Tracy A. Pratt

The plaintiff staked unpatented mining claims on Crown land where the Ministry of Transportation (MTO) planned to build a realigned highway.

The plaintiff subsequently applied for aggregate permits, which were delayed and limited due to the highway construction.

The plaintiff brought an action claiming the MTO expropriated the property and sought compensation for the lost aggregate value.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the action, finding that an unpatented mining claim is not 'land' under the Expropriations Act.

The court further held that even if it were land, the claims had no value because the plaintiff could not have obtained an aggregate permit for the entire property, and the property was not wrongfully downzoned.

The defendant was charged with two counts under the Niagara Parks Act, Regulation 829: disturbing other persons and using abusive or insulting language that unnecessarily interfered with the use and enjoyment of the park.

The charges arose from the defendant's conduct at Grand View Plaza in Niagara Falls on August 2, 2016, where he displayed a sign with profane political commentary and engaged in loud, aggressive, and profane interactions with park visitors and police officers.

The defendant raised a Charter s.2(b) freedom of expression defense and sought to stay the charges based on a prior Superior Court decision.

The court dismissed the first count as lacking statutory foundation but convicted on the second count, finding that the defendant's conduct constituted abusive and insulting language that unnecessarily interfered with park visitors' enjoyment and caused an overtly manifested disturbance.

Following execution of an ex parte Anton Piller order authorizing the seizure of computer hardware and smartphones, the parties disputed the method for returning the seized computers to the respondent.

The applicants alleged the devices contained confidential customer lists and email addresses that had been misappropriated.

They proposed removing the existing hard drives and installing new drives containing only non-confidential information copied by a forensic expert.

The respondent objected to replacing the hard drive on one computer containing business records and applications.

The court approved the applicants’ proposed deletion and hard-drive replacement process, subject to safeguards requiring forensic expert involvement, a report to the court, and restoration of operating systems and applications, and ordered return of the devices by a specified date.

The appellants achieved modest success on their appeal, successfully striking down a ban on signs under s. 2(b) of the Charter and certain prohibitions in a municipal by-law.

However, the respondent municipality was substantially successful overall.

The Court of Appeal awarded the respondent reduced costs of the appeal fixed at $25,000.

The court declined to interfere with the lower court's costs award of $350,000 for the injunction motion and by-law application, finding it fair and reasonable.

The appellants, representing the Haudenosaunee Development Institute, challenged two municipal by-laws passed by the City of Brantford to prohibit unauthorized interference with development and the imposition of unauthorized fees.

The appellants argued the by-laws were passed in bad faith, violated the open meeting requirements of the Municipal Act, 2001, infringed sections 2(b) and 15 of the Charter, and were ultra vires the province under section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867.

The Court of Appeal dismissed most of the appeal, finding the by-laws were validly passed and did not target the Haudenosaunee.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part, striking the words 'invite', 'request', and 'sign' from the by-laws as they unjustifiably limited freedom of expression under section 2(b) of the Charter.

The plaintiffs, indigenous Mayan Q'eqchi' from Guatemala, sued a Canadian mining company and its subsidiaries for human rights abuses allegedly committed by security personnel at a mining project in Guatemala.

The defendants brought motions to strike the claims for disclosing no reasonable cause of action, arguing that a parent company does not owe a duty of care for the actions of its foreign subsidiary.

The court dismissed the motions, finding that it was not plain and obvious that the negligence claims would fail, as the plaintiffs pleaded facts that could establish a novel duty of care.

The court also dismissed a motion to strike one of the actions as statute-barred, finding that the claim was based on sexual assault and fell within the exception in section 10 of the Limitations Act.

The applicant municipality successfully obtained an interlocutory injunction to prevent the respondents from blockading various development sites and successfully defended a motion to quash its by-laws.

The applicant subsequently sought its costs of the proceedings.

The respondents argued they were public interest litigants and that costs should be in the cause or paid by the province.

The court rejected these arguments, finding the respondents' unlawful conduct necessitated the litigation and they were not acting in the public interest.

The court awarded the applicant costs fixed at $350,000, significantly reducing the $887,000 claimed due to duplication, excessive time, and the exclusion of costs for a court-ordered consultation process.

Following a family law trial, the court addressed the issue of costs.

The unsuccessful party advanced an unreasonable theory at trial, requiring the opposing party to expend significant effort to establish entitlement to support and property division.

Although the successful party did not obtain the full quantum sought, the court found the litigation efforts necessary, including expert evidence relating to income.

Applying proportionality and the general principle that the successful party is presumptively entitled to costs, the court fixed costs in favour of the successful party.

The appellant mining company appealed an interim injunction that halted its exploration activities and required consultation with the respondent First Nation.

Prior to the appeal, the Mining Amendment Act, 2009 came into force, establishing a new legislative regime for exploration plans and permits involving Aboriginal interests.

The Divisional Court declined to hear the appeal, finding it moot because the rights and obligations of the parties now rested on the new statutory foundation, rendering the propriety of the original injunction an academic exercise.

The parties separated after a lengthy marriage.

