B. Bowen

In a bifurcated family law trial, the court determined issues of spousal support entitlement, income for support purposes, and a claim for a resulting trust over a property.

The court found the wife had an ongoing entitlement to spousal support.

The husband's income was imputed to include $30,000 annually in housing and other benefits provided by his wealthy father.

Finally, the court held that a property purchased by the father and placed in the names of the husband and wife was a gratuitous transfer.

The wife failed to rebut the presumption of resulting trust, and the property was declared to be held in trust for the father.

The applicant, a private career college, sought judicial review of a Restraining Order issued by the Superintendent of Private Career Colleges.

The Superintendent had issued the order alongside a Notice of Contravention without providing the applicant prior notice or an opportunity to respond.

The Divisional Court held that the application was not premature and found that the Superintendent breached the duty of procedural fairness by failing to allow submissions before issuing the Restraining Order.

However, because the applicant was subsequently given an opportunity to be heard, which cured the procedural defect, the application was dismissed.

No costs were awarded due to the initial breach of fairness.

The applicant shareholders sought an oppression remedy and a court-ordered shareholder meeting, arguing that the company's Special Quorum Requirement for electing directors was invalid and oppressive.

The requirement mandated a 50% quorum, which had not been met for 15 years, preventing the election of directors.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the board complied with its legal obligations, the quorum requirement was publicly known and approved by shareholders, and the applicants had not attempted to use statutory tools like requisitioning a meeting or soliciting dissident proxies.

The court declined to order a meeting under s. 106 of the OBCA, as it was not impracticable for the shareholders to call one themselves.

In the context of competing applications arising from a disputed annual general meeting, the parties brought motions to compel answers to questions refused during cross-examinations.

The court held that an applicant could not withdraw a statement in his affidavit referencing legal advice and that the statement constituted a waiver of solicitor-client privilege, requiring him to answer questions about the advice.

The court also ordered an expert witness to produce draft reports and communications with counsel, finding that tendering the expert waived litigation privilege over those materials.

Other requests for production and answers were dismissed for lack of relevance.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment awarding damages to a former chief financial officer and consultant arising from a stock option plan.

The central issue was whether a termination provision ending options when the optionee ceased to be an employee applied to a participant who was found at trial to be a consultant rather than a true employee.

The court held that, on a fair reading of the plan as a whole, the terms 'employee' and 'eligible participant' were used interchangeably, so the termination provision applied to all persons granted options under the plan.

Because the respondent did not exercise his options before ending his relationship with the company, his rights under the option agreement had terminated.

The appeal was allowed, the trial judgment was set aside, and the action was dismissed with costs.