Jane Alexandra Langford

The defendant physicians brought a motion for summary judgment arguing that a medical negligence claim arising from treatment that preceded a patient’s death from necrotizing fasciitis was statute-barred under the one‑year limitation period in s. 89 of the Regulated Health Professions Act.

The estate argued that the limitation period did not begin to run until a medical expert later reviewed the records and identified specific errors in treatment.

The court held that discoverability required knowledge of material facts establishing potential negligence, which in complex medical cases may require expert interpretation of medical records.

Because the plaintiff only obtained those material facts after receiving an expert analysis of the records, the action was commenced within the applicable limitation period.

The motion for summary judgment was dismissed.

The Court of Appeal issued an endorsement regarding costs following an appeal concerning the allocation of defence costs between an insurer and an insured.

The respondent, the insured university, was awarded costs on a partial indemnity basis fixed at $25,000, inclusive of disbursements and GST.

The appellant insurer appealed a trial judge's decision allocating 95% of the respondent insured's defence costs to the insurer.

The underlying action involved multiple claims, including wrongful dismissal and malicious prosecution, but only the malicious prosecution claim was covered by the policy.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the allocation of defence costs for mixed claims is a matter of contractual interpretation, not fairness or equity.

Because the policy contained an unqualified obligation to pay for the defence of covered claims, the insurer was required to pay all reasonable costs associated with defending the malicious prosecution claim, even if those costs also assisted in defending uncovered claims.

Following a successful appeal that allowed the plaintiff's claim to proceed to trial, the parties agreed on costs of $44,000 but disputed the timing of payment.

The plaintiff, an impecunious litigant represented on a pro bono basis, sought costs payable forthwith.

The defendant argued costs should be in the cause or paid into court as security.

The Court of Appeal ordered the costs to be paid forthwith, noting that the appeal costs were stand-alone and that ordering costs payable forthwith assists impecunious litigants and encourages lawyers to accept pro bono retainers.

The appellant was wrongfully charged with second-degree murder based on an autopsy performed by the respondent pathologist.

After the charges were withdrawn, the appellant sued the respondent for negligent investigation and misfeasance in public office.

The respondent successfully moved at the Divisional Court to strike the claims based on absolute witness immunity.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the claims related to the respondent's role as a public official investigating a suspicious death under the Coroners Act, not merely his testimony.

The Court found that the scope of witness immunity in this context is unsettled law and must be determined at trial on a full factual record.

Following the release of reasons disposing of the appeals regarding an Indigenous land claim, the Court of Appeal determined the costs of the proceedings.

The court ordered the appellant to pay 50% of the federal and provincial crowns' costs of the appeals on a party and party basis, noting the federal crown's unsuccessful arguments regarding the validity of the land surrender.

The class representatives, including the railway company, were awarded 100% of their costs for both the summary judgment motions and the appeals on a party and party basis.

The court directed that all costs be assessed rather than fixed.

An Indigenous band appealed from a summary judgment disposition concerning reserve lands sold in the 19th century without a lawful formal surrender.

The Court of Appeal held that there had been no surrender and that the claim was not barred by statutory limitation periods, but concluded that declaratory and possessory relief should nevertheless be refused.

The court applied public law discretion and equitable doctrines, emphasizing the band's historical acquiescence, the extraordinary delay in asserting the land claim, and the reliance of innocent third-party landowners who had held and developed the properties for generations.

The band was left to pursue its damages claims against the Crown.