration that the Minimum Maintenance Standards regulation was ultra vires and invalid, arising from a motor vehicle accident tort action against a municipality.
The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that under section 8 of the Judicial Review Procedure Act, the motion judge had the discretion to retain jurisdiction over the application rather than transferring it, and that this discretion was exercised reasonably to facilitate judicial economy.