The husband worked in an unregistered firewood business with his father and lived rent-free in a home titled to his parents.

The court found the husband's income was $100,000, accounting for unreported cash and personal benefits.

The court also found the husband had a 50% partnership interest in the business and a $100,000 beneficial interest in the home via constructive trust, both of which were included in his net family property.

The wife was awarded an equalization payment of $285,862.24, ongoing spousal support, and child support for their daughter's post-secondary education.

Following the granting of an interim injunction restraining individuals from interfering with development activities on privately owned land, the court determined costs of the application.

The responding parties argued that costs should not be awarded because the litigation raised public interest issues relating to Indigenous title and burial grounds.

The court rejected this characterization, finding the respondents engaged in trespass and intimidation rather than advancing their claims through lawful court processes.

Applying the proportionality principles under Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the guidance in Boucher v. Public Accountants Council for the Province of Ontario, the court fixed partial indemnity costs.

Costs of $12,500 were awarded to the applicants as fair and reasonable in the circumstances.

The moving party, a mining exploration company, sought leave to appeal an interlocutory injunction that restrained it from engaging in mineral exploration activities on lands subject to asserted treaty and Aboriginal rights of the responding First Nation.

The motion judge had granted the injunction based on the Crown's failure to consult and accommodate, finding that the operational aspects of the duty to consult had been delegated to the mining company.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal, finding good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's decision that the company had a delegated duty to consult and that an injunction could be issued against a third party based on the Crown's failure to consult.

Following a motion for leave to appeal, the court received written submissions on the reserved issue of costs.

The moving parties argued for a no-costs order, while the responding party sought its costs.

The court found that the responding party was entitled to its costs on a partial indemnity scale, noting that the moving parties had a full hearing on constitutional issues and did not disclose their funding arrangements to support a no-costs order.

Costs were fixed at $28,000 all-inclusive.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination on the basis of race, place of origin, ethnic origin, disability, and reprisal against Legal Aid Ontario and two of its employees.

The respondents requested a summary hearing to dismiss the application for having no reasonable prospect of success.

The applicant alleged that the respondents improperly denied her a second legal aid certificate to appeal her criminal conviction, 'doctored' her legal aid file, and conspired with her former lawyer and the Crown.

The Tribunal found that the applicant provided only bald allegations without any evidence linking the respondents' actions to a prohibited ground of discrimination.

The application was dismissed as having no reasonable prospect of success.

The corporate respondent requested the removal of the personal respondent, Angela Longo, from the human rights proceedings following her death.

The Tribunal applied the Persaud factors and determined that there was no longer a compelling reason to keep her estate as a party.

The corporate respondent would be vicariously liable for her actions and had the capacity to provide any remedy, while potential remedies against the personal respondent, such as training, were no longer applicable.

The request was granted and the personal respondent was removed.

The applicant filed a human rights complaint against Legal Aid Ontario and two personal respondents, alleging discriminatory treatment in an investigation and historical differential treatment dating back to 1993.

The Tribunal dismissed the historical allegations under section 34(1) of the Human Rights Code, finding they were out of time, did not constitute a series of incidents, and the delay was not incurred in good faith.

The Tribunal declined to remove the personal respondents from the proceedings, as their conduct was central to the allegations of racism and racial profiling.

The applicant, a legal aid clinic, filed a human rights complaint alleging that Legal Aid Ontario (LAO) discriminated against it on the basis of race in the manner it conducted an investigation into alleged financial irregularities.

The respondents sought to dismiss the application at the outset, arguing that the substance had been dealt with in a prior judicial review application and that LAO's oversight functions are not 'services' under the Human Rights Code.

The Tribunal found that the prior proceedings did not appropriately deal with the substance of the complaint and that LAO's oversight and investigation of clinics do constitute a service within the meaning of the Code.

The Tribunal directed the applicant to provide further particulars regarding historical allegations and the personal respondents.

The appellants were successful on their appeal and sought costs.

The Court of Appeal awarded the appellants costs fixed at $50,000 inclusive of disbursements and GST.

The respondent Frontenac Ventures Corporation was ordered to pay $40,000, and the respondent Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario was ordered to pay $10,000, as its position during the original contempt and sentencing hearings was instrumental in leading to the appeal.

Following a successful appeal of sentences imposed for contempt, the appellants sought costs.

The Court of Appeal awarded the appellants their costs of the appeal fixed at $25,000 inclusive of disbursements and GST.

The respondent corporation was ordered to pay $20,000, and the respondent Minister was ordered to pay $5,000, as the Minister's position during the original contempt and sentencing hearings was instrumental in leading to the appeal.

The appellants, a First Nation and its leaders, engaged in a peaceful protest and blockade to prevent a private mining company from conducting exploratory drilling on lands subject to an ongoing aboriginal land claim.

They were found in civil contempt for violating interim and interlocutory injunctions and were sentenced to six months' imprisonment and substantial fines.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal set aside the custodial and monetary sentences, holding that they were excessively harsh and that the sentencing principles from R. v. Gladue apply to aboriginal persons facing civil contempt proceedings.