Cheryl Lynn Milne

Five organizations brought motions for leave to intervene in an appeal concerning the constitutionality of provincial legislation that required the removal of bicycle lanes in Toronto.

The underlying judgment found the legislation violated section 7 of the Charter.

The motion judge granted leave to all five proposed interveners, but limited the scope of their interventions to specific issues such as the positive/negative rights dichotomy, the interpretation of recent section 7 jurisprudence, and the application of equality and child-interest principles to the gross disproportionality analysis.

The interveners were restricted to 10-page factums and brief oral submissions.

Several public interest organizations sought leave to intervene as friends of the court on a motion to strike a constitutional application alleging that federal and provincial housing policies violated sections 7 and 15 of the Charter by failing to ensure adequate housing.

The proposed interveners argued they could provide perspectives relating to poverty, disability, housing policy, international human rights obligations, and constitutional remedies.

The court emphasized that intervention on a Rule 21 motion is exceptional and requires a showing that the intervener will make a useful legal contribution beyond the parties’ submissions without prejudicing the proceeding.

Interventions focused primarily on social context or policy impacts were rejected because the motion concerned a narrow legal question regarding whether the application disclosed a reasonable cause of action.

The court granted limited intervention status to three groups with specific expertise relevant to Charter interpretation, international human rights law, and constitutional remedies, while dismissing the remaining intervention motions.

The Canadian Foundation for Children Youth and the Law brought a motion for leave to intervene as a friend of the court in an appeal involving a young person.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario granted the motion, subject to conditions including that the moving party take the record as it exists, file a factum of no more than 20 pages, and make oral argument of no more than 30 minutes.

The moving party was also permitted to reference the Convention on the Rights of the Child and other international treaties ratified by Canada.

The appellant sought a declaration that s. 43 of the Criminal Code, which justifies the reasonable use of force by way of correction by parents and teachers against children, violates ss. 7, 12, and 15(1) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that s. 43 does not offend the Charter.

The Court found that s. 43 is not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad, does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment, and does not discriminate against children, as it is grounded in their actual needs and circumstances by protecting them from the blunt instrument of the criminal law for minor disciplinary contacts.

The appellant challenged the constitutionality of section 43 of the Criminal Code, which provides a defence for parents and teachers who use reasonable force to correct a child.

The appellant argued that the provision violates sections 7, 12, and 15 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while section 43 engages a child's security of the person, it does not violate the principles of fundamental justice.

The court also held that section 43 does not constitute state-imposed cruel and unusual punishment under section 12, and any infringement of equality rights under section 15 is justified under section 1 of the Charter.