André Tremblay

The appellant challenged provisions of Quebec's Charter of the French Language that required the exclusive or joint use of French in commercial signage and business.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the provisions were intra vires the province as they related to commerce within the province.

However, the Court found that freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Canadian Charter and s. 3 of the Quebec Charter includes the freedom to choose one's language of expression.

The requirement for the exclusive use of French was not justified under s. 1 of the Canadian Charter or s. 9.1 of the Quebec Charter, and those provisions were struck down.

The provisions requiring the joint use of French were upheld as reasonable limits.

Constitutional appeal challenging Quebec legislation requiring public signs, commercial advertising, and firm names to appear exclusively in French.

The Court held that freedom of expression under both the Canadian Charter and the Quebec Charter includes expression in the language of one’s choice and extends to commercial expression.

Although Quebec’s objective of protecting the French language was pressing and substantial, the French-only requirement failed proportionality review because marked predominance of French, rather than exclusivity, would have been a less impairing measure.

The Court also held the impugned provisions infringed the Quebec Charter’s guarantee against discrimination based on language, while upholding the formal validity of the override provisions except to the extent of impermissible retrospective operation.

The appellant municipality challenged a Court of Appeal decision annulling a by-law regulating amusement machines and amusement halls.

The Supreme Court held that, apart from severable age-based restrictions, the by-law was a valid regulatory scheme concerning local commerce, zoning, youth protection and local policing, and was neither disguised prohibitory legislation nor impermissibly vague.

The Court further held that the municipality lacked authority to enact discriminatory distinctions based on age absent express or necessarily implied statutory authorization, rendering the provisions excluding persons under eighteen from amusement halls and billiard halls ultra vires.

The constitutional division-of-powers challenge failed because the by-law did not trench on the federal criminal law power.