Stewart Edward Phillips

The court awarded full indemnity costs against the plaintiffs after dismissing their claims, which were found to be statute-barred, subject to res judicata and issue estoppel, abuses of process, and collateral attacks.

The claims were deemed devoid of merit and repetitive of earlier unsuccessful actions.

The court emphasized that the claims should never have been brought, especially for a third time, and that the plaintiffs' conduct, including unsubstantiated allegations, delaying tactics, and unrealistic settlement offers, warranted the highest scale of costs.

The plaintiffs brought negligence actions following a fatal nighttime boating accident where a pleasure craft struck a breakwater, resulting in three deaths and two serious injuries.

The plaintiffs sued the estates of the vessel's operator and owner, as well as the federal, provincial, and municipal governments.

On summary judgment motions for liability, the court found the operator and the owner/master jointly and severally liable, apportioning fault equally at 50 percent each, due to their failure to keep a proper lookout, travelling at an unsafe speed, and the operator's impairment.

The actions against the government defendants were dismissed, as the court found that the existing navigation lights were visible and any alleged failures regarding the breakwater's illumination or background lighting did not cause or contribute to the collision.

The plaintiff brought a class action on behalf of Canadian cattle farmers against the Government of Canada, alleging negligence in its response to the threat of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE), commonly known as 'mad cow disease'.

The plaintiff claimed that Canada failed to implement a ruminant-to-ruminant feed ban in a timely manner and failed to prevent cattle imported from the United Kingdom from entering the animal feed chain, which led to the discovery of a BSE-infected Canadian cow in May 2003 and the subsequent closure of international borders to Canadian cattle and beef.

The court dismissed the action, finding that the claim was barred by section 9 of the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act because the class members had received compensation through various government financial assistance programs.

Furthermore, the court held that Canada did not owe a private law duty of care to the cattle farmers and that its policy decisions regarding the monitoring of imported cattle and the timing of the feed ban were reasonable and did not breach the standard of care.

The appellant appealed the Superior Court's dismissal of his habeas corpus application challenging the revocation of his day parole by the Parole Board of Canada.

The appellant had been released on day parole in April 2016 after serving a sentence for robbery and firearm offences, but his parole was revoked in April 2017 on the basis that he presented an undue risk to society.

The appellant contended he was detained during a parole disciplinary meeting without being informed of his right to counsel, contrary to section 10 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as moot because the appellant had been released on statutory release while the appeal was pending.

The court also set aside the costs order, finding that the habeas corpus application challenging parole revocation was criminal in nature rather than civil, and therefore costs could not be awarded.

The appellant, a former flight attendant employed by Canadian Airlines International Ltd. before its merger with Air Canada in 2000, appealed the dismissal of his application for recognition of seniority by date of hire as a protected right under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The appellant challenged the seniority integration decision made through arbitration and confirmed by the Canada Industrial Relations Board, which integrated seniority on the basis of relative position on seniority lists rather than date of hire.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's decision, finding no infringement of the appellant's Charter rights under sections 7 and 15, and dismissed the appeal.

Following the dismissal of the applicant's habeas corpus application, the respondent Attorney General sought costs of $15,951.78.

The court noted that while costs can be awarded in habeas corpus applications relating to the administration of a lawful sentence, they must not become a roadblock to accessing the writ.

Given that the application required additional work due to the applicant's request for an adjournment to file further materials, the court fixed costs at $6,000 all inclusive.

Mr. Samuel sought habeas corpus with certiorari in aid, alleging a Charter s. 10 violation when his day parole was suspended and he was detained without being advised of his rights or given counsel.

The Attorney General of Canada challenged the Superior Court's jurisdiction, arguing that the Corrections and Conditional Release Act (CCRA) provides a complete, comprehensive, and expert procedure for parole review, including judicial review by the Federal Court.

The court, bound by prior Ontario Court of Appeal decisions, found that the CCRA scheme, including Federal Court judicial review, constitutes such a procedure, falling within the exception articulated in May v. Ferndale Institution.

Consequently, the court exercised its discretion to decline habeas corpus jurisdiction, dismissing the application.

The applicant, a former flight attendant, challenged the loss of nine years of seniority resulting from an arbitration award that integrated seniority lists following the merger of Air Canada and Canadian Airlines.

He argued that the devaluation of his seniority violated his rights to liberty and security of the person under section 7 of the Charter, and his equality rights under section 15.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, holding that seniority is a product of collective bargaining and does not engage the liberty or security interests protected by section 7.

Furthermore, the court found no violation of section 15, as seniority ranking is not an enumerated or analogous ground of discrimination.

The moving party sought leave to appeal an order of the Divisional Court that dismissed her appeal under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Divisional Court had dismissed the appeal because the amount claimed exceeded $50,000, placing it outside its jurisdiction under section 19(1.2) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The Court of Appeal agreed that the Divisional Court lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the motion for leave to appeal under Rule 2.1 as devoid of merit.