Rachel Ann McMillan

This appeal arose from the dismissal of a class proceeding claiming damages against the Crown for negligence related to the presence of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) in Canada between 2003 and 2008.

The trial judge dismissed the claim, finding it barred by section 9 of the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, and also that no duty of care was owed and no negligence occurred.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, focusing solely on the application of section 9.

It found that various government programs providing financial assistance to cattle farmers in response to the BSE outbreak constituted "compensation" under section 9, thereby barring the negligence claim as it sought double recovery for the same factual basis of loss.

The plaintiff brought a motion seeking a Mareva injunction against May Anis and BNP Advisors Inc., a finding of contempt against May Anis, and a variation of an order to make May Anis and BNP Advisors Inc. solely responsible for the Receiver's fees.

The motion arose from a shareholder and employment dispute where May Anis repeatedly produced forged bank records, lied under oath, and provided false information to the court and an investigative receiver.

The court granted the Mareva injunction, found May Anis in contempt due to her egregious and repetitive dishonest conduct, and ordered her and BNP Advisors Inc. to bear all Receiver's fees.

The plaintiff was awarded costs of the motion.

The appellants appealed a certification order for a class action arising from an infection control lapse at an endoscopy clinic.

The plaintiff sought compensation for the enhanced risk of infection and the psychological trauma of receiving a public health notification, despite testing negative for any blood-borne diseases.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal and set aside the certification order, finding that a claim for damages based solely on an increased risk of harm, without actual injury, is not a legally viable cause of action.

The plaintiff sought to certify a class action against an endoscopy clinic and its operator following a public health notice regarding infection control lapses.

The notice advised former patients to be tested for blood-borne diseases.

The plaintiff, who tested negative, sought compensation for exposure to enhanced risk of infection, shock, trauma, and inconvenience.

The court found that the claims raised genuine common issues, including duty of care, standard of care, and foreseeability of harm.

The court also determined that a class proceeding was the preferable procedure for resolving the claims of the 6,800 affected individuals.

The certification motion was granted.

The plaintiff brought a class action on behalf of Canadian cattle farmers against the Government of Canada, alleging negligence in its response to the threat of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE), commonly known as 'mad cow disease'.

The plaintiff claimed that Canada failed to implement a ruminant-to-ruminant feed ban in a timely manner and failed to prevent cattle imported from the United Kingdom from entering the animal feed chain, which led to the discovery of a BSE-infected Canadian cow in May 2003 and the subsequent closure of international borders to Canadian cattle and beef.

The court dismissed the action, finding that the claim was barred by section 9 of the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act because the class members had received compensation through various government financial assistance programs.

Furthermore, the court held that Canada did not owe a private law duty of care to the cattle farmers and that its policy decisions regarding the monitoring of imported cattle and the timing of the feed ban were reasonable and did not breach the standard of care.

During a class action trial regarding the federal government's alleged negligence in preventing mad cow disease, the defendant sought to read into evidence discovery transcripts from the current representative plaintiff, the deceased former representative plaintiff, and other class members.

The court denied the request to read in the current representative plaintiff's evidence, applying the rule in Browne v. Dunn, as the plaintiff had already testified and the evidence did not merely fill a gap.

The court also denied leave to read in the deceased former plaintiff's evidence under Rule 31.11(6) and (7), finding the excerpts to be of limited importance and lacking cross-examination.

However, the court permitted the defendant to read in discovery evidence from other class members, as it provided helpful real-world insight into the financial impact on different cattle producers.

During a common issues trial regarding the federal government's alleged negligence in preventing the spread of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (mad cow disease), the plaintiff sought to admit eight foreign public records for the truth of their contents.

The defendant argued the documents should only be admitted to show the government's knowledge of them.

The court held that the documents, which included reports from the World Health Organization and the European Commission, met the criteria for the public documents exception under s. 25 of the Ontario Evidence Act and were admissible for the truth of their contents, though the court reserved judgment on the weight to be given to them.

During a common issues trial concerning the impact of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) on Canadian farmers, the plaintiff sought to admit the affidavit and cross-examination transcript of a deceased witness, Mr. Mel McCrea.

The defendant, the Attorney General of Canada, objected on the basis of necessity, arguing that other witnesses could provide similar information.

The court applied the principled exception to the hearsay rule, finding that Mr. McCrea's evidence met both the necessity and reliability thresholds.

The court emphasized the unique nature of Mr. McCrea's first-hand account regarding the first Canadian-born BSE-diagnosed cow and the prior cross-examination, ruling the evidence admissible.

This ruling addresses the admissibility of the plaintiff's expert reports as evidence-in-chief in a complex common issues trial concerning the Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) outbreak.

The defendant objected to the hybrid trial process, arguing that expert evidence should be presented viva voce rather than through reports.

The court dismissed the defendant's objection, affirming the trial judge's discretion to admit expert reports as direct evidence in non-jury hybrid trials, consistent with prior case management orders.

The decision emphasized that this approach enhances trial efficiency and does not prejudice the opposing party's right to cross-examination.

This ruling addresses a hearsay objection raised by the defendant during a common issues trial concerning the 2003 Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) outbreak.

The defendant sought to strike out several paragraphs from the affidavit of Lawrence Sears, the plaintiff's principal, arguing they contained inadmissible hearsay.

The court dismissed the objection, finding that the statements in the affidavit were based on Mr. Sears' personal knowledge, experience, and observations, and thus were not hearsay.

The judge emphasized that the evidence could be tested through cross-examination.

The parties in a class action jointly sought an adjournment of the trial commencement to allow time to finalize settlement discussions.

The court granted the adjournment, moving the trial start date from February 1, 2021, to February 16, 2021, noting that no further adjournments would be granted.

The defendants in a 15-year-old class action regarding the federal government's response to the mad cow disease crisis brought a motion to adjourn the peremptory trial date of January 18, 2021, to September 2021.

They cited difficulties preparing due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the late delivery of supplementary expert reports by the plaintiff.

The court dismissed the motion for a lengthy adjournment, finding that the parties were well-resourced to conduct a virtual trial and that the late expert reports were responsive to the defendants' own late productions.

The trial commencement was postponed by two weeks to February 1, 2021, to allow for the completion of remaining pre-trial steps.