David I. Crocker

The appellant, a commercial truck driver, appealed his conviction under the Highway Traffic Act for operating a truck with a speed limiter set above the mandated 105 km/h.

He argued the speed limiter requirement violated his right to security of the person under section 7 of the Charter by preventing him from accelerating to avoid collisions.

The Court of Appeal held that while the legislation infringed section 7 by being overbroad in rare situations where acceleration is necessary to avoid accidents, the infringement was demonstrably justified under section 1 of the Charter as a reasonable limit to improve highway safety and reduce greenhouse gas emissions.

The appeal was dismissed.

The respondent was charged with driving a commercial vehicle not equipped with a working speed limiting system contrary to section 68.1(1) of the Highway Traffic Act of Ontario.

At trial, the respondent challenged the constitutionality of the legislation, arguing it infringed his right to security of the person under section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms by preventing him from accelerating to avoid dangerous driving situations.

The trial justice found in favour of the respondent and struck down the provision.

The Crown appealed.

The appellate court allowed the appeal, finding that the respondent failed to establish on a balance of probabilities that the speed limiter legislation deprived him of security of the person, and that the legislation was not arbitrary.

The court also addressed the procedural issue of continuing the appeal following the respondent's death, substituting his widow as respondent in the interests of justice.

The applicants, commercial motor vehicle operators, sought a mandatory injunction or stay of the Registrar of Motor Vehicles' decision to downgrade their safety ratings from 'Satisfactory' to 'Conditional'.

The applicants argued the Registrar erred by using a kilometric measure and by attributing the same rating to an associated company.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding no serious issue to be tried as the Registrar acted within his statutory authority and did not breach procedural fairness.

The court also held that the balance of convenience favoured the public interest in highway safety over the applicants' pecuniary interests.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Ontario Energy Board approving the respondent's application to construct electricity transmission lines for a wind energy project and approving the forms of land agreements offered to affected landowners.

The appellant argued the independent legal advice clauses in the agreements were misleading and the Board failed to provide adequate reasons.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the approval of the form of agreement was a discretionary decision that did not raise a question of law or jurisdiction.

Furthermore, the Board's decision was reasonable and its reasons were adequate.

An appeal of a conviction under section 25(2)(a) of the Occupational Health and Safety Act arising from a workplace injury where a temporary employee's foot was crushed under a moving refuse truck wheel, resulting in amputation.

The trial judge convicted the employer of failing to provide adequate information, instruction, and supervision.

The appellate court found the trial judge erred by conflating the actus reus analysis with the due diligence defence, failing to properly evaluate whether the Crown proved the prohibited act beyond a reasonable doubt, and misapplying the law regarding delegation of supervisory responsibilities.

The court ordered a new trial.

The respondents were acquitted of operating a commercial motor vehicle in a dangerous or unsafe condition under s. 84(1) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The Crown appealed, arguing that a regulation defining 'critical defects' for the purpose of vehicle impoundment under s. 82.1 should also apply to the offence provision in s. 84(1.1).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the regulation explicitly applies only to s. 82.1 and that the legislature intended a higher threshold of danger for a conviction under s. 84(1.1) than for an impoundment under s. 82.1.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Environmental Review Tribunal granting several respondents leave to appeal the Ministry of the Environment's issuance of Certificates of Approval for the use of alternative fuels, including tires, at a cement plant.

The Divisional Court held that the Tribunal's decision to grant leave was reasonable.

The Tribunal correctly interpreted the test for leave under s. 41 of the Environmental Bill of Rights as requiring a standard of proof lower than a balance of probabilities.

Furthermore, it was reasonable for the Tribunal to conclude that the Ministry Directors should have considered the Statement of Environmental Values, common law rights, and environmental consistency, and that the project could result in significant harm to the environment.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The applicants sought judicial review of the Minister of the Environment's approval of Terms of Reference for an environmental assessment regarding a proposed landfill expansion.

The core issue was the interpretation of section 6.1(3) of the Environmental Assessment Act, specifically whether the phrase 'other than' meant 'in addition to' or 'different from' the standard requirements.

The Divisional Court held that 'other than' means 'in addition to', requiring the proponent to fulfill the comprehensive environmental assessment requirements listed in section 6.1(2).

The Minister's decision approving the Terms of Reference was quashed.