7 total
NEB process adequately fulfilled consultation duty; pipeline appeal was dismissed.
This appeal considered whether the Crown’s duty to consult Indigenous peoples can be fulfilled through the National Energy Board process for a pipeline modification.
The Court held that the Board’s approval decision was Crown conduct that engaged the duty to consult, and that the Crown may rely on a regulatory process where statutory powers and process are sufficient.
On the facts, the Court found meaningful participation, assessment of potential impacts, and accommodation conditions imposed on the proponent.
The consultation obligation was met and the appeal was dismissed.
NEB approval failed because deep Inuit treaty-right consultation was not adequately fulfilled.
The Court allowed the appeal and quashed the National Energy Board authorization for offshore seismic testing in Baffin Bay and Davis Strait.
It held that the Board’s approval process triggered the Crown’s duty to consult, and that the Crown may rely on a regulatory process to fulfill consultation obligations where that process is adequate.
On these facts, consultation was inadequate given the significance of Inuit treaty harvesting rights, the potential impacts of testing, limited participation opportunities, and insufficient accommodation.
Métis and non-status Indians fall within Parliament’s s. 91(24) jurisdiction.
On a constitutional appeal, the appellants sought declarations that Métis and non-status Indians fall within Parliament’s jurisdiction under s. 91(24), that the federal Crown owes them a fiduciary duty, and that they have consultation and negotiation rights.
The Court held that Métis and non-status Indians are “Indians” under s. 91(24), restored the broader trial declaration, and rejected restricting Métis status to the Powley framework for this jurisdictional purpose.
The Court found this declaration had practical utility in ending the federal-provincial jurisdictional impasse.
The Court declined the second and third declarations as restatements of settled law lacking practical utility.
Regulatory challenge failed because no evidence rebutted presumed administrative regularity.
In an appeal concerning transportation regulation, the appellant sought to invalidate amending rail interswitching regulations on the basis that the regulator followed improper governmental direction in the rule-making process.
The appellant accepted that the regulator had statutory authority and that a presumption of proper administrative action applied.
The Court held that no evidentiary foundation was provided to rebut that presumption.
The appeal was dismissed with costs to the federal respondent.
Aboriginal land claim summarily dismissed as statute-barred because the causes of action were discoverable decades earlier.
The plaintiffs, claiming to be descendants of the Papaschase Indian Band, brought an action against the Crown for breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and treaty breach relating to the 1889 surrender of their reserve.
The Crown applied for summary dismissal.
The Supreme Court of Canada restored the chambers judge's order dismissing the action, finding that there was no genuine issue for trial because the claims were barred by the Limitation of Actions Act.
The evidence established that the causes of action were discoverable by the plaintiffs in the 1970s, well beyond the limitation period.
Crown breached its duty to consult First Nation before taking up treaty lands for winter road.
The federal government approved the construction of a winter road through Wood Buffalo National Park, which would traverse the traditional hunting and trapping grounds of the Mikisew Cree First Nation.
The Mikisew argued this infringed their rights under Treaty 8.
The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the Crown has a treaty right to 'take up' lands for purposes such as transportation, this right is subject to the honour of the Crown and the duty to consult.
The Court found that the Crown failed to adequately consult the Mikisew before approving the road, thereby breaching its duty.
The appeal was allowed and the Minister's approval was quashed.
Income Tax Act provisions for seizing tax debtor funds do not infringe provincial jurisdiction.
The appellants challenged the constitutionality of sections 224(1.2) and (1.3) of the Income Tax Act, arguing that the provisions for seizing funds owing by a tax debtor and giving priority over provincial security interests infringed on the provincial jurisdiction over property and civil rights.
The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, adopting the reasons of the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal, and held that the provisions were not ultra vires the Parliament of Canada.